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Although the philosophical underpinnings of the 
legal/political systems of England and the United States had 
a common origin, this changed when the opportunity to create 
a new system presented itself to the United States. Among 
the departures from the English system were the protections 
granted to the people of the United States in matters that 
pertained to government actions against the people. One 
significant area concerns the right of the accused to remain 
silent and not have to speak in his own defense, nor be 
required by law to provide any incriminating statement. The 
research examines the main protections granted under each 
political system, as well as the political institutions that 
shape such protections. While the English system sets the 
standard regarding confessions and the right to silence, 
these protections are weakened because of the manner in 
which these guarantees can be changed or eliminated by a 
single action of Parliament. In contrast, altering similar 
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protections in the United States is far more difficult as it 
entails long debates and support by a bicameral Congress and 
final approval by three-fourths of the states. Additional 
protection is provided through the role of the United States 
Supreme Court, best illustrated by the Miranda Rule which 
had a significant impact on the decrease of confession 
rates, and through a written Bill of Rights. 
It is this twofold combination of a written Bill of 
Rights and the difficult process required for altering 
constitutional protections that gives the American system 
its advantage. Ultimately, both systems depend on citizens 
who internalize the relevant political values for guarantees 
that the protections provided by the right to silence will 
survive. 
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All Rights Reserved 
Said the cop as he viewed with contrition 
the defendant's bloody condition 
"For the case that's not sure 
there is really no cure 
like a solid, substantial admission." 
Uviller 
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Statement of Problem 
This research is designed to determine if a suspect's 
rights during interrogation are better protected under 
United States' law or English law. 
If an individual is going to be questioned by the power 
of the State, is he better protected in the United States 
with its Bill of Rights and Miranda Warning vis-a-vis the 
same individual in England? For further consideration, what 
is the impact of a separation of powers in the United States 
where the United States Supreme Court has judicial review 
over laws generated by the Congress, as opposed to the 
system in England where Parliament both makes law and is the 
final arbiter of the law? 
How the people are affected under each of the two 
political systems by their "rights" or "guarantees" will be 
of paramount concern. The viewpoint of the population is an 
expression of its position within the society and is an 
integral part of the political culture. The legal aspect of 
this culture is the manner in which the laws and the courts 
deport themselves. The population has an expectation that 
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the courts be independent of the government and dispense 
justice on an impartial basis, for without this 
consideration, they cannot provide adequate protection for 
the individual in competition with the disproportionate 
power of the state. This protection emanates from the 
method by which the organized principles of the state are 
integrated into the legal system. 
The legal systems of both countries share one important 
aspect of their respective legal proceedings. This 
perspective is the acceptance of case law or stare decisis 
(let the decision stand), whereby past judicial rulings of 
law are used as the basis for future judicial renderings. 
The continent of Europe, being easily accessible, had many 
impacting legal systems throughout its history. England, by 
virtue of the English Channel, was somewhat protected from 
numerous invasions of a military or other type. The United 
States, also separated from the rest of the western world by 
two oceans, was afforded a similar luxury of being allowed 
to develop a legal system as a normal outgrowth of its 
nation building era. 
There are various terms and concepts which will be 
forthcoming, and it is paramount that an understanding of 
each be made to ensure proper perspective and direction. As 
"torture" is encountered in the research, it becomes clear 
that this is the beginning in defining the paradigm for the 
elimination of pain in the process of truth finding. At 
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various times the phrases "right to silence" and "suspect's 
rights" both allude only to those rights under discussion in 
this research. The one additional right mentioned, although 
not the focus of the research, is the right to counsel. 
This inclusion is necessary to avoid confusion in later 
discussion in the research of the Miranda rule. 
What this research will not attempt to do is to chart 
those additional "rights" of suspects in the various other 
phases of criminal proceedings. However, this research is 
fundamental to those who might later seek to examine these 
various other rights and thereby serves as an excellent 
starting point for their endeavors. 
Under each system, United States' and English law, 
comparisons of various points must be made in order to 
clarify the boundaries of protection each system accords its 
subjects. Is the right to remain silent absolute? Can an 
individual who is protected by the right to remain silent be 
compelled to give testimony against himself? And, if he 
refuses, as should be his protected right, does he put 
himself at risk? Protections granted to citizens can be 
altered over time through methods allowed by law under most 
systems or extra-legal when the law within the system is so 
perverted, fostering the political ends of those in power, 
as to be lawfully meaningless. Even though there are 
protections for the citizens in the law, these protections 
can be enhanced or eroded through the legal process itself. 
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The citizens of the United States, with their written 
Constitution, have witnessed the enhancement of their 
protections concerning freedom of speech. However, there is 
the example of the legal system being perverted as was the 
case in Germany during the Hitler era. In the German 
example the legal system fostered the political goals of the 
Nazi party, thereby rendering the protections provided by 
the law to the people to be meaningless. However, we will 
concern ourselves only with those political actions which 
would be considered lawful in the normal context of the 
particular problem. How the legal systems of the United 
States and England change their legal philosophical 
viewpoint must be taken into consideration, because a system 
that can drastically provide for, or eliminate from, its 
source legal underpinnings, i.e. a written constitution, 
fundamental grants might perhaps provide, in reality, no 
protection to its citizens. This legal philosophical 
viewpoint is predicated by political ideology being 
translated into political gains by one party or the other. 
If conservative political positions gain sufficient control 
in the United States' government, this can now be used to 
change the legal philosophical viewpoint of the United 
States Supreme Court. This process is a slow one because 
the attrition rate on this judicial bench itself is slow. 
This change of legal philosophical viewpoint can take 
several years to accomplish. However, this identical type 
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of legal philosophy in England can be changed much more 
quickly -- in a matter of weeks -- owing to the political 
structure there which can call for general elections in six 
weeks' time. The resultant possible change in Parliament 
also directly affects the laws because Parliament is supreme 
in all legal matters. The conclusion of this research will 
address this very problem in great detail in order to firmly 
place in proper perspective those rights allocated and the 
strength of the rights prevailing under conditions which may 
call for their demise in those political circumstances less 
committed to the welfare of its subjects. 
The court systems themselves, of each country, vary in 
their assigned roles. Courts are traditionally the arbiters 
of the law and its applications. Although the courts are 
part of the government itself, the courts should be viewed 
as independent entities. Situations can arise wherein the 
courts themselves, through their decision-making power, can 
create law. The research will address the separate court 
systems on more than one occasion thus underscoring the 
important roles these courts play within each political 
system. 
A comparison of law from a political viewpoint between 
similar countries would be a formidable undertaking. 
However, if we break it down and begin to compare small yet 
significant segments, the problem becomes more manageable. 
This research will address one small, significant area of 
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law and will attempt to determine if the efficacy of such 
law is better served by a written foundation in the 
Constitution of that country or by a steady evolution 
through social outlook, legal expediency or method of 
assigning supreme jurisdiction. Although both legal systems 
will evolve over time with resultant political/sociological 
swings of conservative or liberal goals, does one system 
(United States vis-a-vis England) provide for better 
sustained citizen protections while such evolution is taking 
place? 
How important is a written Bill of Rights to the 
personal security of an individual? In the larger political 
dynamics of each civilization what determined the well-being 
of the individual vis-a-vis the political control exercised 
over him? When measured against the awesome power of the 
state, the individual seems indeed small and frail. Can a 
written Bill of Rights adequately protect that individual's 
right to silence, or is it superfluous given the current 
orientation of "enlightened political thought" and 
evolutionary "Christian charity" towards the needy -- 
political or otherwise? 
It is accepted practice among many of the western 
cultures to extend basic rights to people by their 
governments. No-one today would endorse methods of treating 
the population as characterized by the Nazi regime of World 
War II Germany. Many cultures and governments today 
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consider themselves "enlightened," thereby eschewing those 
practices as physically and psychologically damaging to 
those within the control of the police powers. This is, in 
many cases, a thought; a goal; a fundamental right accepted 
through discussion and put into practice. But where does it 
live? If not in a written code, how fundamental, how 
protective can it be realistically considered? Christian 
charity is well-meaning. A written constitution may be more 
reassuring ! 
This research is significant in that the fundamental 
rights of the citizen must be safe-guarded by the governing 
political system. This allows for the orderly transition of 
power between political parties and lessens the temptation 
to wreak vengeance on political foes. With such guarantees 
in place, this practice demonstrates to the global political 
community its commitment to serve its people in an orderly 
and equal fashion. This then helps promote stability and as 
a result creates a favorable climate for business and trade. 
This comparison of legal-political systems between the 
United States and England allows for possible future 
adoption in system selection for newly emerging republics to 
examine what effects upon the individual may be realized by 
either inclusion or rejection of written constitutional 
guarantees and the method for adding or deleting initial 
guarantees as future requirements are altered. 
8 
This reliance on a political science perspective 
defining "who gets what and how," has deep roots in the 
formation of legal decision-making policies. Political 
scientists are now showing a greater interest in police 
actions, judges and courts and the various penal 
institutions. Political scientists are also scrutinizing 
the decisions of the Supreme Court in the United States, the 
make-up of which is an ideological reflection of the 
political powers in place at the time of nomination of each 
Supreme Court judge. It appears that the various fields of 
the broader political science spectrum, namely public policy 
dynamics and public administration, are all inputting the 
criminal justice system at all stages. If we consider the 
make-up of the Supreme Court to be either too conservative 
or too liberal then, if change in ideological viewpoint is 
desired, political action across the elected officials' 
spectrum is needed. If the conservative Court (political 
conservative here being the equivalent of conservative 
judicial opinions rendered) needs to be changed, then 
political scientists will see this change occur in the 
electoral process, gaining governors, legislators, even the 
White House to help select and confirm those appointees to 
the Court who reflect the desired ideological shift. It is 
proper that political scientists concern themselves with how 
laws are made within the context of public opinion, relative 
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strength of the political parties and the fringe minority 
groups. 
This research will start with the individual's situation 
before it was recognized that he had any "rights" to silence 
at all. This root beginning will better enable us to chart 
the events that have led us to present-day guarantees of 
secured rights. Progressive case histories between the 
countries will be paired in those instances where direct 
comparison can be made. In other cases, where there is not 
a clear comparison addressing those peculiar points of law 
and their exceptions, inferences will be drawn and 
subjectively evaluated. This progression through the courts 
of both countries will reveal the political/legal reasoning 
helping to advance or retard that legal concept under 
courts' scrutiny at the time. As this is original research, 
the use of archival analysis allows for future researchers 
in this area to follow the path here taken and to add their 
own data and findings as appropriate to their task. 
Newly emerging countries struggling to formulate a 
stable governmental policy amidst their own internal 
conflicting groups may view either or both the United 
States' and English systems because of their inherent and 
historical political stability. The United States and 
England can provide a wealth of political knowledge not only 
on the practical level, but also on the theoretical 
approaches that are the underlying foundation for both the 
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United States' and English systems. Each system provides 
alternative viewpoints and options and careful study of each 
can provide insight to the successes or failures each has 
experienced. 
How each new emerging nation addresses the various 
competing and conflicting groups within its borders, in its 
desire to provide a balance between an individual's rights 
and those of society/government, will find a rich harvest as 
the United States' and English systems are examined. It is 
this framework of future political doubt that this research 
is designed to dispel. We have, on the one hand, the United 
States with its written, fundamental, legal position set out 
in its Constitution, and on the other hand, the English 
constitution which is not fundamental in nature but, rather, 
a mixture of tradition, ordinary statutes and political 
practices. 
In the United States, the Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land. In England, Parliament and its laws are 
supreme. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 once and for all 
established the absolute supremacy of Parliament over the 
monarchy. This brings us to the position that, if 
Parliament is supreme and Parliament creates the laws, the 
only arbiter of judicial review is Parliament itself. How 
does this affect an individual's rights? Or does it? 
Judicial review in the United States is accomplished by 
the Supreme Court interpreting the written Constitution 
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which is supreme. However, though the words may be written, 
with the Supreme Court as the interpreter and with the 
United States Supreme Court selected by political processes, 
this interpretation can also be altered theoretically. As 
the ideological shift within the Supreme Court takes place, 
this shift can be reflected in the Court's decisions, either 
favoring or limiting the rights so delineated in the 
Constitution. 
An analysis of the evolution of each system is therefore 
compelling. This analysis must be viewed from a historical 
perspective in order to develop fully the underlying reasons 
as to why each system (United States and England) has 
evolved differently, though from common roots. 
Looking within the application of the law one must 
therefore utilize legal cases and studies as a natural 
progression of the political science viewpoint. The law is 
the natural child of politics. The case is made that if we 
wish to determine the benefits of apples and oranges, we 
should address the bulk of our research to the beneficial 
effects of each fruit upon the individual rather than 
examine, more than in a cursory fashion, the trees 
themselves. It is the final product that rests most heavily 
upon the individual. "How" it arrived on his shoulders is 
secondary to "what" has arrived. 
To properly illustrate the origins of the "right to 
silence" we must trace its roots back through time to those 
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civilizations less enlightened in comparison to today's 
viewpoint. The progress of all civilizations that have 
survived depicts the willingness of that civilization to 
experiment with, keep, or discard its various chapters of a 
social contract. Brutality within a brutal time of history 
goes unnoticed. The ancient conquerors slaughtered 
thousands in entire regions when they were victorious. 
Within this context the torture of a single individual gets 
lost among the piles of corpses. Nevertheless, we must move 
from the "thousands" to the singular for our purposes. 
The very word "torture" conjures up various images of 
pain producing events. Depiction of individuals in pain is 
vividly displayed in movies of the genre. Most people 
flinch when they imagine themselves trying to have the 
efforts of torture directed to them by others. Is it 
abhorrence of torture that prompted the protection of 
suspects under the control of the government? How did 
torture find its way into criminal proceedings? Where did 
it come from, how was it ended? This must be the beginning 
of the research for the abolition of torture, and the 
sanctity of the individual is the purpose of such 
legislation to abandon and to condemn its use. For what 
other purpose could be the goal? The might of the State was 
now giving away a portion of its power to be vested with the 
subject of the State, empowering the individual, not by 
right of birth or title, but by right of law. This marriage 
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of torture and criminal proceedings must at some point in 
time be anchored in political expediency, and the demise of 
its use also must have political points of reference. 
The various chapters will include material addressing 
the difficulty the "ancients" had in determining truth or 
fact-finding. Ordeals, torture and their variations will 
help set the stage for the joining of torture and the early 
judicial process. 
Does each legal system define interrogation, torture, 
interviews in the same manner? If not, then a set of 
definitions is called for to help the readers find their way 
among the various paths. 
It was an interesting concept where the individual could 
stand his ground when confronted by the might of the State. 
This shows a clear departure from the interests of the State 
or society being paramount, to subordination of those 
interests to protect the individual and his interest at the 
bar. The interests of the State and, earlier, of the 
Church, were cited as reasons for the institutionalization 
of torture to secure confessions in cases where the evidence 
of witnesses was either insufficient in number to qualify or 
lacking in other evidentiary ways.1 The work of John H. 
Langbein depicts the questions of the time in attempting to 
change the legal system's reliance on mutual combat or 
1John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof ; Europe 
and England in the Ancien Regime (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 6-7. 
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ordeals in the administration of justice and the methods of 
fact-finding to be employed. 
According to Malise Ruthven "Torture appears to have 
been known to all the societies of the ancient world with 
the possible exception of the Hebrews."2 He goes on to 
trace the earliest recorded uses of torture, by whom, upon 
whom, and the reasons prompting such a measure. It was 
clear at the beginning that State interests were of primary 
importance in obtaining information. Ruthven traces this 
position to the position of Church and Roman/canon law. 
The research is, of necessity, also concerned with 
portions of the 6th Amendment in the United States Bill of 
Rights dealing with the right to counsel. The wording of 
the 5th Amendment and the subsequent adoption of the Miranda 
Warning forge a strong and inseparable bond between the 
two.3 
Research Plan 
Many of the sciences will allow for mathematical 
expression to indicate research findings. Numbers and 
equations assign values and the result is a mathematical 
vernacular term agreed upon in its research design. 
However, what if the research does not easily lend itself to 
such precise notations? What if the implied rules under 
2Malise Ruthven, Torture, the Grand Conspiracy (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978). p. 23. 
3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 16 
L. Ed. 2nd 694 (1966), hereafter referred to as Miranda. 
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research are in ambiguous terms to allow for various nuances 
to be addressed? Under a more pure mathematical design "a" 
will always represent something, "b" something different. 
In political science we are faced with imprecise events and 
varying circumstances. In political science, for example, 
"A" may sometimes be represented by "ARZ" or "170" or a 
combination. Such is the discourse of political science in 
its very language - its vagueness, its very imprecise or 
ill-defined terms. 
How do we assess these outcomes? The research design 
proposed will take into account these variances, nuances and 
compare them across political systems as closely as can be 
determined, and then view the results, and finally make a 
determination as to what it is that has occurred. What are 
the nuances that come into play when one political system 
advances the "right to silence" or the right not to give 
testimony. What is "silence?" How is it defined? And, 
what of "testimony?" Each condition, where possible under 
both political systems here in question, addresses these 
issues differently. If addressed differently, what are the 
outcomes to the citizenry so governed? 
A valid method of comparing the criminal justice systems 
of two similar/dissimilar political foundations is through 
the use of archival analysis. This comparison will, of 
course, begin with the adoption of the "Bill of Rights" as 
part and parcel of the United States Constitution in 1787, 
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and the legal dicta that have emerged as a consequence of 
legal challenges to state actions vis-a-vis the suspect 
under interrogation. 
Each system was viewed (independently) from the 1787 
period to the present. Major occurrences in law addressing 
this issue were noted in order to determine, if possible, 
under which system the interests of the individual or 
society were better served. 
The use of archival analysis allowed for both the 
descriptive and exploratory exercise. We were then able to 
broaden the scope of this work where necessary and yet 
remain tight to the theme, thereby arriving at the 
conclusion and its present dynamics. The qualitative 
content in the archival analysis yielded definitive 
impressions of the value of a suspect's rights under each 
system. 
Some of the indicators sought out in the archival 
process would be the discovery of methods that either, or 
both, systems utilized in the expansion or contraction of 
protections as new areas of "need" presented themselves over 
time. Cultural and political arguments change over time, 
and this impacts on the law and provisions of protection of 
the citizen. When challenged by such events, the research 
directed its efforts to determine how, and if, the 
protection granted was affected. Of further concern to the 
research was the need for implementing issues of comparative 
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law methodology. The current debate, or the issue of 
contextual as opposed to textual only, serves to highlight 
the shortcomings. Practicality and philosophical 
standpoints are unequal in their attempts to balance one 
against the other, and the research was mindful of this 
turmoil when criticizing various inconsistencies of legal 
outcomes. Other problems in this area called upon the 
research to be mindful of the fact that law, within the 
confines of one's country, still must be viewed in a 
transnational fashion. This is predicated upon the concern 
that law is rarely a pure entity of "national law." The 
research was aided in recognizing this concept of 
"transnational" influence, because the archival analysis 
automatically provided a continuous stream of input across 
time, and this process of input, in this fashion, brought 
along with it transtemporal influence. 
Other considerations, such as public opinion polls and 
surveys, aided in tracking the public's concern in those 
matters which impinge in such a way that political actions 
would be forthcoming to shape, or re-shape, protections of 
the "right to silence." 
The extensive databases of Lexis/Nexis of Mead Data 
Central were again utilized where applicable to provide 
current court decisions on both United States' and English 
law. This database allows the researcher to explore those 
descriptive areas as broadly as possible in a short period 
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of time, thereby enabling the research to quickly accept or 
reject data uncovered as germane or not to the research 
design. Final acceptance is thus better accomplished and 
helps the researcher to stay focused on the research. Law 
libraries, periodicals and texts from both countries were 
consulted in fine tuning areas that required it. 
Basic to each country are the laws themselves. Within 
the United States, various Supreme Court decisions have 
updated and re-defined the language of the Bill of Rights. 
In England, various conventions including the most recent 
Royal Commission of Criminal Justice 1993 will be examined. 
A comparison would be incomplete, furthermore, if the 
research failed to include the frequency or manner in which 
Parliament found its own laws repugnant vis-a-vis the United 
States Supreme Court taking similar actions on the laws as 
they relate to an individual's right during interrogation, 
within the confines of unique legal circumstances. 
How can we best evaluate the protection under the law to 
this individual's "right to silence?" If we can determine 
any inherent risks the suspect incurs by virtue of invoking 
this right, would it be fundamental to challenging the 
protection the "right to silence" should provide? The 
degree of erosion of this protection may be subjective 
because hard data addressing any degree of loss would be 
problematical to determine unless a trend should emerge. 
Other points of consideration would include the frequency or 
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number of occurrences that either the United States' or 
England's legislature have overturned, or those laws they 
have enhanced concerning the issue. How closely defined is 
the protection? Are there limitations to other types of 
testimony that can be demanded from a suspect besides purely 
verbal responses? If so, what are the implications to the 
protection offered? What protections are extended if such 
demands by the law are refused by the suspect? We should 
note also the vulnerability of any protection in place to 
amendment or rescission by subsequent legislative action or 
judicial review depending upon the political system in 
question. 
Terms Encountered 
Winston Churchill once remarked "The United States and 
England are separated by a common language." It is 
undeniably so and, in the area of political and legal 
expression, it is also apparent. To assist in this 
comparison of the two political/legal systems, a common 
ground must first be established. 
The use of jargon in political science, or in the 
social sciences generally, has been a source of deep 
frustration to those -- both inside and outside the 
discipline -- who seek to follow the literature. 
Jargon arises in response to the need for precision 
in any field of knowledge. It provides, for the 
initiated, shorthand notations for whole concepts or 
basic elements of a scientific paradigm. If it is 
esoteric in excluding the layman, it nevertheless 
seeks to provide precision in meaning for those 
within the discipline. The purpose of jargon is 
more effective and efficient communication. The 
development of jargon within a discipline may be a 
measure of its growth as a science. The use of 
20 
jargon, however, necessarily reduces the scope of 
communication to those familiar with its specialized 
concepts and to those who share a particular 
paradigm.4 
The following passages will illustrate areas that could 
be confusing if proper identification of terms and their 
intended meanings are not properly defined and evaluated 
against each other. 
British Law 
Interview 
An interview is the questioning of a person regarding 
his involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal 
offence or offences. Questioning a person simply to obtain 
information or his explanation of the facts or in the 
ordinary course of the officer's duties, does not constitute 
an interview for the purpose of this code. Neither does 
questioning which is strictly confined to the proper and 
effective conduct of a search. This was reinforced in the 
case R. v. Absolam (1989) 88 Cr. App. R 336 -- opinion of 
Judge L. J. Bingham defining an interview namely "a series 
of questions directed by the police to a suspect with a view 
to obtaining admissions on which proceedings could be 
founded." 
Voire Dire 
"A trial within a trial." 
4James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., 
Comparative Politics (Columbus, OH.: Charles E. Merrill 
Publishing Company, 1973). p.201. 
21 
Where various motions are discussed prior to the actual 
trial itself to determine facts/admissibility of different 
issues. 
United States Law 
Voir Dire 
"To speak the truth." - Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. 
A preliminary examination which the court and attorneys 
make of prospective jurors to determine their qualifications 
and suitability to serve as jurors. 
Interview 
Black's Law Dictionary does not contain parameters for 
this event. "Prior to the interrogation phase - a system of 
free-flowing questions and answers in which the investigator 
gathers information from a subject for the purpose of 
evaluating the subject himself in terms of how the subject 
views himself."5 
InterrogatiQH 
Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. In criminal law, the 
process of questions propounded by police to person arrested 
or suspected to seek solution of crime. 
5Joseph L. Kibitlewski, "The Use of Psychology in 
Interrogation," paper presented at the 55th annual meeting 




Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way. 
Inquisitorial System 
This was best exemplified by the star Chamber of King 
Henry VII in 1487. The Star Chamber proceedings sanctioned 
the examination of an accused under oath without a formal 
charge. It was widely used in sedition and heresy trials. 
The English judges gradually changed to the accusatorial 
system because of many abuses. People were tortured into 
admitting crimes that they did not commit just to obtain 
relief from the pain. By 1700, the privilege against self- 
incrimination in England was fully recognized. 
Accusatorial System 
This calls for the State to prove its case against the 
accused. The accused need not produce any evidence against 
himself, in fact the accused need not even testify. 
Functions and Structures 
The comparison of the rights of a suspect during 
interrogation between England and the United States takes as 
a given that the rulers and those governed live under their 
own laws. These laws and procedures are but part of the 
internal bureaucracy that keeps and molds the 
"understandings" that become a product of the culture, 
tradition, and political entities of each nation or state. 
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Each in its own fashion must contain institutions that allow 
for the governance of its people. Most governmental tasks 
are common to all sovereign nations. However, it is the 
method and distribution of tasks that differs between 
countries because, whereas the tasks themselves have much in 
common, the manner in addressing them can be quite diverse. 
The most common tasks that allow for distinction between 
countries can be examined by the manner in which each 
performs the major functions of government, most notably: 
A. how political participation is achieved 
B. how political power is structured 
C. the manner of addressing the concerns of the people 
D. the various expressions of the political power itself 
Those items which must be dealt with are the "functions" 
involved. How the functions are performed, by whom, and 
when, give expression to the "structure" of government. 
The research will confine itself to those discreet areas 
which impact most directly with law-making and judicial 
review. This combination of political expression helps to 
define the importance of the function of each through the 
structure in which it performs its duties. David Easton 
addressed these issues thusly: 
There are certain basic political activities and 
processes characteristic of all political systems 
even though the structural forms through which they 
manifest themselves may and do vary considerably in 
each place and each age. . . . 
The requisite function of any political system, 
and the criteria by which its boundaries are 
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defined, is 'the authoritative allocation of values 
for a society.' that is, the process of how binding 
decisions are made and implemented for a society.6 
A look at the basic governmental structures of the 
United States and England immediately brings to the fore 
certain fundamental differences. The United States has a 
federated system, a two-tiered method of addressing its 
legal issues, whereas England's system is unitary in nature. 
The House of Commons is representative in nature and 
contains three hundred and fifty members (Members of 
Parliament or MPs) who are elected by adult suffrage. It is 
required that a general election be held at least every five 
years. However, the Government can call for elections at 
any time. A simple majority elects its members. The 
representation is not proportional, giving a definite 
advantage to the larger political parties. The House of 
Lords is not an elected body being, for the most part, 
hereditary or based on life membership. Also included are 
the senior bishops from the Church of England. This House 
is secondary to the House of Commons. The House of Lords 
cannot change certain bills of legislation issued by the 
House of Commons. 
The United Kingdom, of which England is a part, has no 
constitution or bill of rights. The "unwritten 
constitution" combines law, practices of the day and 
6James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., 
Comparative Politics (Columbus, OH.: Charles E. Merrill 
Publishing Company, 1973). p.221. 
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tradition, and the result is the product of centuries of 
government control and conflict resolution. 
The people of England do not possess any specific rights 
but are free to do all that which is not forbidden by law. 
The combination of the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords provides for the structure of Parliament. 
The functions and structures of government in the United 
States are directed from powers separate from each other, 
with each exercising some measure of control over the 
others. In England, the government operates with a fusion 
of powers. Parliament supplies the leadership and is made 
up of the House of Lords, the Monarch and the House of 
Commons. Parliament acts as the legislative body, and there 
is no oversight to its laws save itself. In the United 
States, Congress passes laws subject to the judicial review 
of the Supreme Court. 
Political Culture 
An additional ingredient of the political culture is the 
method by which the population assimilates its norms and the 
rapidity, or lack of rapidity, in changes that take place 
within the society. This allows for the successive 
generations to acquire the political socialization of the 
preceding generation, giving a continuity to the whole. The 
growing child learns from his associations within the 
family, school and society in general. The expectations 
this individual holds are, therefore, his foundation in 
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reference to his government, and what he expects that 
government can, or will, do to, or for, him. With this in 
mind, we can then inquire of the population its opinions on 
governmental changes that are offered or altered. These 
opinions will be shaped by the population's beliefs in 
politics, as well as its perception of its inclusion in the 
nation-state and its perceived effectiveness of impacting 
upon the political process. 
This process of political culture is difficult to 
quantify. Public opinion polls or surveys can provide a 
useful barometer of the direction the population has taken 
on various laws and regulations. The weak link in this 
acquisition of input is the manner in which the population 
so queried is selected, and also the selection of words used 
to form the questions. Bias is inherent in most types of 
information gathering techniques. The political agenda of 
the conducting entity must be included in weighing the 
veracity of such poll results. This research includes many 
such polls, and the reader is urged to carefully consider 
the selection of words used to convey the results obtained. 
Literature Review 
If we consider that an individual has "rights" in regard 
to remaining silent, these "rights" must have been prompted 
by some action on the part of the State that was found to be 
objectionable by the citizenry. What was this behavior and 
how or where did it start? 
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The obvious answer is that the "State" used torture to 
obtain information from individuals. The literature was 
researched to discover the origins and location of the use 
of torture for interrogative purposes and to trace its 
history into, and through, each of the two criminal justice 
systems under discussion. 
Reports of State and Church records were reviewed where 
needed along with the various methods each employed. A 
determination was made to examine when torture was 
introduced to extract confessions and for what reasons. 
The impact of the Church upon secular matters can be traced 
to its policies and direction issued from the Fourth Lateran 
Council. This gathering was influenced significantly by 
Pope Innocent III, who combined his theological and legal 
training, political experience and wide knowledge of Europe 
at the time, to achieve his own ambitious agenda. The 
Council set down the governing position and policies 
dictating the day-to-day principles of the Church to be 
observed, as well as the future destination to be reached. 
Various forms of heresy were encroaching on the doctrines of 
the Church and were considered a definite threat to its 
influence. Prior to the thirteenth century, Church statutes 
were generally ineffective particularly in "southern France 
and other parts of Europe."7 The method selected to improve 
7Miroslav Hroch and Anna Skybova, Ecclesia Militans: 
The Inquisition, trans. Janet Fraser (Dorset Press, 1990), 
p. 11. 
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the effectiveness of the Church's power was the institution 
of new courts which were outside of local legislative input. 
"The courts were to be administered by qualified churchmen 
instead of local bishops. . . . 1,8 These courts were later 
to become the Courts of Inquisition. These Courts of 
Inquisition were conducted by a judge who presided over the 
proceedings. The judge heard the denunciation as well as 
the accused's defence and so the judge now became the 
accuser, prosecutor and sentencing judge. His major 
function was to obtain confessions, and torture was soon 
implemented to help in achieving this. With the temporal 
leader at risk in view of the widespread authority of the 
Church through the Inquisition, the local leaders placed 
their authority alongside that of the Church, in support. 
This joining of the powers, Church and State, gave the 
courts unquestioned authority. Now, when an individual was 
condemned, the State would place him before the Church's 
Inquisition for condemnation, excommunication and execution. 
Miroslav Hroch's Ecclesia Militans gives excellent 
insight into the manner in which the church utilized torture 
to secure confessions. The two methods described in his 
work were the exertion of psychological pressure and 
physical torture. Also referenced in this work is the 
classic fourteenth century writing of Nicholas Eymeric. 
Eymeric's Directorium Inquisitorium describes the 
8Ibid. p. 11 
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psychological setting and methods employed to secure a 
confession. The setting and method were to be sympathetic 
in tone to the accused, with the inquisitor adopting a 
manner of already having the "truth" in writing and merely 
urging the accused to substantiate that which the inquisitor 
already knew. Eymeric also describes the use of agents 
provocateurs being placed in the cells with the accused to 
prompt the accused into making incriminating statements. 
This practice was widespread in Italy and Spain with these 
countries having witnesses placed outside the cell to bear 
witness to the incriminating statements. 
The State1s use of torture can be traced through various 
governments. In traditional China, the Ch'ing Code "allowed 
for the torture of principals and witnesses for the purpose 
of extracting confessions and evidence as a normal part of 
judicial procedure."9 In Greece, the use of torture was 
usually reserved for slaves, with the possible exception of 
some political crimes. If there was a political conspiracy 
suspected, then free citizens were also liable to be 
tortured. Parry's work on The History of Torture in England 
also notes that in thirteenth century France, the Crown 
utilized its bevy of civil lawyers who were versed in Roman 
law, "... the Roman law not only had sanctioned torture 
9L.A. Parry, The History of Torture in England. 
Patterson Smith Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement, and 
Social Problems, no. 180 (London: Sampson Low. Marston & 
Co., Ltd., 1934; reprint ed., Montclair, N.J.: Patterson 
Smith, 1975), p.V. 
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but had a procedural and evidentiary system congenial to its 
use. "10 
Parry notes that the Star Chamber, which was instituted 
by the House of Tudor, was well suited for its purposes. 
Its composition included "two Chief Justices, and the whole 
of the Privy Council, and therefore brought the highest 
legal and the highest political capacity to bear on 
cases."11 The views of the various courts along this path 
helped to determine the legal precepts for its inception, 
continued use, and finally the conditions that caused the 
ultimate disfavor of torture. 
Law being the expression of political direction, there 
should be discovered the foundation upon which a new 
direction in criminal justice proceedings was sought. 
Further, this new direction was not defined at one period in 
time and held inviolate but, rather, it has been polished 
and bruised by the various contenders on either side of the 
adversarial issues at stake, i.e. State interests as opposed 
to an individual's rights. What defined torture? Which 
forms were acceptable? Were there new forms not even 
verbalized by the early advocates of these "rights" for 
suspects? 
10Ibid. p.VIII 
“Ibid. p. 4. 
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Where feasible, first editions were consulted, and 
review of the literature along the same paths as the 
research model itself: 
A. Torture 
major works in England circa 1200 A.D. to present 
B. English law -- use of torture -- change in the law 1200 
A.D. to present case law 
C. United States Colonial Law 
D. United States Bill of Rights acceptance, use of the 5th 
Amendment/6th Amendment. 1787 to present case law 
E. Case law comparison 
F. Conclusions 
This comparison of the legal aspects selected is 
original in nature, and so, no direct literature review can 
be realized. What is of importance, however, is the 
selection of works forming the foundation of each chapter 
and, subsequently, the underpinning for the conclusions 
reached. Original research provides the additional benefit 
of allowing discussion of the subject from a philosophical 
viewpoint, as well as providing a reference point for those 
embarking upon nation building in those instances where the 
creation of a new nation seeks improved methods of governing 
its people. 
With research addressing torture and confessions as a 
starting point, the major work covering that period, used as 
fundamental to the scheme, was John H. Langbein's treatise 
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Torture and the Law of Proof. Europe and England in the 
Ancien Regime (1977). Although his work addresses both 
punishment and torture (judicial torture), it is the latter 
that is of interest to this endeavor. 
James Heath and his publication Torture and English Law 
was found to be useful, as it criticized David Jardine's 
Reading on the Use of Torture in the Criminal Law of England 
previously to the Commo.riwaa.llLh. it was Heath's position 
that Jardine's work was insufficient in depth and erroneous 
in conclusions, and Heath found solace in Langbein's works. 
Jardine was complacent in accepting as fact that the 
juridical use of torture was established under Edward VI of 
England and lasted until 1640.12 
The writings of Malise Ruthven give an excellent 
overview of torture, and his work Torture. the Grand 
Conspiracy blends well with the selected works that address 
the precursor of juridical torture for confessions -- the 
"ordeal." Because the ordeal plays a minor role in this 
research, much of the information used was provided by 
various encyclopedias with the main thrust being provided by 
The Encyclopedia of Religion (Vol. II) by Mircea Eliade. 
Its use is historical in nature only for its introduction of 
12James Heath, Torture and English Law: An 
Administrative and Legal History from the Plantaaenets to 
the Stuarts. Contributions in Legal Studies, no. 18 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p.xvii. 
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torture/fact finding, with the end result of present day- 
guarantees to protect the suspect from such activities. 
Henry Lea's work Torture was first published in 1866. 
Lea made a comparison with the archaic use of torture and 
contemporary judicial use of torture. He labeled it as a 
bridge between different legal universes. He cites how even 
medieval history's enlightened societies reverted to the use 
of judicial torture when the danger to the society strained 
at having confidence in its traditional legal systems. Lea 
was also concerned that there could be error if the use of 
judicial torture was viewed outside the cultural context in 
which it was utilized. Lea said "Judicial torture 
constitutes a kind of bridge between irrational and rational 
legal universes, a significant, if repugnant, step in that 
process by means of which rules of evidence . . . 
constituted a humanizing force. . . . "13 This work is 
consulted to show the transition of political processes 
enabling the attendant judicial system to progress to a 
matter of fact genre, utilizing reasoning powers. This 
transition highlights the progression of western 
civilization and its laws from a ceremonial and negative 
form of proof to a rationalistic and substantive usage of 
positive proof, torture being the bridging mechanism. 
13Henry Chas. Lea, Torture. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1973), p. ix. 
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Works referencing early colonial United States judicial 
processes included Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the 
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self- 
Incrimination by Eben Moglen. This work traces the right to 
silence from 1630's-1640's of England through the Glorious 
Revolution and into the period where the Bill of Rights was 
embodied first in state constitutions, and later in the 
Federal version. Other works such as Fair Trial : Rights of 
the Accused in American History by David Bodenhamer and The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege by Mary A. 
Shein were also consulted, along with the various 
supplemental texts listed in the bibliography. 
The review of the literature progressed from the origin 
of the "right to silence" in English law with the use of the 
profound work London's Liberty in Chains Discovered by John 
Lilburn (1646). The Pitts Theology Library at Emory 
University, Atlanta, Georgia, contained an original copy of 
the work, and it was consulted for the research. Other 
works consulted and relied upon in the bibliography were 
provided by various legal journals, sociology reviews and 
court cases in English law over the past one hundred years. 
The court cases were provided by the Mead Data Central 
legal research system of Lexis/Nexis using the key terms of 
"suspect," "rights," "interrogation." This database service 
was selected because it is the premier source for legal 
research as well as complete news and informational 
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services. The Lexis service contains major archives of 
Federal and state case law and it continuously updates the 
statutes of all 50 states. It stays current with all state 
and Federal regulations as well as the public records from 
the major United States' cities. The Lexis service includes 
forty-five specialized libraries covering all major fields 
of law practice, including tax, securities, banking, 
environmental, energy, and international law. The group 
files are conveniently set up to provide legal information 
from all jurisdictions and, where appropriate, add sources 
of relevant business, financial or general news. A 
subscriber to the Lexis services may also have access to 
Nexis service and its related services. The Hot Topics 
library contains summaries of the latest legal and 
regulatory developments within nearly forty practice areas. 
The BEGIN library contains ALI Restatements of the Law, 
ALR(r) and LEd2d articles. This makes the service an 
excellent starting place for the research of secondary legal 
materials. The Lexis service contains libraries of English, 
French and Canadian law as well as legal materials from 
Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Ireland and Scotland. In 
addition, Lexis has a full complement of research tools, 
including an on-line Guide providing detailed descriptions 
of all Nexis and selected Lexis libraries, Shepard'stR) and 
Auto-Cite(R| citator services, and the FOCUS™ feature to 
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spotlight key words in a search result, and numerous 
software. 
The Nexis service is a leading news and information 
service which contains more than 5,800 sources, of which 
2,400 provide their entire publications on-line. These 
include regional, national and international newspapers, 
news wires, magazines, trade journals, and business 
publications. The Nexis service is the exclusive on-line 
archival source for the New York Times in the legal, 
business and other professional markets. The Nexis service 
also offers several thousand other news sources including 
the Washington Post. Los Angeles Times. Business Week. 
Fortune and the Economist. It is a one-stop service for 
both national network and regional television broadcast 
transcripts in addition to carrying CNN and National Public 
Radio news and features. Other services used in this 
research were the "MORE" and "LEXDOClR)" areas. The "MORE" 
command takes full-text, on-line searching to a new 
dimension by enabling the researcher to use a single 
document as a model to retrieve more documents that resemble 
it. The search is formulated automatically for the user by 
extracting key terms from the model document. The LEXD0C(R) 
feature allows Lexis-Nexis users to order copies of public 
record documents retrieved from any jurisdiction -- state or 
local in the country. 
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In the section on English law, we are brought up to date 
with the latest example of a suspect's rights as outlined in 
the final report, "The Roval Commission on Criminal Justice 
Report" (July 1993). 
The transition of the United States' colonial law of the 
period into constitutional acceptance and usage is 
accomplished by utilizing Robert Allen Rutland's work The 
Birth of the Bill of Rights 1776-1791. This work provides 
historical viewpoints generally accepted by legal 
historians. However, as the bibliography will show, it was 
not alone in providing information for research. Other 
works are cited in the research where appropriate, and every 
attempt was made to find more than a single source of 
information whenever possible. Court cases themselves 
provided much of the raw data. Hroch's and Skybova's work 
Ecclesia Militans illustrates how the Church increased its 
role in the day-to-day governing of people. This translated 
into a canonical judiciary outside of any legal bounds of 
the monarchy. The works of John Locke and the Federalist 
papers were consulted for a perspective of the time. 
The court cases illustrate the change in legal thought 
over time from the state law decisions of the late 
nineteenth century to the slow evolution of the Federal 
position on various rights into the state legal system, 
thereby creating a more homogenous approach to extending 
protection across the country. 
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Major works that discuss any historic court decision 
such as "Miranda" were utilized where appropriate. Current 
cases are cited from the records of the United States 
Supreme Court, and the documentation for these cases is also 
provided in the reference and bibliographical sections. 
Surveys and polls can have a decisive impact on the 
decision making process. As a possible predictor of 
political outcomes, surveys and polls give guidance to 
office seekers wishing to take the pulse of their 
constituents. These methods of obtaining public opinion 
i.e. possible political direction, were examined to 
determine if the public has definite positions relating to 
constitutional issues and those political processes that 
help to shape those positions on such issues. The data from 
these surveys and polls, acquired from both countries in the 
research model, will help define the final conclusions 
reached, dependent upon examination of all the data. Of 
special interest here is the new "deliberative" poll now 
being used in England. This is how it works. A random 
sample of the electorate is taken from all over the country 
and transported to one place. This sample is then supplied 
with briefing materials carefully balanced to explain the 
problem. This is followed by lengthy discussions among 
small groups allowing these groups to question competing 
experts and politicians. After several days, the sample is 
then polled. The resultant survey is representative of the 
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considered judgments of the public, in essence, what the 
entire country would conclude given the same opportunity to 
access the facts. The deliberative poll does not replace 
the usual surveys for it is neither descriptive nor 
predictive. Instead it is prescriptive. This recommending 
force illustrates the most likely outcome if the population 
were better informed. 
Prior to concluding the research, a comparison of the 
two legal systems was called for, and usage of "World 
Criminal Justice Systems: A Survey" by Richard J. Terrill 
was liberally used. Other comparative sources include "The 
Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of 
the Sngligh and American Approaches" by Gordon Van Kessel14 
for its excellent research in comparative legal studies. 
Although this research is similar in nature, the underlying 
difference remains in the caveat of which system provides 
the better safeguard to the suspect, and not in why 
confessions should be allowed. 
Also of note were the viewpoints expressed by Amnesty 
International. However, much of the direction of their 
concern is prisoner treatment outside the civilian legal 
system and more within the confines of military/terrorist 
activities. The Report on Torture generated by Amnesty 
14Gordon Van Kessel, "The Suspect as a Source of 
Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and 
American Approaches," The Hastings Law Journal Vol. 38:1 
(Nov. 1986) . 
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International gives historical viewpoints of the use of 
torture as a political control mechanism to punish 
detractors, and to inhibit those who may try to harm the 
State. This insight by Amnesty International could, at 
first, be viewed as outside the scope of the research if it 
were not for the fact that political decisions determine 
what is lawful. The report quotes Pierre Vidal Naquet in 
that "Torture d'etat is in effect nothing other than the 
most direct and most immediate form of the domination of one 
man over another, which is the very essence of politics."15 
The results of modern court decisions and their effect 
on the questions at hand and determined by recent court 
cases in recent publications emanating from the Supreme 
Court, and various periodicals explaining those decisions, 
along with the extensive legal databases of Lexis/Nexis 
assisted in the final analysis of the subject. 
15Amnesty International, Report on Torture (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p. 31. 
CHAPTER 2 
UNITED STATES AND ENGLISH LAW UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Each form of government must have a deciding entity 
which ultimately establishes what is and what is not 
allowed. This final authority differs with the conceptual 
configuration of the government. If it is a configuration 
of a constitutional regime, defining the powers of the 
various departments of the government, its constitution and 
statutes, then there is a restriction upon the power of the 
government. Crucial to limiting this power are the courts 
provided. In the United States there is in place a system 
in which political power is limited by the courts. "Its 
institution of 'judicial review' allows Federal and state 
courts to rule that other parts of the government have 
exceeded their powers."1 This separation of powers in the 
makeup of the Government of the United States is contrasted 
to the majoritarian form of government utilized in England. 
The United States' model is a hybrid form of government 
"with a majoritarian executive, a federal distribution of 
powers among the central government and the states, and a 
1Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., gen. 
eds. Comparative Politics Today: A World View. 5th ed. (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1992), p. 95. 
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consensual bicameral legislature with a powerful Senate, 
representative of the states.2 Consensual democracies use a 
system of power sharing of the executive represented by the 
various ethnic or religious groups. 
This final authority in the United States rests with the 
Supreme Court. In England, Parliament is not subservient to 
the courts in such a manner. The only one who can declare 
an act of Parliament unlawful is Parliament itself. In the 
United States an act of Congress can be declared unlawful 
(unconstitutional) by a majority decision issued by the 
Supreme Court. 
If a definition of judicial review is sought, it may be 
described thusly: the main focus of "judicial review" is a 
function performed by judges and is a formal entity of 
government. It is performance of judicial authority, and 
the manner in which it is designed is an outgrowth of the 
culture and traditions within which it is expected to 
reside. Also, judicial review presupposes a fundamental 
identifiable constitution. Without such a set of 
guidelines, judicial review cannot function for there is no 
basic law against which to make a comparison. England has a 
constitution of sorts, but it is the product of the 
evolution of political practices and ordinary statutes 
rather than one of immutable authority. It then stands to 
reason that absent laws which are not constitutional or 
2Ibid. p. 96. 
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fundamental, there is no higher law upon which to utilize 
judicial review for compliance. England succeeds in 
providing protection for its citizens by joining the 
supremacy of Parliament with a legal tradition noted for its 
strict observance of the law. 
Although England does not possess a written constitution 
per se, it nevertheless operates with a body of underlying 
basic precepts providing for the government to be considered 
a "constitutional regime." Part of the unwritten 
constitutional pillars would include the Magna Carta (1215), 
the Petition of Right (1626), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), 
the Bill of Rights (1689) and the Act of Settlement (1701). 
This unwritten constitution under which Parliament 
operates also includes "common law." This "common law" is 
generally considered to be the practice of various customs 
with regard to the law and judicial decisions rendered. It 
is separate from legislative law. 
United States 
Of fundamental importance to the functioning of 
government in the United States is the concept of "judicial 
review." This concept first came into prominence with 
Marbury v. Madison (1803), the case decided by the Court 
with Chief Justice John Marshall interpreting the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, which unlawfully created new jurisdictions for 
the Court under Article III of the Constitution. This was 
but the opening round of what was to become a viable tool in 
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the "check and balance" system of the government of the 
United States. The Marshall Court subsequently went on to 
review and overturn various state laws as well. Table 1 
gives illustration to this point from the year 1789 to the 
present. 
Examination of table 1 illustrates several points. The 
first column indicates that the Supreme Court does not shy 
away from overturning decisions made by itself previously. 
This may be a function of political ideology, forces of 
political culture among the voting population and/or 
personal positions or interpretations among the sitting body 
itself. 
The next column reveals that the Supreme Court, as the 
countering force in our governing system, will also review 
laws passed by Congress to ensure that the new laws conform 
to the dictates of the Constitution, or, as the Supreme 
Court itself dictates, the meaning of the Constitution. 
The last two columns address state and local laws with 
the same standards being applied to them as in the previous 
two instances. 
The research will show the Supreme Court in action, 
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Court 3 1 18 
1835-1864, Taney Court 6 1 21 
1865-1873, Chase Court 3 10 33 
1874-1888, Waite Court 11 9 7 
1889-1910, Fuller Court 4 14 73 15 
1910-1921, White Court 6 12 107 18 
1921-1930, Taft Court 5 12 131 12 
1930-1940, Hughes Court 14 14 78 5 
1941-1946, Stone Court 24 2 25 7 
1947-1952, Vinson Court 11 1 38 7 
1952-1969, Warren Court 46 25 150 16 
1969-1986, Burger Court 50 34 192 15 
1986- Rehnquist 
Court 
5 4 29 3 
*See Footnote1 
1David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in 
American Politics, 2nd ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1990), p. 60. Note that in Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), the Burger Court 
struck down a provision for a "one-house" legislative veto 
in the Immigration and Naturalization Act but effectively 
declared all one- and two-house legislative vetoes 
unconstitutional. While 212 statutes containing provisions 
for legislative vetoes were implicated by the Court's 
decision, Chadha is here counted as a single declaration of 
the unconstitutionality of congressional legislation. Note 
also that the Court's ruling in Texas v. Johnson (1989), 
striking down a Texas law making it a crime to desecrate the 
American flag, invalidated laws in forty-eight states and a 
federal statute. It is counted here, however, only once. 
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The comparison of the state cases vis-a-vis self¬ 
incrimination provide ample proof of the Court's willingness 
to overturn its own prior decisions to meet new expectations 
congruent with social engineering, morality and political 
ideology. The process to change the Constitution is a long 
and arduous one through the Congress, and through the 
ratification process of the various state assemblies. 
England 
With England, we have another concept utilizing 
"judicial review" in a vastly different fashion. This use 
of "judicial review" under English law is quite different in 
its scope of meaning. Whereas in the United States its 
usual meaning is to oversee the courts for laws for their 
compliance with the United States Constitution, the supreme 
law of the land, in England, "judicial review" concerns 
itself with Court decisions being proper on various legal 
grounds for fact of law, jurisdiction, etc., but not that 
the law in itself is in any way defective, because the law 
is a product of Parliament, and Parliament is supreme. 
England does not have a written constitution. Its 
constitution is uncodified. 
The English constitution is a blend of statute 
law, precedent, and tradition going back to the time 
of King Henry I (1100). A large part of English 
constitutional law is based on statutes passed in 
Parliament.3 
3Richard J. Terrill, World Criminal Justice Systems: A 
Survey. 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 
1992), p.2. 
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Parliament consists of the Monarchy, the House of Lords and 
the House of Commons. 
Today the most important component of Parliament 
is the House of Commons.... 
This House, more than the other two components of 
Parliament, represents the various social and 
political elements of the English population. The 
major responsibility of the House is to vote on 
legislative bills proposed by either the government 
or a member of the Commons.4 
It would appear that, up to this point, a direct 
comparison can be established equating the Monarchy with the 
Executive Branch of the United States, the House of Lords 
with the United States Senate, and the House of Commons with 
the United States House of Representatives. This comparison 
would not hold up to much scrutiny as Parliament's power is 
vastly superior to the Congress of the United States in the 
area of "judicial review." Whereas in the United States the 
United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the law, 
in England, 
the supremacy of Parliament assures the system that 
no English court will declare an act 
unconstitutional. English judges interpret and 
apply the law; they do not make it. The latter role 
is the responsibility of the legislator.5 
So, while there is "judicial review" in England it is, for 
the most part, only various appellate courts overseeing case 
decisions and not the actual laws themselves. 




In medieval England there was no clear 
distinction between legislation and other forms of 
government action . . . terminology was confusing 
. . . such as "Constitutions" of Clarendon 1164, the 
"Great Charter" 1215, the "Statute of Merton"' 1235 and 
the "Provisions" of Oxford 1258.  6 
This is illustrative of the situation. 
The supremacy of Parliament began to unfold. In the 
seventeenth century we find such wording: 
There is no Act of Parliament but must have the 
consent of the Lords, the Commons and the Royall 
assent of the King.7 
Further, the Parliament Recognition Act 1689 provided inter 
alia, 
That the pretended power of suspending laws or 
the execution of laws by regall authority without 
consent of Parlyament is illegall. . . . 
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws 
or the execution of laws by regall authoritie as it 
hath been assumed and exercised of late is illegal.8 
In addition, 
The prerogative powers of the Crown were in 
general restricted, and not abolished, but it was 
clear they could be modified or extinguished 
according to Parliament's wishes. Other possible 
rivals have also been unable to maintain any 
challenge to the dominance of Parliament. The 
Reformation Parliament established legislative 
supremacy over the Church. In more recent times, 
the courts have refused to accept that a resolution 
of the House of Commons may alter the law of the 
land.9 
SP.F. Smith and S.H. Bailey, The Modern English Legal 
System (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), p.184. 
7Ibid., p.184. 
8Ibid., p. 185. 
9Ibid., p.185. 
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A simple majority of both Houses and the assent of the 
monarch gives the law its legitimacy as an Act of 
Parliament. These acts are then the supreme law of the 
land. 
Judicial review was not unknown to the Framers of the 
United States Constitution. The political scientist David 
Adamany posited five categories in addressing the point. 
They are : 
A. Framers' intent 
B. Judicial restraint 
C. Democratic checks on the Court 
D. Public opinion 
E. Protection of minority rights 
For purposes of comparison with the evolution of the stance 
concerning "judicial review" with England's, the research 
has found Adamany's position to be adequate for argument's 
sake and that, in the main, proper foundation and equitable 
tolerance for each of his major points are sufficient in 
scope to be very useful. The research has paraphrased to a 
large extent his views and will indicate when the views of 
this research comment on Adamany's findings and whether to 
agree with them or to disagree. 
Framers' Intent 
Although first noted in Marbury v. Madison via Justice 
Marshall's opinion, the concept of "judicial review" was far 
from being a novel idea to the Framers of the Constitution. 
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The evidence indicates that it was first observed in England 
in the Dr. Bonham's Case (1610), this occurring during the 
reign of James I. The case involved the issuance of medical 
licenses as directed by an act of Parliament. Dr. Bonham 
was convicted of violating the act and subsequently appealed 
to England's high court, the King's Bench. 
Writing for the court, Lord Chief Justice Sir 
Edward Coke struck down the act, noting in dictum. 
"It appears in our books, that in many cases, the 
common law will control acts of Parliament, and 
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void." ... At 
a time when King James I was claiming tremendous 
authority, the court, in an otherwise trivial case, 
took the opportunity to assert its power.10 
In the early part of the seventeenth century, Parliament 
overcame the attempts of the Crown "to assert legislative 
competence rivalling that of Parliament."11 The Glorious 
Revolution and the subsequent Crown and Parliament 
Recognition Act 1689 vastly limited the prerogative powers 
of the Crown but did not abolish them, but did pave the way 
for Parliament to eliminate or modify those powers as 
Parliament saw fit. Having established its legislative 
supremacy, Parliament was in a strong position not to allow 
any other body of the government to assume authority over 
it. 
10Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law 
for a Changing America: Rights.Liberties. and Justice 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, A Division of Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1992). p. 50. 
I:L
P.F. Smith and S.H. Bailey, The Modern English Legal 
System (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), p. 184. 
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The political processes in the 1700's in England 
witnessed the concentration of power. "... Authority was 
centralized but it was centralized in Parliament rather than 
in the Crown."12 If judicial review would have remained as 
an overseer of English legislative authority, Parliament 
would have abrogated much of its long sought-after power. 
Huntington illustrates further by indicating that political 
modernization cannot take place if there is diffusion of 
power and a basic fundamental law. If there were these 
entities, then authority would not be centralized and 
modernization could not then take place. The new concept of 
authority embodied, "supreme power over citizens and 
subjects, unrestrained by law."13 If this is the case, we 
then have a nation of men as opposed to a nation of laws. 
Hobbes and others argued that "the Parliament is above all 
positive law, whether civil or common, makes or unmakes them 
both. 1,14 
In the United States a different approach was used. The 
traditional view, according to Huntington, embodied the idea 
that man could only declare law and not make it. Also, that 
fundamental law was outside the control of man deriving its 
authority as a written form or contract imposing limitations 
12Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1968), p. 96. 
13Ibid. p. 101. 
14Ibid. P. 104. 
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on government. This viewpoint rejects issues of sovereignty 
and allows for greater interaction between government and 
the governed, engendering a harmonious balance to permit 
political thought. 
By 1700 "judicial review" was out of favor in England 
but was resurrected in the Colonies by James Otis who relied 
on Coke's opinion when he, Otis, argued the "Writs of 
Assistance Case" (1761). Otis lost the case, but history 
shows that between 1776 and 1787 
Eight of the thirteen colonies incorporated judicial 
review into their constitutions, and by 1789 various 
state courts had struck down as unconstitutional 
eight acts passed by their legislatures.15 
Adamany further supports his point of intent by showing that 
over half of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
also approved of its concept. In addition, Adamany draws 
upon The Federalist Papers, wherein Alexander Hamilton 
defended judicial review. Hamilton wrote: 
There is no position which depends on clearer 
principles than that every act of a delegated 
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission 
under which it is exercised, is void. No 
legislative act, therefore, contrary to the 
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be 
to affirm that the deputy is greater than his 
principal; that the servant is above his master; 
that the representatives of the people are superior 
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue 
of powers may do not only what their powers do not 
authorize, but what they forbid. 
15Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law 
for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, A Division of Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1992). p. 50. 
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If it be said that the legislative body are 
themselves the constitutional judges of their own 
powers and that the construction they put upon them 
is conclusive upon the other departments it may be 
answered that this cannot be the natural presumption 
where it is not to be collected from any particular 
provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise 
to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to 
enable the representatives of the people to 
substitute their will to that of their constituents. 
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts 
were designed to be an intermediate body between the 
people and the legislature in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits 
assigned to their authority. The interpretation of 
the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be 
regarded by judges as, a fundamental law. It 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning 
as well as the meaning of any particular act 
proceeding from the legislative body. If there 
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance 
between the two, that which has the superior 
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be 
preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution 
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention 
of the people to the intention of their agents.16 
Judicial Restraint 
It is the opinion of many political analysts and 
justices that the courts should defer to the elected 
institutions of government. Justice Gibson made an early 
referral to Marbury when he wrote in Eakin v. Raub (1825) 
The constitution and the right of the legislature 
to pass [an] act may be in collision; but is that a 
legitimate subject for judicial determination? If 
it be, the judiciary must be a peculiar organ, to 
revise the proceedings of the legislature, and to 
correct its mistakes . . . [I]t is by no means 
clear, that to declare a law void which has been 
enacted according to the forms prescribed in the 
constitution, is not a usurpation of legislative 
power. It is an act of sovereignty; and sovereignty 
and legislative power are . . . to be convertible 
16Ibid. , p. 50. 
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terms. It is the business of the judiciary to 
interpret the laws, not scan the authority of the 
law giver; and without the latter, it cannot take 
cognizance of a collision between a law and the 
Constitution. So that to affirm that the judiciary 
has a right to judge the existence of such 
collision, is to take for granted the very thing to 
be proved.17 
This research disagrees with the position of Judge Gibson in 
that the authority of the legislature is not what is being 
addressed by the Court, but rather the actions of the 
legislature as they are allowed under the fundamental law of 
the land. If the legislature's acts are not forced to 
conform to the dictates of the Constitution, then, in 
effect, the Constitution is being constantly amended by the 
legislature in the everyday exercise of its authority to 
make law and, in so doing, circumvent the constitutional 
process dictated for amending the Constitution itself. If 
this were to be the case, the United States would then 
parallel the system in England where Parliament is supreme. 
From an ideological/political viewpoint, judicial restraint 
can be viewed as a "conservative" position whereas an 
activist court could be viewed as "liberal" e.g. Warren 
Court versus Frankfurter Court. Thus one can view the 
Warren Court as "activist" within the context of having the 
Court's decisions used as social engineering devices, and 
the position of judical restraint reflecting the desire of 
the Court to take a "hands off" approach in such matters. 
17Ibid. , p. 51. 
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Democratic Checks 
A third controversy is what Adamany calls "democratic 
checks" on the Court. His position, also paraphrased by 
this research, shows that judicial review is defensible on 
the grounds that the Supreme Court is subject to potential 
checks by the elected branches. In various combinations, 
the Congress and the President may 
A. ratify a constitutional amendment to overturn a decision 
B. vary the size of the Court 
C. remove the Court's appellate jurisdiction 
Adamany concedes that these checks are rarely used: 
Only four amendments have explicitly overturned 
Court decisions; the Court's size has not been 
changed since 1870, and only once has Congress 
removed the Court's appellate jurisdiction.18 
This, perhaps, is an indication of how well the system 
functions. 
Public Opinion 
The fourth item in Adamany's debate is the position of 
judicial review in public opinion and the Court. Adamany 
contends that the Court decisions are generally in harmony 
with public opinion but that the Court really is under no 
pressure to do so. It is unclear why Adamany included this 
position. Perhaps it was to underscore a possible weakness 
in the Court in its desire to not provoke strong criticism 
18Ibid. , p. 52 
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from the population in reaction to a decision rendered by 
the Court. 
Role of the Court 
This is the most argued aspect in the controversy: that 
the role of judicial review is the proper role for the Court 
to play. 
Those who support judicial review assert that the 
Court must have this power if it is to fulfill its 
most important constitutional assignment: protector 
of minority rights. By their very nature, the fact 
that they are elected, legislatures and executives 
reflect the interests of the majority. But those 
interests may take action that is blatantly 
unconstitutional. So that the majority cannot 
tyrannize a minority, it is necessary for the one 
branch of government that lacks any electoral 
connection to have the power of judicial review. 
This is a powerful argument, the truth of which has 
been demonstrated many times throughout our history. 
For example, when the legislatures of southern 
states continued to enact segregation laws, it was 
the U.S. Supreme Court that struck them down as 
violative of the Constitution.19 
Under present-day English law, judicial review is 
somewhat more limiting. There are two basic vehicles of 
legal procedure. First, an appeal may be provided by 
statute. However, the common law does not recognize appeals 
as such. The appellate process operating within the common 
law concerns itself with whether or not the decision in the 
case came out of a court having proper jurisdiction. If 
jurisdiction was a problem, the decision could be quashed. 
To prevent future problems, the Court of King's Bench could 
issue a prohibition. Writs of mandamus were also issued to 
19Ibid. , p. 53 . 
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provide compliance in accordance with the law. There are 
two basic functions allowed for appeal or review. One is 
for the correction of errors of fact. The other, to provide 
for the harmonious development of the law. 
So, within the scope of "jargon" we have "judicial 
review," under our comparison of the United States and 
English law, clearly fulfilling different roles. In the 
case of the United States, it is supreme while under English 
Law, it is subservient. The research will address how this 
affects its citizen protections in its final assessment. 
Problematic to our study is the term "interview." In 
the United States, the criminal justice system assigns 
different rules depending on whether an interview or an 
interrogation is being conducted. Moreover, it is easier to 
describe the intents and methods of either one term or the 
other because their differences are so easily defined. The 
setting for each is also markedly different. For an 
interview with a subject, the interviewer should strive for 
an environment that is fairly relaxed and non-threatening. 
The purpose of the interview is to gather information about 
the subject; the interviewer to provide a constant stimulus 
in the form of a set line of questions allowing for varied 
responses. The interview allows the interviewer to evaluate 
his subject. Interviewing is not a free-flowing, ad-libbing 
procedure. It is goal oriented. An interview is a directed 
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stimulus condition whereby the responses can vary. The 
interviewer does not care what the responses are. The end 
product is subject evaluation. The interviewer is 
interested mostly in how the subject sees himself. The 
interviewer listens and observes. 
In the United States, successful interrogation is a two- 
part function; the first being a thorough interview followed 
by specialized interrogation techniques. This system allows 
the subject to be manipulated in order to allow that subject 
to begin responding to the interrogator. Furthermore, 
The difference between interviewing and 
interrogation is that, while interviewing goes 
beyond a simple question and answer period which 
enables the interviewer to evaluate the subject's 
emotional response, the sole purpose of the 
interrogation is to obtain a confession. In the 
interview the conditions (questions) are constant 
(stimulus). The response will vary, and this must 
be evaluated. With the interrogation, the stimulus 
or the manipulation technique (only if legal) 
varies. As for the response, only one is 
acceptable: admission.20 
The distinction between interviewing and interrogation in 
the United States is thus easily defined and recognizable. 
When we move to England, the boundaries are barely 
distinguishable. 
The research uses the most recent legal directive for 
England which was finalized and presented in July, 1993. It 
20Joseph L. Kibitlewski, "The Use of Psychology in 
Interrogation," paper presented at the 55th annual meeting 
of the Mississippi Academy of Sciences, Jackson, MS., 22 
February 1991. 
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is the Report of The Roval Commission on Criminal Justice.21 
hereafter referred to as the "Report." This Report was 
generated by the Royal Warrant22 which in part stated as 
partial purpose to be -- 
the conduct of police investigations and their 
supervision by senior police officers, and in 
particular the degree of control that is exercised 
over the conduct of the investigation and the 
gathering and preparation of evidence.23 
The Report outlines its desire to protect or safeguard the 
rights of those in police custody and further indicates that 
interviewing (interrogation) should be performed under 
strict guidelines at a police station. Code C from the 
Report is quoted here for clarification. 
Code C provides that interviews must normally 
take place at the police station (paragraph 11.1), 
must be properly recorded whether or not they take 
place at a police station (paragraph 11.5(a)), and 
the second must be shown to the suspect for him or 
her to sign (paragraph 11.10). The revision of Code 
C in April 1991 attempted a redefinition of an 
interview in Note for Guidance 11A. This states 
that an interview is the questioning of a person 
regarding his or her involvement or suspected 
involvement in a criminal offence, but that 
questioning only to obtain information or an 
explanation of the facts or in the ordinary course 
of the officer's duties does not constitute an 
interview for the purposes of the Code.24 
21Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice to 
Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, by Viscount Runciman 
of Doxford, CBE., FBA., Chairman (London, England: 1993). 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. , p. 27. 
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The use of the word "interview" in legal parlance here 
is interchangeable with the United States' legal concept of 
interrogation, and the reader is urged to keep this in mind 
when comparing the case dicta to follow. 
It is apparent that under English law almost all verbal 
intercourse, with some minor exceptions, is an interview. 
Of glaring importance is the list of acceptable interviewing 
techniques also given in the Report: 
Even when the right of silence is exercised by a 
suspect, the police still have a right to put 
questions.25 
This last quote clearly defines a marked difference between 
the two legal systems of the research. 
If suspect invokes right to silence, 
Questioning must stop Questioning can 
continue 
u.s. Yes* No 
England No Yes 
*Questioning may be reinstituted again under certain 
conditions. 
In the United States, when the suspect invokes his right to 
silence, the questioning must stop (Miranda). However, 
although the police in the United States must scrupulously 
honor the suspect's invocation of his right to silence under 
Miranda, the police may again initiate questioning at a 
25Ibid. , p . 13 . 
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future time, provided the suspect is again warned of his 
rights.26 (State Holding Law) . 
No common expression can be used to discriminate between 
the two systems under research and careful attention by the 
reader is strictly urged. Perhaps of some assistance will 
be the fact that the term "interviewing" as it relates to 
the United States' system will rarely be encountered in this 
research and where it might be found, clarification will 
follow to further assist the reader through those hazard- 
studded waters. 
The term "custody" will often be encountered, and the 
common meaning here implied is that the subject/suspect 
realizes that his movements are curtailed and subject to the 
direction of the investigators. The term "custody" is of 
particular note in those instances referencing United 
States' cases, for if the subject is not in custody the area 
of interviewing/interrogation is less easily defined and the 
protection to the subject under Miranda less 
distinguishable. 
The Fifth Amendment states in part "nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." There are a host of meanings that could be 
implied by that simple phrase. What is a witness? What 
does a witness provide? Can a person be a witness who does 
not speak? Does a witness give testimony? Does a witness 
26Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1989) . 
62 
provide evidence? What is evidence? Where is evidence 
produced by a person? Is it only in court or can a person 
provide evidence, that is be a witness, in proceedings not 
held in a courtroom? 
These nuances of evidence, testimony, right to silence, 
witness, etc., have been interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
various fashion. It will be interesting to note if the 
research shows, as an unintended by-product, that the United 
States Supreme Court views different "rights" contained in 
the Bill of Rights in a more "broad" or "narrow" fashion 
than others. 
This "right to silence" -- what exactly does it mean? 
Is the meaning the same between the two countries or does 
the Bill of Rights give added protection? 
Research shows that the right to silence is not absolute 
in all forms. Can the suspect be required to provide 
written exemplars thereby giving evidence against himself? 
Is this not protected? Is this not testimony? If so, does 
the suspect have the option to provide or not to provide? 
Is the right to silence conditional? Can a suspect 
under either, or both, systems be required to give verbal 
information, and if so, what parameters must be in place? 
How has each political/legal system viewed this? 
Although these nuances could be defined here as per 
Black's Law Dictionary, it would serve small purpose for it 
is not the dictionary that assigns meanings to the words at 
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the United States Supreme Court level. The research will 
show how the meaning is stretched or limited by the Court 
and its overall effect upon the individual. 
The Fifth Amendment also uses the word "compelled" in 
its body. Here again variances of being "compelled" must be 
examined along with all the previous "jargon." 
Just as we have seen that the words of each criminal 
justice system differ as to "interrogation" and "interview," 
and that the political arena of the two countries concerned 
in this research also differs in the meaning of "judicial 
review," is it then any wonder that, within a single 
country, the meaning of words will differ as those words 
cross from the public usage domain and enter into the realm 
of legal definition? This point is addressed because, as we 
are concerned with the "rights of a suspect" during 
interrogation and seeing that these "rights" are founded 
within the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, 
it is paramount to identify how the "rights" are articulated 
-- what words were chosen -- what do they mean. 
It would appear that more than countries can be 
separated by a common language ! 
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United States' Case Law and 
Supreme Court Decisions 
"The right of an accused person to have the aid of 
learned counsel was recognized by the twelfth century. 1,27 
The United States Constitution contains a preamble 
followed by seven articles and twenty-six amendments. It 
has three major objectives: 
A. It establishes the framework for government 
B. It designates the powers of government 
C. It protects the individual from the excess of government 
by ensuring that certain rights of an individual nature 
are maintained 
In Miranda, court dicta included partial history of the 
thinking behind the right of suspects and interrogation. 
Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court 
eloquently stated: 
'The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its 
origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and 
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused 
persons, which (have) long obtained in the 
continental system, and, until the expulsion of the 
Stuarts from the English throne in 1688, and the 
erection of additional barriers for the protection 
of the people against the exercise of arbitrary 
power, (were) not uncommon even in England. While 
the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when 
voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high 
in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an 
accused person be asked to explain his apparent 
connection with a crime under investigation, the 
ease with which the questions put to him may assume 
an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press 
the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid 
27Robert Allen Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights 
1776-1791 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983). p. 
3 . 
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or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to 
entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so 
painfully evident in many of the earlier state 
trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas 
Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made 
the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for 
its total abolition. The change in the English 
criminal procedure in that particular seems to be 
founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but 
upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts 
in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has 
become firmly embedded in English, as well as in 
American jurisprudence. So deeply, did the 
iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves 
upon the minds of the American colonists that the 
States, with one accord, made a denial of the right 
to question an accused person a part of their 
fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England 
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this 
country with the impregnability of a constitutional 
enactment.' Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-597 
(1896) .28 
The usual discourse in examining the more noteworthy 
cases addressing this aspect of criminal procedure i.e. 
Miranda, Escobedo, Brown v. Mississippi will be augmented by 
the various nuances put forth by defense attorneys to 
attempt to stretch the protection offered by the Bill of 
Rights to cover various and sundry circumstances. 
The research discusses what is testimony, and when is 
obtaining evidence from the actions of the accused not 
testimony in one sense, and just who might be providing the 
evidence at that moment. 
28Irving J. Klein, Constitutional Law for Criminal 
Justice Professionals. 2nd ed. (Miami, FL: Coral Gables 
Publishing Co. Inc., 1986), p. 326. 
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With the United States' cases there are dozens of such 
defensive tactics, some points victorious when exposed 
before the Supreme Court, others not. 
CHAPTER 3 
EARLY METHODS OF FACT FINDING 
Determination of facts surrounding various events posed 
serious problems for the leaders of a clan, a tribe or 
country. In comparison to today, they were simple folk, 
their world a mystery. Why certain events took place, or 
did not take place, were ascribed to the actions of the 
gods. It was this reliance on divine judgment on which 
early methods of determining truth were based. One of the 
earliest was compurgation or oath taking. The individual 
parties on either side of a controversy swore oaths 
attesting to their veracity. Often others were involved to 
lend the weight of their oaths to the principals in the 
quest to shift the balance in their favor. The flaws of 
this system are obvious, and so another method evolved. 
Enter the ordeal. 
Use of the ordeal is known to most cultures. The ordeal 
was the trial or judgement of the truth of a claim or 
accusation by various means based on the belief that the 
outcome would reflect the judgement of supernatural powers 
and that these powers would ensure the triumph of right. 
The word reached the English language from the medieval 
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ordalium, the latinized form of the German word Urteil 
("sentence, judgement").1 
The Ordeal was included in various Germanic laws 
including Lex Visiaothorum. Lex Burgundiorum and Lex Salica. 
"The Lex salica called for ordeals in which the accused 
was tested for resistance to pain and for ordeals that 
involved the drawing of lots. This judiciary ordeal 
corresponds to the practice of inflicting torture on the 
accused to extort confessions."2 
Earlier usages of the ordeal can be found in the Bible 
such as Prv. 16:33 "that judgement came from God," Prv. 
18:18 "the drawing of lots resolved conflicts," Joshua 7:14 
depicts the judiciary drawing of lots to discover the 
violator of a divine interdiction. 
One possible reason also for the use of the ordeal was 
the fact that decision making can be risky. By invoking 
divine intervention, the decision now became the sole domain 
of the divine. 
Some types of ordeal would include fire, or water 
wherein the accused would be bound and thrown into a river. 
If the accused sank, this was taken as a sign that God 
wanted this individual, and his innocence was thus declared, 
albeit he was dead at this time. Other variations of the 
xThe Encyclopedia of Religion, s.v. "Ordeal," by Dario 
Sabbatucci. 
2Ibid. , p . 93 . 
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water ordeal had opposite demands. In other times or 
places, although the accused was bound, he had to float to 
be considered guiltless. The ordeal by fire dealt with 
various methods of involving the accused with fire or heated 
objects; by walking over burning coals, or by kissing heated 
irons, the absence of blisters etc. would vindicate the 
charges. 
Also known was the ordeal by combat in which the accuser 
and the accused faced one another in combat, with the victor 
being chosen by God. It is assumed that many athletic 
events today are rooted in this quaint custom of ritual 
battle. 
Ordeals of Combat 
Ordeals of battle, or combat, both for political and 
judicial reasons are also worth mentioning. From the 
political spectrum we have such examples as David and 
Goliath and, of course, the various combat ordeals taking 
place between Greece and Troy in their long war. In 
England, following the Norman Conquest, trial by battle 
became an accepted method of determining the outcome for 
conflict resolution.3 This superseded the legal ordeals 
3"When both appear, the accuser as well as the accused, 
let the accuser put forth his appeal in this way: he ought 
to say that he was present and a witness at a certain place 
on a certain day and hour and knew that the accused had 
plotted the death of the king, or his betrayal, or that of 
his army, or had assented or given counsel or aid or lent 
authority thereto. If he is ready to prove this as the 
court may award and the accused denies the charge 
completely, the appeal is usually decided by the duel, nor 
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which were abolished by Henry III.4 This method allowed 
substitutes to be engaged in combat in place of the 
principals, "with priests and women ordinarily represented 
by champions."5 This method of judicial proceedings 
silently fell out of favor and went unnoticed until 1818 in 
the case of Ashton v. Thornton, when it was invoked at this 
murder trial, at which point judicial combat was formally 
abolished following the trial. 
Perhaps their heart was in the right place -- those 
hearty souls motivated by a strong sense of justice, who 
grasped at divine omnipotence through the marriage of 
seeking justice and obtaining information. 
Through the very nature of humanity, since the time of 
pre-history, there has been crime, or sin and the consequent 
need for determining facts in order to assess or assign 
punishment, retribution or, indeed, forgiveness. The 
criteria for determining the guilt of a person however have 
varied dramatically through the ages, as have the parties 
responsible for dispensing judgment. Unfortunately, 
political expediency has all too often been the determining 
will it be possible for them to compromise the matter except 
with the king's consent. The accused may answer and avoid 
the appeal before the duel is waged." Bracton on the Laws 
and Customs of England, trans. Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 2 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1968), p. 336. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. 14th ed., s.v. "Ordeal." 
5Ibid. 
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factor. Until only very recently has an accused person 
gained greater support in his efforts to sustain innocence, 
at least in a large part of the world. 
Those in a position to make the determination could very 
often be on shaky political ground, and a misstep in 
judgment could have drastic effects upon the decision maker. 
It is easy to recognize the dilemma. It is not reasonable 
to assume that everyone will tell the truth about a 
particular event, when the knowledge of that event would not 
be in the best interests of certain parties. But society 
must have a mechanism to deal with occurrences if stability 
within the group is to be a reality. 
The research will show that, even after thousands of 
years, certain obstacles still remain. Some areas are still 
uncharted waters, and some methods still leave much to be 
desired in obtaining the truth of the matter. Kings have 
faced the dilemma of treason hurled at one or another of 
"loyal" supporters. Are the accusations true or are they an 
attempt by those not loyal seeking to undermine the 
legitimate rule of the Crown? There are the examples of 
religious leaders (Roman Catholic and others) using various 
methods to root out those in opposition to their teachings. 
Pagan religions were also not immune to the various 
practices in vogue at the time. These practices included 
witch hunts, lynchings, drugs, ordeals, oath taking and 
torture with its various nuances. 
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Compurgation 
Compurgation, or oath taking, was one of the earliest 
attempts to assist in the decision making process. These 
early proceedings do not share much in common with modern 
day trials. Evidence as we know it was not presented, 
weighed carefully, with the resultant outcome predicated 
upon such evidence. Compromise was also not a usual 
outcome. The decision was clearly defined with one side 
"right" and the other "wrong." The person levying the 
charge usually prevailed because he was the one who bore the 
burden of proof and therefore directed the course of events 
leading up to a decision. 
Compurgation involved a considerable amount of minute 
procedures and, as long as these were met by the accuser, a 
favorable outcome was his reward. This was not always the 
case with the ordeals, nor with judicial combat. This 
ancient system of negative proofs "worked" for the society 
because of its reliance on the judgment of God to produce 
the guilty party. 
This "wager of law" as it was called in English law, 
consisted of an accuser furnishing the court sufficient 
proof of the righteousness of his case by taking upon 
himself an oath. Other compurgators, who might be friends 
and neighbors, would then swear an oath to his allegations 
being true. The number of oath takers would increase with 
the greater gravity of the charge. There is no record of 
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oath taking being used in those instances where guilt was 
obvious. Allowing the accused to take the oath was the 
prerogative of the political figure/judge conducting the 
proceedings and such allowance of this method of trial 
assured acquittal. There were efforts made to limit abuse 
of this system. If an accuser somehow lost his case, his 
fellow compurgators risked "losing a hand" as perjurers. 
The revival of Roman Law in about the 12th century started 
the demise of this practice. By 1300 it had all but 
disappeared from France. It was formally abolished in 
England in 1833. 
If we consider ordeals we find they can be divided into 
three categories: judicial combat, divination and the 
physical test. There is the ordeal of divination such as 
the one used by the ancient Burmese people. In this 
example, the two contesting parties are each given a candle 
of identical length. The candles are lighted 
simultaneously; the owner of the candle that outlasts the 
other is considered to have won his cause. Divination was 
known also in medieval Europe. It was called the ordeal of 
the bier and it was predicated upon the belief that a 
sympathetic action of the blood of the corpse would cause it 
to flow at the touch or nearness of the accused murderer, 
thereby signifying his guilt. 
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"O gentlemen, see, see! dead Henry's wounds 
Open their congeal'd mouths, and bleed afresh!" Shakespeare 
(Richard III. Act 1, Scene 2). 
Other methods of divination involve the use of a curse. 
Water or bread or cheese might be cursed with a magical 
penalty wherein the accused takes the object into his body 
and an allotted period of time is allowed to pass in order 
to determine guilt or innocence. A period of three weeks 
was usual. Poison ordeals also fall into this category, and 
with the mixture and its strength being determined by the 
priest or tribal doctor, he thereby possessed great 
influence in many matters. Truth or fact finding in this 
situation had a great deal of human influence -- bias! 
The third method of ordeal was the physical test, 
usually of fire or water, and this was the most common test 
used by the various cultures. In Hindu codes, the spouse of 
the husband could be required to pass through fire to prove 
her fidelity to her jealous husband. If she exhibited 
traces of burning, it was regarded as proof of her guilt. 
There were burning liquid ordeals or molten metal, where 
the party to be tested immersed his hand to retrieve some 
article from the heated medium. Escaping injury to the 
immersed portion of the body was indicative of innocence. 
The Code of Hammurabi used flowing water. The accused was 
thrown into the water and was "adjudged guilty if the water 
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bore him away."6 Variations on the water theme included 
ducking the accused which was used to locate witches. In 
India one variation was to have both adversaries keep their 
respective heads under water. The winner was adjudged to be 
the one who stayed under the longest. 
Islam is to be noted as a religion that basically 
forbids all types of ordeals. The only surviving ordeal 
from ancient times concerns matters between a husband and 
wife. If adultery by the wife is suspected by the husband, 
he may accuse her of infidelity and question the legitimacy 
of her child. He does this by invoking God four times as a 
witness that he is speaking the truth and by the calling 
down of His curses if he has lied; then the marriage is 
dissolved and the wife must be punished for adultery, unless 
she swears four times by Allah that her husband has lied, 
invoking God's wrath upon herself if her husband has spoken 
the truth (Qur'an XXIV. 6-9). This is called "lian" or 
"mutual imprecation." This also has obvious drawbacks, 
great faith in Allah notwithstanding. 
Recourse to ordeal is always liberating considering the 
risk of uncertainty which lies in decision making. Ordeal 
in the religious sense reflects a system of interdependence 
among the divine, the royal, and the judiciary. The king 
Encyclopedia of Religion & Ethics, s.v. "Ordeal 
(Introductory and Primitive)." by A.E. Crawley. 
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rules by "divine right," sitting in judgment as allowed by 
law. 
One has to wonder if throughout all the years in which 
the ordeal was used whether or not it was, to use a modern 
term, scientifically tested? Was there any research 
performed at that time where several individuals, known to 
be innocent because no crime occurred, were accused and 
tested, at least by the boiling substance or heated 
ploughshare method? The water ordeal would most likely have 
produced not guilty results. This is a rational 
consideration to make today, but one must be reminded to 
keep all things within the historical context and, given the 
level of sophistication in such matters, it most likely was 
not attempted. However, what might have been the fate of an 
individual who could have proven the ordeal fake? Would 
that inquisitive soul have been condemned? If so, by what 
method? Just prior to the thirteenth century, civil law 
started to be prosecuted with intensity. "Innocent III 
struck a fatal blow at the barbaric systems of the ordeal 
and sacramental compurgation by forbidding the rites of the 
Church to one and altering the form of oath customary to the 
other. "7 
The ordeal and torture, virtual substitutes for each 
other, have rarely co-existed as a rule. The laws which 
7Henry Charles Lea, Torture■ (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1973), p. 53. 
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supported one usually rejected the other form of fact¬ 
finding . 
If one considers the Teutonic tribes, this becomes 
evident. A freeman possessed personal independence. There 
were not laws allowing for corporal punishment. If a crime 
was committed, the injured party had broad latitude to 
obtain retribution. The injured party could be bought off. 
The criminal likewise could defend himself by the sword 
against his adversary. The use of torture was thereby 
precluded. 
That a crime was against society was not the thought of 
the day. Crime was a personal thing. The use of the 
abstract theory to promulgate legislation was beyond the 
scope of political realities of the time. 
On the Continent, in 1215 or thereabouts, the Fourth 
Lateran Council abolished the proof by ordeal. This 
reliance on God to determine guilt or innocence dictated by 
the results of the chosen ordeal was replaced with human 
judges. Of interesting note is that, if someone confessed 
while ordeals were the accepted manner of truth assessment, 
these ordeals were not used to confirm the confession, 
thereby circumventing its own system for the determination 
of truth! The year 1252 saw Pope Innocent IV generate a 
decretal whereby the use of torture in canonical procedures 
was confirmed. 
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Providing a legal definition of torture becomes 
problematical because of the various possibilities that 
cover each case. This is due, in part, to the recognized 
fact that we are all individuals with varying tolerance to 
physical pain, psychological implications and cultural 
expectations. Where, along the line of usage, does 
something become unbearable, intolerable? Where does it 
produce death? The word itself can be changed to other 
forms: "interrogation in depth", "rehabilitation," etc. Of 
further consideration is the fact that pain is subjective. 
Many would consider a single blow to suffice for the term of 
ill-treatment. If one adds intensity and degree, one now 
arrives at beating over a period of many hours, or several 
days, and somewhere along the way, "ill-treatment" becomes 
"torture." Further, it is the breaking of the will which 
signals the destruction of the person as a human being that 
triggers human rights groups to rebel and insist on the 
reinstitution of human dignity back into the process. The 
deliberate infliction of pain is the intent of the torturer, 
conducted for a specific goal, generally to obtain a 
confession or information. 
During the mid 13th century northern Italy allowed the 
use of torture and its codification in Roman-canonical law 
and utilized it as an integral portion in the investigations 
of the Inquisition. This was later translated into 
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acceptance into the common nomenclature of juridical 
proceedings as plain Roman law. 
In less than two hundred years, the use of torture was 
accepted from Scandinavia to Sicily, and from Spain to the 
regions of Slovakia in the east. Persistence in the use of 
torture in certain areas of Central Europe were alive and 
well into the 19th century. What was occurring in the 13th 
century was a revolution of the legal system which 
heretofore relied upon oaths, judicial combat and ordeals. 
These were archaic systems of fact finding, or "immanent 
justice," which relied upon divine intervention to halt or 
to prevent wrongs from going unpunished. After all, if God 
showed "the way", it must be correct. 
In order for the older system to be replaced, a 
number of distinct changes had to happen; an entire 
system of ancient and respected methods of procedure 
and the cultural assumptions they reflected had to 
be eliminated and replaced; the idea of immanent 
notion of effective human juridical competence and 
authority; and both clergy and laity had to concur 
in these changes. The older system of proofs gave 
way before two distinct but equally revolutionary 
procedures, those of the inquisitorial process and 
the jury; the ideal of a justice within reach of 
human determination came to be widely accepted, 
particularly with the creation of a legal 
profession. . . . churchmen and learned lay people 
both professed to find the idea of immanent justice 
repellant.8 
This metamorphosis from the accusatorial into the 
inquisitorial model brought with it methods of verdict 
8Edward Peters, Torture New Perspectives on the Past 
Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985; reprint ed., New 
York, N.Y.: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986). p.43. 
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finding by juries, and evidence required, obtained, and 
viewed. As for witnesses, determination had to be made as 
to their classification and methods of acquiring information 
under oath. There was great uncertainty as to the 
effectiveness of these new procedures and so reliance on 
confession became paramount. 
Confession ascended to the top of the hierarchy of 
proofs and remained there long after the Romano- 
Canonical inquisitorial procedure and the procedure 
of trial by jury had come to be firmly in place 
themselves. For jurists and lay people alike, 
confession was 'regina probationum': the queen of 
proofs.9 
It was this reliance upon confession which prepared the way 
for the joining of torture with the legal systems in the 
13th century. 
Other problems had to be faced in light of these 
changes. They consisted of the question of proof and the 
use of confessions. With all the associative questions 
rising out of the use of judicial combat, oaths and 
ordeals, these displaced methods did provide an outcome. 
Would these new methods be more or less risky to 
defendants? 
What was now in place in the doctrine of proofs was the 
requirement that the accused could only be convicted with 
two eyewitnesses providing testimony and/or upon 
confession. It became problematic if there were only one 
or no eyewitnesses, for then the supportive allowances 
9Ibid. , p . 44 . 
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called for various indicia or circumstantial evidence to 
provide some measure of proof. 
To overcome the lack of a second eyewitness and the 
presence of many but never sufficient indicia, the 
courts had to return to the one element that made 
full conviction and punishment possible: confession. 
And to obtain confession, torture was once again 
invoked, but on very different grounds from those of 
ancient Roman law.10 
At its most fundamental point, it is safe to say that 
torture is punishment, the victim being the only real 
decider of which term to employ. It may also be said that 
torture is cruelty by the State, performed by the State's 
designees through the efforts of the State's judicial 
system. We must also make strong note of the fact that, in 
today's rhetoric, there are those who would espouse that any 
form of punishment or cruelty is torture. This will not be 
of concern to the research. Torture as punishment for a 
crime that one has been judged guilty of will also not be 
the focus of the research, but rather it will explore that 
use of torture (pain) to help the State elicit needed 
information to determine exactly what the facts of a 
particular event were. The research will also show that 
torture takes on many roles in the quest for justice. 
Some of the principle uses of torture would be its use 
as a tool of vengeance. With the potential to commit 
torture housed within the human being, it is no wonder that 
its selected use was as varied as human ingenuity could 
10Ibid. , p. 47. 
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envision. However, viewed within this context, torture or 
vengeance is a much more personal, individual if one will, 
method of securing satisfaction. A classic example would be 
those who would demand that the penalty for a particular 
crime should be more than death, death by itself being 
insufficient to balance some scale of measure. Torture here 
must precede the execution. This urge for vengeance fails 
usually to surface because at the time laws and punishments 
are promulgated, the passion is not at a sufficient level to 
let the urge of vengeance rear its ugly head. Hitler was 
able to use torture/vengeance as a tool of power, evidenced 
by the types of reprisals taken against those villages 
opposing the occupation of their land by his armies. 
Hitler's use of torture showed clearly that he understood 
how his vast amount of authority was an effective means to 
limit the individual's ability to act or think 
independently. Hitler's dictatorial jurisdiction was 
accepted by the compelling nature of his ability to exact 
retribution unchallenged. 
There are other forms of torture which are mentioned 
here to assist in defining the various uses of torture. 
Sadism allows for the perpetrator of torture to witness or 
practice cruelty for sexual excitation or release. Usually 
this practice is highly ritualized and, upon completion, the 
sadist loses interest in further cruelty. The sadist is not 
to be confused with the individual who engages in torture 
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for other than sexual purposes. Whereas the sadist has 
limiting parameters or rituals, this "cruel" person has no 
such boundaries and thus looks continually for methods in 
which to become increasingly more cruel. The Diagnostic 
Manual11 however, distinguishes one type from the other as 
(a) sexual sadism, and (b) sadistic personality disorder. 
Thomas Weinberg and Gerhard Falk (1978) asserted that, 
although sadists and masochists seem unusual, they "are now 
insisting that they not be seen as disturbed. 1,12 This brings 
us to the question of how torture could have been accepted 
into judicial proceedings in order to elicit a confession. 
If the observance of pain, or the receiving of pain, or its 
infliction on others is perhaps culturally ingrained as 
Weinberg and Falk suggest, then is it not reasonable to 
suggest that this might have been an underlying factor in 
the acceptance of torture? An extension could be made to 
the vast sections of the population in the United States 
that "enjoy" a good solid "hit" in football or hockey, 
praising it while watching the hapless victim being carried 
off the field. The culture allows this punishment 
(torture)! It is socially acceptable, even moral as 
“American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 3rd ed. rev. 
(Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1987), 
p. 269. 
12Gilbert D. Nass, Roger W. Libby and Mary Pat Fisher, 
Sexual Choices: An Introduction to Human Sexuality 
(Monterey, CA: Wadsworth Health Sciences Division of 
Wadsworth, Inc., 1981), p. 382 
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evidenced by the religious schools and universities that 
field football and hockey teams. Such vicarious pleasure 
may be fundamental to humans as a species. If so, then the 
acceptance of torture needs only a vehicle to make it 
socially/morally acceptable. Only the law at present denies 
this from happening. Several hundred years ago the law 
provided the vehicle to make torture acceptable. It was 
acceptable because it performed a public service. It helped 
to punish the wrongdoers by providing confessions. It was 
politically correct. 
The Inquisition adopted torture to secure a confession. 
This was a powerful tool to make someone do something which 
was clearly not in their best interest. This familiarity 
with the power of torture leads to its approval and so the 
acceptance of torture then leads to its justification. With 
this acceptance of torture to secure confessions, other 
aspects become evident. What makes torture so abhorrent is 
the fact that it begins with the interrogator committed to 
the belief that the suspect is guilty. This allows then for 
the interrogator to persist in the administration of torture 
until the confession is secured. The effects of torture are 
unilateral in that the compelling reason for the torture is 
to obtain a confession or other information deemed vital to 
the State. If this is so, then could it not be said that 
the State, at that time, was preoccupied with obtaining 
convictions rather than in the pursuit of justice. 
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The pursuit seems curious looking back at its path. 
Originally there were the oaths issued or taken at a place 
of reverence. Together were the accused and his accusers. 
The criminal was present when adjudication occurred, this in 
public. Then the ordeals became another public event. The 
judicial duels taking on a festive atmosphere with hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, in attendance; the customs and political 
culture validated by these judicial proceedings. To then 
allow the pursuit of justice to be transferred to some 
loathsome place demanded that society, ever so gently, be 
eased into this quarter. 
As stated earlier, the greatest impetus took place 
following the Norman Conquest. The trials by combat then 
were "plenty of proof of the employment of illegal torture 
during these periods by gaolers either for the purpose of 
extracting money or to induce prisoners to give false 
evidence against others."13 
The Early "Bill of Rights" 
If power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely, then the needs of the citizenry are clearly 
indicated. With the governing body being a monarchy with 
all its inherent power, the individual was clearly outgunned 
when confronted by the might of this monarchy/government. 
13L.A. Parry, The History of Torture in England. 
Patterson Smith Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement, and 
Social Problems, no. 180 (London: Sampson Low. Marston & 
Co., Ltd., 1934; reprint ed., Montclair, N.J.: Patterson 
Smith, 1975), p. 27. 
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Before we can examine the Bill of Rights amending the 
United States Constitution, thought must be given to that 
pre-history which gave birth to such high ideals as 
individuals' rights vis-a-vis governmental needs or desires. 
Although we are primarily concerned with the rights of a 
suspect during interrogation, some inclusion of other 
"rights," and when they were demanded, is a necessary 
foundation to the whole concept. The earliest established 
"rights" concerned the writ of habeas corpus and trial by 
jury, both of which had roots planted prior to 1215 and the 
Magna Carta.14 By the twelfth century the accused was 
entitled to the "aid of learned counsel."15 In 1444 was 
added the enactment "to release readily prisoners on bail 
unless their crime was of an extremely serious nature."16 
The use of royal prerogative by James II suspending 
penal laws "in matters ecclesiastical" brought forth a Bill 
of Rights making objection in concrete form. "The pretended 
power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by regal 
authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal."17 
However, it was John Lilburn who is best remembered for his 
fight against self-incrimination when he was taken before 
“Robert Allen Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), pp. 4-5. 
15Ibid. , P- 5 
16Ibid. , P- 5 
17Ibid. , P- 7 
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the Star Chamber in 1637 charged with printing and 
publishing seditious books. At his trial Lilburn said: 
I am not willing to answer you to any more of these 
questions, because I see you go about by the 
Examination to ensnare me: for seeing the things 
for which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against 
me, you will get other matter out of my examination; 
and therefore if you will not ask me about the thing 
laid to my charge, I shall answer no more ... I 
think by the law of the land, that I may stand upon 
my just defence, and not answer to your 
interrogations.18 
His defense was a landmark in that this point of law had 
never before been pressed to any great degree for lack of 
solid evidence, but his defense was later justified by an 
act of Parliament in 1641. 
In Protestant England this Bill of Rights supported both 
the common and statute law. Later these rights were carried 
to the colonies and began to show up in various forms in the 
different settlements. 
The research covered not only the early settlement 
reasons for having a "bill of rights" but also some of the 
prevailing thoughts addressing the issues involved in the 
drafting process of the United States Constitution itself. 
The lofty ideals of justice, so proudly held by most 
Americans, stemmed from beginnings that were in contrast to 
their outcomes. Such is the case with nemo tenetur propere 
seipsum -- "no one is bound to betray himself." Indeed, the 
early colonial period of the United States was preoccupied 
18Ibid. , p. 8. 
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with survival paramountly and the rights of citizens 
somewhat further down the scale of priorities. Economic 
considerations for providing judges and jails strained at 
all locations, with the distances between small settlements 
being the underlying cause. 
It would have been of some benefit if the reporting of 
the legal proceedings of this period had been in greater 
detail, especially from all the colonial entities in 
evidence at the time. However, the only "qualitative 
reconstruction of the criminal justice system" for the 
period is from colonial New York.19 
The various colonies differed in many ways -- religion, 
economic origins, urban and rural considerations and the 
various nuances borne out of ethnic diversity. The one 
common thread for the period was, however, "an intention in 
principle to provide criminal justice in conformity with the 
laws of England."20 
As mentioned earlier, time and distance and economic 
factors eroded the philosophical trappings of the law to 
expose the raw essence. If an individual was charged for a 
serious crime and jailed until trial, the sheriff was 
responsible for delivering the prisoner up for trial. If 
the prisoner escaped, the sheriff was liable to be fined and 
19Eben Moglen, "Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the 
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege against Self- 
Incrimination," 92 Michigan Law Review 1086 p. 88. 
20Ibid. , p. 89. 
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also imprisoned. A quick trial was preferred and was 
usually predicated upon how soon a judge could find his way 
to the outlying district. It is no wonder that the 
practicality of the "'accused speaks' trial represented the 
common core of English criminal procedure in America during 
the first century of settlement."21 
It is key to this period that John Langbein's 
explanation of the "accused speaks" be paraphrased.22 The 
defendant was without the aid of counsel, limited in his 
ability to call witnesses of his own, and denied access to 
the adverse evidence before trial presentation including the 
charging instrument itself. At trial, the defendant 
confronted a prosecution who was not hindered by proving a 
case beyond a reasonable doubt; at pretrial committal he was 
examined unsworn by a Justice of the Peace who wrote down 
his answers and other evidence, including any confession, 
and who then made this available at the trial. The 
defendant faced a tremendous hurdle at trial in trying to 
explain all this away without providing greater obstacles 
for him to overcome. 
Although deprivation of counsel for the defendant was 
routine, several points must be viewed. First, trained 
lawyers were few in number and those available usually 
21Ibid. , p. 90. 
22John H. Langbein, "The Historical Origins of the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law." 92 
Michigan Law Review 1047 (1994) : 1060-1062 . 
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shunned criminal practice. In some cases paid lawyers were 
banned from court.23 Other states had various allowances for 
participation including capital cases (Virginia 1734). It 
appears that even then a distrust of lawyers was in evidence 
among the various colonial communities. 
In England at the end of Charles II's reign, the claim 
that no man was bound to incriminate himself on any charge, 
in any court, was generally conceded by the English judges. 
After 1700, this privilege was fully recognized. 
In America, the formation of the various states saw this 
principle codified into their various state constitutions. 
Seeing that this was already entrenched in the common law, 
the preservation of the concept guarding it against 
legislative or judicial change was the normal progression of 
the thought. At the time of the Declaration of 
Independence, five of the original thirteen colonies 
included this as a part of their developed constitutions. 
23Eben Moglen, "Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the 
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege against Self- 
Incrimination, " 92 Michigan Law Review 1086 p. 91. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE RIGHT TO SILENCE UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 
There are several areas that invite comparison. They 
are : 
A. The strict usage of the right to silence/no compulsion 
to self-incriminate 
B. Early interpretations 
C. Miranda and Escobedo 
D. State compelled self-incrimination 
E. Public expectations of the Government 
F. Use of psychology in interrogations 
G. Immunity 
H. Multiple personalities 
I. Miranda and its effects 
The major cases under both systems (United States and 
English) will be analyzed and compared, as the inclusion of 
all possible exceptions would cause the research to become 
unmanageable and would serve little purpose. 
For the case of the United States protection, in the 
first instance, reliance upon Miranda v. Arizona seems the 
most justified for its precedent-setting and for exploration 
in the delivered dicta of the rights and protections. 
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It would do the reader well to keep in mind how the 
Supreme Court affixes strict interpretations upon some 
provisions of the Bill of Rights while broadening the 
inclusion of others i.e. the First Amendment and Fourth 
Amendment. Although not the focus of the research, this 
causes the reader to wonder why the disparity does in fact 
exist ! 
The Bill of Rights was added to the United States 
Constitution to protect the individual from the power of the 
government, in this case the Federal Government. Most state 
constitutions of the time already had their "Bill of Rights" 
protecting the individual from the state governments. Not 
envisioned by these geniuses of political thought and 
protectors of individual liberty were the advances of 
technology into areas not even within their dreams. The 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
part, "... nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself." The protection seems to be crystal clear. 
However, the following cases will illustrate that the 
crystal has many "facets" to its clarity. 
Non-Testimonial Self-Incrimination 
If someone commits a crime he should be held 
accountable. The evidence against him placed before a 
lawful tribunal is a setting providing for a fair trial. He 
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should not be tortured nor threatened with punishment should 
he refuse to provide evidence against himself. The 
government in its quest to prosecute must do so on the 
evidence obtained by its own resources rather than through 
the compelled assistance of the accused. 
Although this appears to be a solid principle founded 
upon the Constitution, there are many cases in which this 
protection has been eroded. An accused may be required to 
participate in a line-up,1 to provide writing exemplars,2 to 
declare the use of any aliases,3 to walk a particular way,4 
etc. Provision of the aforementioned cannot be denied as 
anything but giving evidence -- incriminating and most 
damning for the most part -- with refusal to provide such 
testimony, evidence, etc. not being an option. The Supreme 
Court, in all its wisdom, has declared that providing such 
evidence is not "testimonial," therefore it falls outside 
the protection granted by the Fifth Amendment. An 
examination of the several noted cases is called for in 
order to grasp the fundamental position of the various state 
courts in assessing its position to the "rights" under 
protection. As for the position of the Supreme Court in 
1United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) . 
2Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
3United States v. Prewitt, 553 F. 2d 1082, 1085-96 (7th 
Cir. 1977) . 
4Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979). 
94 
these cases, the research will examine the various positions 
both in the comparisons phase and the conclusion argument. 
Although provided for from the time of the acceptance of 
the Bill of Rights, the claim not to self-incriminate was, 
for the most part, confined to the trial phase of the 
criminal proceedings against an accused. The argument 
against strict observance of the words of the Fifth 
Amendment is well discovered through the article written by- 
Charles Gardner Geyh, "The Testimonial Component of the 
Right against Self-Incrimination. 1,5 
To place a better perspective on the present position of 
the Court, it is necessary to indicate that prior to 
Schmerber v. Calif. (1966) it was generally held by the 
Court that the privilege against self-incrimination was 
broadly interpreted. The following is a partial list of 
selected cases which give fair indication of the Courts' 
position. Of note is the year represented for each. 
By the weight of authority it is held to be error 
to compel the accused to submit to a comparison of 
footprints and to permit a witness who was present 
when the accused was forcibly compelled to place his 
foot in footprints, or to surrender his shoes for 
the purpose of making a comparison, to testify as to 
the result . . . State v. Sirmay. 40 Utah 525, 537, 
122 P. 748, 753 (1912) 
Cooper v. State. 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110 (1889) 
(admission of evidence that defendant refused to 
make tracks in his stocking feet for comparison 
purposes was reversible error). 
5Charles Gardner Geyh, "The Testimonial Component of 
the Right against Self-Incrimination," 36 The Catholic 
University Law Review 611 (Spring 1987) . 
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Day V. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879); State v. 
Griffin. 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924); Stokes v. 
State. 64 Tenn. 619 (1875) 
further, People v. Akin. 25 Cal. 
App. 373, 143 P. 795 (1914); State v. Horton. 247 
Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051 (1913) (Reversible error to 
compel accused to undergo physical examination); 
Bowers v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 185, 75 S.W. 299 
(1903) ; Whitehead v. State. 39 Tex. Crim. 89, 45 
S.W. 10 (1898). 
State v. Jacobs. 50 N.C. 259 (1858) (defendant 
cannot be compelled to exhibit himself as a means to 
establish that he is a free negro); Blackwell v. 
State, 67 Ga. 76 (1881) (it was error to compel the 
defendant to exhibit his leg); State v. Garrett. 71 
N.C. 85, 87 (1874) (impermissible to compel an 
accused to unwrap a bandage and exhibit a wound; 
once done, however, a witness' testimony concerning 
the wound was admissible). 
Aiken v. State. 16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S.E. 1076 
(1915) (it was error to compel defendant to stand in 
a window for identification). 
Other cases of note : 
People v. Mead. 50 Mich. 228, 15 N.W. 95 (1883) 
(a prisoner cannot be required to measure or try on 
a shoe; it is permissible, however, if he does so 
voluntarily); Gallagher v. State. 28 Tex. App. 247, 
281, 125 S.W. 1087, 1095 (1889) (no violation of 
right where defendant voluntarily dons a hat and 
mask; however, "if in his case, the defendant had 
declined to be distinguished and exhibited, the 
court would doubtless have protected him in his 
constitutional right to be exempted from giving 
evidence against himself"); Turman v. State. 50 Tex. 
Crim. 7, 95 S.W. 553 (1906) (defendant cannot be 
compelled to put a cap on his head); Ward v. State. 
27 Okla. Crim. 362, 228 P. 498 (1924) (defendant may 
not be compelled to put on a coat); Reyes v. 
Municipal Court. 41 P.R. 892 (1931) (defendant may 
not be compelled to dishevel his hair and pull down 
his cap) . 
Counter argument to this position views that the 
protection offered is founded in the determination of truth. 
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Whereas verbal communication can be unreliable, confessions 
etc. can be fabricated to achieve some ulterior motive. 
Of note, however, is the dissenting opinion of Justice 
J. Brennan in California v. Byers.6 Justice Brennan held 
that the protection of the Fifth Amendment included "non¬ 
testimonial compulsion" but that this protection of the 
accused was overridden by the government's interest in 
conducting the criminal process in an orderly and efficient 
manner. 
The earlier cases offered were from the various state 
courts as the Supreme Court had not yet incorporated the 
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment making the 
Federal provisions applicable to the state judicial systems. 
However, if we look at these state cases closely we can see 
that it was their intent to incorporate a broader view of 
the protection against self-incrimination as their own state 
constitutions, many of which pre-dated the United States 
Constitution, called for such broad provisions. The 
incorporation broached the federal/state separation, and 
what remains is the Federal system of procedural provisions 
in state criminal proceedings and leaves intact essentially 
the state substantive law. 
6California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 464-65, 473-74 
(1971). 
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The Supreme Court looks at this issue on a Federal level 
in Holt v. United States (1910) .7 The case centered around 
the accused being "compelled" to wear a blouse to see if it 
fitted him. The accused was appealing on the grounds that 
the same duress that would make his statements inadmissable 
should also exclude his wearing of the blouse. The 
reasoning of the Court with its contrary holding was based 
upon the position that if his assertion was valid, it would 
then invalidate the compelling of the accused to present 
himself in court for identification. It appears that this 
Court relied heavily upon the legal writings of John 
Wigmore. 
Appearing in court dressed as the defendant would like 
to be does not equate to his being dressed as the State 
would like him to be -- nor would the defendant's utterances 
have to be the same as what the State would like, i.e 
confession, etc. He can speak without giving a confession 
as the words are his -- being dressed by the prosecution is 
different ! 
So, two issues contributed to this dichotomy of judicial 
viewpoints. One, the states' judicial system was not 
subservient to the Federal system which embraced the Bill of 
Rights in its proceedings and, two, the United States 
Supreme Court's reliance on the writings of John Wigmore 
which narrowly interpreted the protection offered. Again, 
7Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) 
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it is of some importance to know how Wigmore would have 
positioned himself in regard to the protections outlined in 
the First Amendment. 
Also to be taken into consideration at this time was the 
general make-up of the United States Supreme Court. It was 
generally composed of those lawyers whose expertise in 
business/commercial pursuits brought them the political 
favor to be appointed to the august body they inhabited. 
Law enforcement was still pretty much in the neophyte 
stage, with the first police academy appearing at the turn 
of the century, a mere seventy odd years after the first 
dedicated police departments were organized. 
Miranda and Escobe<do 
The advent of the 1960's and the activism of the Warren 
Court heralded a new initiative by the Supreme Court to use 
the Fourteenth Amendment to impose Federal judicial 
standards upon the various states. Whereas the protection 
afforded to the citizen might vary in state courts, the 
Supreme Court, through appellate state actions to the 
Federal level, sought to standardize the manner in which the 
procedural aspects of the criminal justice system would 
conduct its affairs. This period saw many state actions 
declared unconstitutional if they were found to be contrary 
to Federal guidelines for Federal prosecution. The case of 
Mapp v. Ohio8 helped to remove the old "silver platter" 
8Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
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doctrine wherein evidence, which would have been illegally- 
obtained under Federal guidelines and therefore useless in 
Federal Court, could be obtained under state guidelines and 
given to the Federal Court on a "silver platter," was 
allowed then to be admissible. This new guideline known as 
the "exclusionary rule" prevented the use and the derivative 
use of any evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Other procedural questions concerning rights to 
an attorney and when those rights were deemed important to 
the suspect, as they relate to the respective proceedings 
from investigation through completion of any sentence after 
trial, were given the force of law by the liberal Supreme 
Court empaneled at the time. 
The earliest requirement imposed by the United States 
Supreme Court on confessions addressed the point of 
voluntariness. Was the confession freely given? Two cases 
which concerned this aspect added their name to a rule of 
examination known as the McNabb-Mallory Rule: Supervisory 
Authority over Federal Justice versus Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process. 
Prior acknowledgement or admissibility of a confession 
was predicated that it be free of influence which may make 
it untrustworthy. Dean Wigmore disagreed with the concept 
that used the word "voluntary" for the reason "there is 
nothing in the mere circumstance of compulsion to speak in 
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general . . . which create any risk of untruth."9 But 
voluntariness remained an issue. 
In 1936, the Supreme Court threw out the confession in 
Brown v, Mississippi10 determining that a confession obtained 
after a severe beating presided over by deputies interfered 
with the integrity of the fact-finding process. 
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee11 the Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction based upon a confession obtained after thirty-six 
hours of interrogation. The Court's position was that 
prolonged interrogation amounted to "coercion." This 
position by the Court "reflected less a concern with the 
reliability of a confession as evidence of guilt in the 
particular case than disapproval of police methods which a 
majority of the Court conceived as generally dangerous and 
subject to serious abuse."12 
It was during the time period covered by these cases 
that the McNabb13-Mai lory14 Rule (1936-1957) emerged. This 
9Yale Kamisar et al., Basic Criminal Procedure. (St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1994), p. 452. 
10Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 
80 L. Ed. 682 (1936). 
“Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 
88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944). 
12Yale Kamisar et al., Basic Criminal Procedure. (St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1994), p. 453. 
“McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 
608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943). 
“Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 Sup Ct. 
1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d. 1479 (1957). 
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rule underscored the Supreme Court's supervisory capacity 
over the workings of the criminal justice system on the 
Federal level. In McNabb, the suspect was held over seven 
hours before being brought in front of a committing 
magistrate. During this seven-hour period, the suspect gave 
incriminating statements to the police. Although this 
seven-hour delay was not in violation of state law, it was 
deemed to be in violation of Federal law. The Court 
concluded that the incriminating statements, although 
voluntary, were obtained during unlawful detention according 
to Federal standards and therefore rendered the use of the 
statements in a Federal trial unacceptable. This rule "was 
heavily criticized by law-enforcement spokesmen and many 
members of Congress. . . . "15 In Mallory, the Court 
emphasized the point that there should be no unnecessary 
delay in bringing the detainees before a committing 
magistrate. This rule, although adopted by several states, 
was not placed upon the states by the Court through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. What took its place was the Court's 
continued insistence to the right to counsel and the 
privilege of self-incrimination. The outcome witnessed the 
states' rules governing confessions to exceed the McNabb- 
Mallory requirements. 
15Yale Kamisar et al., Basic Criminal Procedure. (St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1994), p. 459. 
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It was little wonder that the area of confessions and 
their admissibility would take their allotted place before 
the United States Supreme Court for re-examination. It 
started with Escobedo v. Illinois.16 In this case, Escobedo 
was arrested and released on a writ of habeas corpus. He 
made no statements at this time. Eleven days later he was 
arrested. Before making any statement, he requested his 
attorney for consultation and was denied access to his 
attorney. His attorney was, at the same time, trying to 
reach his client but was told by the police that access 
would be denied until after the police conducted their 
interrogation. Escobedo admitted knowledge of the crime and 
was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on 
appeal stating, "The post arrest interrogation was the stage 
when legal aid and advice were most critical." (Mr. Justice 
Goldberg). With the Escobedo decision, the right to counsel 
was extended to the earliest possible moment in the criminal 
process. Where Escobedo opened the door to provide Federal 
protection in state criminal cases, Miranda attached the 
Fifth Amendment to that of the Sixth Amendment and Escobedo. 
The Miranda warning is widely known to program watchers 
of police dramas. The suspect is apprehended and a law 
enforcement officer starts to read "You have the right to 
remain silent . . . ." This was not always the case. Here 
is how it came to pass. Ernesto Miranda was arrested on 
“Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-491 (1964) . 
103 
March 13, 1963 for kidnapping and rape. He was taken to a 
police station in Phoenix, Arizona. Without being advised 
of his rights, Miranda was interrogated for two hours, after 
which time he signed a written confession. The top portion 
of his written statement contained a paragraph which said 
the statement was voluntarily given and that no threats or 
promises of immunity were invoked and "with full knowledge 
of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may 
be used against me."17 Essentially, the Supreme Court held 
that Miranda was not advised of his rights prior (author's 
emphasis) to making an oral confession which preceded the 
written version, he was not advised of his right to have an 
attorney to consult with prior to making any statement or 
that he had a right to have an attorney present during any 
questioning, nor that he had a right not to be compelled to 
incriminate himself. The Court also held, in reversing his 
conviction, that although the written statement contained a 
typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his 
"legal rights" this did not demonstrate that he was 
intelligently and knowingly waiving his constitutional 
rights. 
The court did not say that statements made by the 
accused are not admissible. What has evolved is a set of 
17Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 
L. Ed. 2nd 644 (1966). 
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conditions that must be met before the admission or 
confession can be used as evidence. They are: 
A. It must pass the traditional test of voluntariness and 
trustworthiness 
B. It must meet the requirements of McNabb v. United 
States18 and Mallory v. United States19 
C. It must meet Miranda requirements 
D. It is possible to taint a confession by an illegal 
search or seizure 
E. Failure to provide counsel may also invalidate a 
confession 
The decision in Miranda was not unanimous. There were four 
dissenters who stated that the majority opinion was not 
supported by either history or the wording of the Fifth 
Amendment. It was the position of the dissenters that the 
privilege against self-incrimination, as developed at common 
law, prohibited only compelled judicial interrogation. 
Also, they could find no authority for extending the 
privilege to out-of-court confession but they did agree that 
the test for voluntariness should be retained. An illegal 
search can taint a confession so as to make it inadmissible. 
If items are seized in an illegal search and the suspect, 
subsequently arrested and interrogated, gives a voluntary 
lsMcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 
87 L. Ed. 819 (1943). 
19Mallory v. United states, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 
1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957). 
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confession, the fact that the confession was a result of the 
illegal search would be cause to dismiss the confession as 
well as the illegally seized items. Escobedo showed how 
serious failures to allow/provide counsel can be in viewing 
the admissibility of ensuing confessions. 
State Compelled Self-Incrimination 
What is of interest here is that the word "compelled" 
again becomes important. In the cases of Wade and Gilbert, 
the suspect was compelled in helping the State gather 
evidence which was incriminating. If this point is to be 
disregarded as non-testimonial, then the question is begged 
as to whether or not compelling a suspect to perform or 
provide certain information or samples is testimonial in 
nature, for if the accused can be compelled to provide the 
evidence sought, the very act of providing the evidence is 
testimonial in nature. Whereas the evidence itself may be 
non-communicative or non-testimonial, the fact that the 
accused did in fact produce it is testimonial in itself. 
However, a witness does provide more than testimonial 
evidence. Take for example a laboratory chemist who 
performs certain tests. The tests provide evidence without 
which the testimony would be useless. However, at trial the 
witness gives validity to the test results. Without such 
testimony it is unlikely that the test results would be 
admitted into evidence. With the compelling of the accused 
to perform certain acts, deeds, or to supply biological 
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samples, we have a situation that again changes the rules 
for the submission of evidence. The argument is two-fold 
with the second part being the convenient overlooking of the 
"compelling" nature of the state's right to acquire certain 
evidence from the "self" involved i.e. the accused. 
It is in this regard that the position of John Wigmore 
is at odds with the Constitutional protection. Wigmore's 
position is paraphrased thusly. The individual's protection 
against self-incrimination was limited to using the legal 
process in order to extract an admission of his guilt from 
that individual's own lips. It appears the extraction of 
information from the lips is prohibited to the state but the 
extraction of information from the accused's veins is fair 
game! But Wigmore carried on to justify his position on 
three points. In the first place: 
The process of the ecclesiastical [c]ourt, as 
opposed to through two centuries, . . . the 
inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his 
oath, in order to supply the lack of the required 
two witnesses.20 
It would appear that the straightforward requirement of 
yesteryear of two witnesses has been supplanted by 
laboratory technicians, handwriting experts and others of 
the forensic craft. His second reasoning for justification 
concerned the policy of the position as a defensible 
institution which, in Wigmore's view, was simply to impress 
20Charles Gardner Geyh, "The Testimonial Component of 
the Right against Self-Incrimination," 36 Catholic 
University Law review 611 (Spring 1987) :63 
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upon the prosecution the need for them to obtain evidence 
strictly through their own efforts. But the prosecution, 
now so stimulated, still looks to the accused to provide 
evidence in the main which then is processed by the 
prosecution's experts in the various forensic fields to 
discover what evidence has been yielded, or better, 
"compelled" from the accused. Wigmore's third and final 
justification for limiting the scope of self-incrimination 
was "the practical requirement that follows from the 
necessity of recognizing other unquestioned methods of 
procuring evidence."21 Wigmore's support hinged on his 
argument the "self," and it is most important to note that 
Wigmore strays from the "self" to include "self" plus 
"physical control." "If the privilege afforded protection 
not only for the suspect's physical control of his own vocal 
utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever 
form exercised" then Wigmore concluded that it would be 
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his 
house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy 
the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that 
might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession 
and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles, in 
a clear reduction ad adsurdum. Again, Wigmore failed to 
note that the law has the authority to search and seize 
articles under the procedural guidelines of the Fourth 
21Ibid. , p . 63 . 
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Amendment. Seizure is not forbidden as he would suggest, 
just regulated in its form. Further, "possession" is not 
mentioned in the Fifth Amendment, though a weak case could 
be made that the accused possesses his biological fluids, 
handwriting, etc., but this argument fails to hold if 
"knowledge" is considered a possession as well. Not only 
that but, at the outset of the self-incrimination provision, 
the reliance on physical evidence i.e. biological analysis, 
handwriting, etc. did not exist. Geyh's argument contains a 
startling point. 
If the right is designed to assure that any 
evidence gathered against the accused is obtained 
through the exertions of the prosecution alone, it 
would be inappropriate for the prosecution to garner 
evidence against the suspect by means that compel 
him to assist in producing such evidence, regardless 
of whether that evidence takes the form of testimony 
or not.22 
If the right not to be compelled to be a witness against 
himself but to be a witness means to convey or impart 
evidence, then the question is therefore begged if one 
provides evidence that is incriminating is one then a 
witness against oneself? Niceties not precluded, one cannot 
perform one part of the task without risking the other. The 
earlier state courts appeared to have the same opinion in 
their positions on the matter. 
Further, if a suspect is advised of his rights as per 
Miranda, why must he be read his rights on more than one 
22Ibid. , p . 64 . 
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occasion or even in his entire lifetime? The rights do not 
change over time and, if a suspect could not remember 
certain portions or the entire contents of the wording, 
could he not then request them to be read to him again? It 
appears that the Warren Court created a myriad of avenues 
wherein a suspect could launch various appeals for his 
defense. Further consideration of the "activist" court will 
be addressed in the conclusion of this research. 
The Supreme Court, although not an elected body, appears 
over time to feed the needs of the public and, on rare 
occasions, the dictates of the executive branch (Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in his confrontation with the Supreme Court on 
matters of the New Deal). This outside "will" or pressure 
perhaps guides the Supreme Court in its interpretation of 
the Constitution. The wording contained in the Constitution 
does not change, but new meanings are attributed to the text 
through the political process, either quickly and forcibly 
(F.D.R. in the New Deal), or over the long run by replacing 
judges as they retire with judges who hold contemporary 
values expressed in the political make-up of the other two 
branches. 
Gabriel Almond posits his explanation of a political 
culture by stating that the Anglo-American political system 
is both homogeneous and secular in nature. He states that 
"a secular political culture is multi-valued, is rational 
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and calculating, bargaining and experimental .... 1,23 Part 
and parcel of his opinion is the sharing of values between 
the competing viewpoints. Although different viewpoints are 
furthered, no one singular viewpoint is completely- 
repressed. It is easy to agree with this position, but 
there are also intangibles; a feeling for fairness in the 
United States perhaps better described as political emotion. 
This political emotion blends with the resultant legal 
system and justifies in its proper era those fundamental 
Court holdings that shift toward and away from the 
government or suspect at various times. Were this not the 
case, there would be no rational explanation on how the 
state courts could view the Fifth Amendment in a broad 
favorable light in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century and, with fifty years of so deciding, bear witness 
to the United States Supreme Court vastly narrowing the 
protection granted by this amendment. Even considering the 
viewpoint of Wigmore and his close association with the 
United States Supreme Court in the early twentieth century, 
there were learned judges sitting on state supreme courts 
who rejected Wigmore's tight interpretation by issuing 
appellate decisions which would, fifty years later, be held 
to be non-viable by members of this most august body. 
However, over this fifty year period, the political emotion 
23Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems, 
The Journal of Politics Vol■ 18. (1955):398. 
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was changing towards a more liberal viewpoint on some 
amendments and more conservative on others. The Fourteenth 
Amendment was, perhaps, the most important legal vehicle to 
this phenomenon. In making some of these changes, evidenced 
by Wade and Gilbert, the Court failed to answer what the 
distinction may be between "compelled submission" in 
Schmerber and "compelled assistance" in Wade and Gilbert. 
Wigmore was wrong. His assessment of testimony vis-a- 
vis the Fifth Amendment is in error because he disregards, 
for simplicity's sake, the fact that the individual may be 
the sole possessor of some particular evidence. To compel 
him to produce that essence of evidence that is housed 
within his own body completely ignores the "self" in self- 
incrimination. If the evidence is within the individual 
i.e. knowledge, body fluids, etc., the Fifth Amendment makes 
no distinction between non-physical evidence, such as verbal 
communication/confession, and the more physical, such as 
blood, hair and other bodily "knowledge" (DNA). However, to 
have the position prevail creates problems for the 
enforcement of law upon which, quite often, can hang 
political stability. A severe inconvenience ensues. 
However, if the intent is to circumvent the Bill of Rights, 
then the political process allows for such eventualities, 
but the political danger lies in the engagement of that 
process. It seems inconceivable that the Founding Fathers 
would allow for the extraction of body fluids and find 
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repulsive the compelling of verbal confessions. Again, 
inconvenience to the criminal justice system looms large, 
but constitutional issues are found to be inconvenient when 
they are exercised for, at that time, their true worth as a 
protection is tested on the anvil of political/legal 
expediency. 
Public Expectations of the Government 
The entire Bill of Rights was predicated upon keeping 
government out of church, speech, one's home, etc. Is it 
likely they would allow government into one's veins? 
So it here appears that the rights of the individual bow 
to this political expediency. To carry it one step further, 
it is plausible to envision situations where only the 
barring of physical torture or extreme deprivation could be 
the only barriers to the acquisition of information 
(confession) from a suspect in custody by the enforcement 
arm of politics, law enforcement! 
The basic purpose that lies behind the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not relate to 
protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather 
to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in 
which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless 
the prosecution "shoulder the entire load."24 
Hardgrave and Bill wrote and outlined what they 
perceived to be the elements of our political culture. They 
are, in part: 
24Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 
415 (1966) 
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A. "specific roles or structures such as legislative 
bodies, executives, etc." 
B. "incumbents of roles -- monarchs, legislators, 
administrators" 
C. "particular public policies. decisions, or enforcement 
of decisions"25 
The public defines itself in relation to these structures. 
Part of the relationship is how each person is affected by 
the structures in place and whether or not the population 
agrees with the various outcomes of governmental (criminal 
justice) actions. With the political culture cutting across 
all lines of demarcation, such as class, religion and race, 
and with the resultant different points of reference from 
the individual to the system, it is paramount that 
simplicity of expression of the law be utilized at all 
times. If interpretation of the law conflicts with the 
public's perception then "the balance between governmental 
power and responsiveness, between consensus and cleavage, 
between citizen influence and citizen passivity"26 becomes 
questionable, unstable and problematic. Therefore, out of 
Wigmore1s position comes only chaos brought about by the 
disillusionment of the public with the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system to: 
25James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Comparative 
Politics: The Quest for Theory (Columbus, OH: Charles E. 
Merrill Publishing Company, 1973) p. 87. 
26Ibid. P. 91. 
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A. deal with crime 
B. protect one according to the dictates of the United 
States Constitution 
It is possible that Almond's position is valid "that people 
act in certain ways that can be variously categorized 
because they have internalized certain orientations of 
action."27 This orientation is focused on political/legal 
viewpoint held by the individual. This is important to note 
because the average citizen is not a legal, philosophical 
entity, but nevertheless, that individual's perception of 
the law is his point of reference. If the vast majority of 
citizens feel the Bill of Rights is too broad in the manner 
in which the Supreme Court interprets it, then frustration 
and political depression are a political outcome with 
political instability a resultant destination. On the other 
hand, if the interpretations are too strict, the protections 
imagined shrink in their applicability and are viewed as 
near useless. Again, political depression may set in. 
It could be argued that the various stances of the 
United States Supreme Court, by the very fact that they 
appear to vacillate in legal viewpoint over time, are a 
clear indication of reaction to the political depression of 
the population by the Court. This research disagrees with 
Philip Converse's position that, "The concept of political 
culture emphasizes that each individual has some sort of 
27Ibid. P. 93. 
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orientation to the political world. He does not, however, 
necessarily have opinions about it."28 Is not one's 
orientation or viewpoint his own opinion of where he stands 
in relationship to what it is he is orienting to? One must 
have both simultaneously. This research has referred to 
this blend as political emotion. 
The Use of Psychology in Interrogations 
If a suspect is compelled to give some example of 
physical evidence, the argument could be made that, in this 
case, blood is possessed by the suspect. This is a truism 
evidencing that, indeed, the suspect does possess blood, but 
further in the blood is the DNA or other items of 
evidentiary value, and producing the blood sample need not 
be accompanied by any other testimony. 
If one now considers the argument of "compel submission" 
which was not addressed by the Court in either Wade or 
Gilbert, another player enters the field. Where and how 
does one assess the point at which psychological pressure 
"compels" one to confess? Obviously the threshold for such 
a point exists, but how does the political process, through 
its legislative bodies, address this problem? If all 
psychological pressure is banned, what then will remain 
lawful for the admittance of a confession? Even a 
confession totally and freely offered has, as its 
foundation, some psychological basis and could thus be 
28Ibid. P. 93 
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argued by a defense attorney possessing little legal 
imagination. 
That psychological methods are used by many police 
interrogators is well understood. However, the term 
"psychological" conjures up, in many minds, images of 
prolonged and intense methods to "brainwash" the suspect 
into submission. It cannot be denied that, in some 
instances, this perhaps has occurred in the past with more 
frequency than in the present. Giving someone the "third 
degree" was de riguer prior to the Supreme Court decisions 
of the 1960's. 
To be considered though are several points. First, what 
is it the police are attempting to do? Second, what is 
precisely prescribed or proscribed by law? The political 
climate must also be taken into account for it is at those 
times of extreme fear by the population that the nuances and 
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution 
come under severe pressure to be changed or ignored. This 
political emotion can then make room for more liberal 
allowances in actual or near police misconduct in the area 
of interrogating suspects. What is the balance acceptable 
to the population in trade-offs of protection or safety vis- 
a-vis the surrendering of some "rights" in order to become 
more secure in their safety? If the population feels rather 
secure, then the mere "raising of the voice" by the 
interrogator in confronting the suspect could possibly be 
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viewed as abusive and psychologically overpowering, thus 
placing the interrogator outside the bounds of acceptable 
behavior as it is viewed by the law. Under the more adverse 
situations, the opposite may very well apply. 
Within the individual there are various experiences used 
by that person to maintain a state of homeostasis within his 
nervous system. Creating an imbalance in this system can 
bring on various degrees of depression and anxiety which the 
individual could find to be intolerable and he may, 
consequently, confess in order to remove those items from 
his world (interrogator and his questions) thereby allowing 
his nervous system to return to normal.29 The problem 
created here is that the threshold of intolerance is 
different for all persons. How then does the legislature 
redefine what is acceptable? How far does the present 
protection offered go in its guaranties? How secure are 
those guaranties? 
At What Risk to Remain Silent? 
It is a plausible position to require that no risk, or 
at the very most, only minimal risk be possible by invoking 
a right or privilege guaranteed by the highest law in the 
land. Does a suspect run certain risks by adopting this 
position? If so, how can the State utilize this against the 
29Joseph L. Kibitlewski, "The Use of Psychology in 
Interrogation," paper presented at the 55th annual meeting 
of the Mississippi Academy of Sciences, Jackson, MS., 22 
February 1991. 
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suspect? A variety of case law has been generated by such 
questions and it is necessary to examine this possible 
scenario to help properly evaluate what protections mean 
when legislated by the political system. Law is the 
political contract between the people and the government. 
The United States Constitution offers various protections to 
the people from the weight of the government. 
Of early note are the cases of Twining v. New Jersey30 
and Adamson v. California.31 In Twining, the Supreme Court 
stated that the "Fifth Amendment was not binding on states," 
therefore no protection was possible through the Fifth 
Amendment to cases in state courts. In Adamson, the Supreme 
Court allowed the state to mention that the accused refused 
to testify. By 1964 both the make-up of the Supreme Court 
and the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court had begun to 
change. In Mallory v. Hogan32 the Supreme Court now stated 
that it was improper for judicial comment to be made to the 
jury that the accused failed to testify. However, by 1978 
the pendulum again started to swing the other way. In 
Lakeside v. Oregon33 the judge at trial advised the jury that 
30Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 
L.Ed. 97 (1908). 
31Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1962, 91 
L.Ed. 1093 (1947). 
32Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed. 
2d. 653 (1964). 
33Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 55 L. Ed. 2d 319, 98 
S. Ct. 1091 (1978). 
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the accused invoked his right not to testify and, because it 
was the right of the accused to invoke this privilege, the 
jury should draw no adverse inference from the accused's 
decision not to testify. 
This whole viewpoint appears to be incongruous. We 
empanel a jury, allow the jury to hear what can be described 
as "complex" testimony and presentation of evidence and then 
expect a jury not to take note of the fact that the 
defendant did not testify. The jury is there for the sole 
purpose of evaluating the evidence offered and what it 
means. Surely it will not go unnoticed that the defendant 
failed to testify! Whether the judge or the prosecutor make 
note of that to the jury without attaching specific 
guilty/not guilty values to it seems trite in importance. 
Is it not human to wonder why someone, who professes to be 
innocent, not take the stand in his defense? Legal argument 
notwithstanding, is it not plausible -- perhaps certain -- 
that this thought pattern will enter the minds of many, if 
not all, the jurors? It should be sufficient to advise the 
jury as in the case of Lakeside for proper interpretation. 
But again, this looks questionable when viewed alongside 
"compelled" testimony/evidence such as required through 
blood sampling, etc. Other than direct admonition to 
consider this a guilty act on the part of the defendant not 
to testify, nothing more need be offered. 
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Immunity and Self-Incrimination 
The real sticking point however is the use of immunity 
to "compel" the suspect or witness to testify. The Fifth 
Amendment makes no mention of granting immunity from 
prosecution in exchange for testimony. It works in this 
fashion. First, there are two separate privileges against 
compulsory self-incrimination : 
A. The privilege of the accused 
B. The privilege of a witness 
The Accused 
The accused does not have to take the stand and does not 
have to testify. The prosecutor may not comment on the 
accused's failure to testify except in fair response if the 
accused's defense counsel mentions to the jury in closing 
argument that the state did not allow his client to take the 
stand. If the accused does elect to take the stand he/she 
must answer all relevant questions concerning the charge. 
The Witness 
The witness is cloaked with the privilege to refuse to 
disclose any matter that may "tend to incriminate" him. 
This privilege covers criminal proceedings only, not civil. 
If the answer to the questions merely ridicules, embarrasses 
or disgraces the witness, no privilege is extended unless, 
again, there are criminal implications. 
So, we come now to the grant of "immunity" from prosecution 
for the witness. Two other factors also apply: 
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A. If the witness was acquitted of the crime and therefore 
cannot be re-prosecuted, the witness can be compelled to 
testify 
B. If the statute of limitations has run its course and 
prosecution again is no longer a reality, the privilege 
does not come into play 
In the first instance, the grant of immunity may be given by 
either the law, the prosecutor or the judge. The witness is 
thus compelled to testify. If the witness refuses to 
testify he/she can be held in contempt of court. Our legal 
system takes note of our Federal system in that a grant of 
immunity by either state or Federal proceedings carries its 
protection of immunity over to the other (Murphy [1964]) .34 
The use of witness immunity is further bifurcated by the 
types of immunity possible. There are the Transactional and 
the Use and Derivative Use types of immunity. The 
Transactional grant means that the witness can no longer be 
prosecuted for any occurrence stemming from the transaction. 
The Use and Derivative Use immunity however, is different. 
The witness could be prosecuted for the same charge if 
independent evidence, exclusive of the testimony, can be 
discovered. Transactional immunity is not necessary to 
compel testimony (Kastigar [1972]).35 In Kastigar, the 
witness refused to testify under Use and Derivative Use with 
34Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) . 
35Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
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the point that Transactional immunity must be granted. The 
United States Supreme Court disagreed. 
The privilege of the witness may also be waived. The 
waiver can take place in three ways. First, only the 
witness can assert his privilege. If he fails to do so when 
the incriminating question is asked, the privilege is 
waived. Second, if the witness discloses a self- 
incriminating fact, all further facts relating to the 
privilege are waived. And third, if the accused takes the 
stand, he or she must answer all relevant inquiries to the 
charge. 
Although diplomatic immunity also is involved through 
international law, it is beyond the scope of this research 
(see Appendix for additional types of immunity). 
The Use and Derivative Use immunity was perhaps most 
noted by the case of Colonel Oliver North and the 
congressional hearings concerning the Iran/Contra arms deal. 
In this governmental proceeding, we come full circle in the 
government's quest for knowledge from the ordeals of the 
pre-Magna Carta era to the present day example of Col. 
Oliver North.36 This matter-of-State clearly indicates that 
the needs of the government are still present, but that the 
evolution of time along with the evolution of political 
36United States v. Oliver North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. 
Cir) . 
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thought and expression have dramatically changed how the 
proceedings are now carried forth. 
Colonel North was granted Use and Derivative Use 
immunity in order to elicit information he possessed 
concerning the involvement of various governmental 
officials' and agencies' actions circumventing Congressional 
dictates regarding the supply of arms to the Contras. After 
securing immunity, Colonel North implicated himself in 
actions that were clearly in violation of the law. At the 
conclusion of the Congressional hearings, Colonel Oliver 
North was prosecuted for his illegal involvements. He was 
convicted on three of the twelve counts and he appealed. 
His appeal centered on the point that some of the evidence 
used by the special prosecutor and witnesses had genesis 
from his testimony during the Congressional proceedings and 
should have been suppressed. In a two to one decision, the 
United States Court of Appeals agreed ruling that the 
preceding judge must determine "witness-by witness; if 
necessary line-by-line and item-by-item" if the special 
prosecutor or any of the witnesses in Colonel North's trial 
were influenced by his testimony at the Congressional 
hearings under which he was granted his immunity. The 
Government/special prosecutor found this to be too 
cumbersome in burden to cope with and subsequently elected 
not to retry Colonel North. 
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Controversy surrounding the "right to silence" is as 
unsettled today as it has been these past four centuries. 
Amar and Lettow37 indicate, by their position, to once and 
for all clearly outline what is protected and what is not. 
If Counselman v. Hitchcock38 did not accomplish this feat, 
then Kastigar v. United States surely muddied the waters. 
Whereas in Counselman the Supreme Court indicated that 
compelled testimony carried all use of the obtained 
information involved in subsequent criminal proceedings, 
Kastigar said that some use of the compelled testimony can 
be used. Amar and Lettow would so structure the use of 
immunity as to completely strip the protection to near 
meaningless guidelines. Their proposal would allow for 
testimony to be compelled with the proviso that the 
compelled testimony never be introduced over the defendant's 
objection in a criminal trial. The point being that the 
defendant then is not a witness against himself in a 
"criminal case," but the fruits of these compelled pretrial 
words will generally be admissible."39 This research finds 
Amar and Lettow very disturbing to say the least. The focus 
of their research appears to be to assist the courts 
37Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. Lettow, "Fifth Amendment 
First Principles: The Self-Incriminâtion Clause" Michigan 
Law Review Vol. 93, No. 5 (March 1995):857-928. 
38Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) . 
39Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. Lettow, "Fifth Amendment 
First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause" Michigan 
Law Review Vol. 93, No. 5 (March 1995) :859. 
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because, under the present interpretations of the 
protection, the "courts cripple innocent defendants while 
the guilty wrap themselves in the clause and walk free."40 
If so, then how do the "guilty" go free? The pretrial 
civilized hearing proposed by Amar and Lettow would be 
presided over by a magistrate or judge for the purpose of 
eliciting testimony that the suspect must give truthfully. 
It is difficult on the one hand to realize that the 
privilege against self-incrimination was not sooner in place 
in police interrogations. Early legal reasoning embodied 
that compulsion to testify meant legal compulsion. With the 
suspect being neither threatened with perjury nor contempt 
for failing to testify at all, it could not be said that he 
was being "compelled" during the police interrogation to be 
a witness against himself and therefore, contrary to the 
privilege extended. "As the police have no legal right to 
make the suspect answer, there is no legal obligation to 
answer to which a privilege in the technical sense can 
apply. "41 
Introduction at trial of additional facts obtained 
through scientific methods presents philosophical as well as 
legal debate. Voice stress analysis and polygraphs each 
offer technical assistance to determine truth. In order to 
40Ibid. p. 861. 
41Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, 
Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases. Comments and Questions 7th 
ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1990), p. 440. 
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be admitted at trial, the method used must first comply with 
the "Frye"42 requirements. This essentially lays the 
groundwork for acceptance of the method used, if that method 
is generally accepted within its own scientific community 
and given that certain guidelines are followed. It is in 
this manner that blood typing evidence determination is 
allowed as a valid method of determining blood type from 
various types of body fluid samples. 
The research would be remiss in its mission if other 
predictable possibilities were not considered under the 
penumbra of the various collateral issues yet to be 
addressed by the Fifth Amendment. The United States has a 
legal history of stretching and condensing protections 
offered by the Bill of Rights. With the First Amendment, 
Supreme Court decisions have broadened the "freedom of 
speech" clause to include nudity and flag burning as 
expressions of free speech. Surely if speech is verbal, 
then non-verbal communication is also considered speech. 
Yet in matters important to the Fifth Amendment, non-verbal 
(communication) is considered outside the realm of speech 
and not protected. Of significant nature comes the 
42Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (App. D.C.) 
(1923) 
" . . . while courts will go a long way in admitting expert 
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific 
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction 
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs." 
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following question. Who may be given immunity to testify? 
To fully appreciate this question we must outline the 
problem again through legal case history. 
Multiple Personalities and 
Self - Incrimination 
If one can be given immunity in order for a court to 
secure testimony against the individual or another, can the 
court grant immunity to one "personality" who dwells within 
a singular body with other personalities? On the surface, 
the concept at first appears absurd. Under examination with 
case history, serious questions come into focus. This 
disorder is manifested by the existence within a single 
person of several distinct personalities or personality 
states. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders describes personality thusly: "Personality is here 
defined as a relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, 
relating to, and thinking about the environment and one's 
self that is exhibited in a wide range of important social 
and personal contexts."43 The Manual goes on to illustrate 
how in classic cases there are at least two fully developed 
personalities, or, there can exist one distinct personality 
and one or more personality states. It is possible for each 
personality to have unique memories, behavior patterns and 
social relationships. In the adult population the number of 
43American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 3rd ed. rev. 
(Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1987), 
p. 269. 
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personalities or personality states can number over one 
hundred. The Manual also states that in such cases about 
fifty percent have fewer than ten personalities and, of 
course, the other fifty percent shows more than ten 
personalities. What is important is the realization that at 
some point in time the person's behavior is under the 
control of two or more of these personalities. This change 
of personality is sudden in nature, although there have been 
known cases where the changeover has been gradual. Whether 
the personalities are known to each other or not also occurs 
on a case-by-case basis. In some instances one personality 
is in conflict with one or more of the other resident 
personalities. In many cases, the existence of other 
personalities can be quite unknown to the one personality 
until treatment is sought for some psychological condition. 
There are other distinct points that also bear mentioning. 
One personality may adapt quite well, be gainfully employed, 
while a separate personality could be clearly dysfunctional. 
There are studies that show different physiological traits 
between personalities as well as different I.Q., different 
responses to the same medication, even to each having 
different eyeglass prescriptions. It is not unusual for a 
different sex, race or age to be the position of each 
personality; behaving appropriately according to the sex or 
age so posited. 
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These are a few of the considerations that the law must 
attempt to address. In attempting to be fair, the law 
appears to be entering a new legal quagmire. In the case of 
State v. Halcomb44 the defendant confessed and ultimately was 
convicted. The personality that confessed was also the 
personality that committed the crime. The confession and 
charges were both disputed by the "principle"(?) 
personality. The appeal of the conviction was denied and 
the conviction was affirmed. In Arizona v. Carlson45 the 
preliminary hearing witnessed three of James Carlson's 
personalities, each being placed under oath separately! If 
the judge saw fit to place each personality under oath, is 
then the court treating each as a separate legal entity? 
This brings the question, if one personality is guilty, the 
others must be innocent unless a conspiracy can be 
established. Should an innocent personality suffer the 
consequences of a guilty person? 
Miranda and Its Effects 
What has been the effect of Miranda upon the actions of 
the police? Were there any social costs? Both questions 
were researched by Paul Cassell individually. 
The first study addressed is titled "Police 
Interrogation in the 1990's: An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of Miranda," conducted by Paul G. Cassell and Bret 
44State v. Halcomb, 3 NCA 169, 1993 NEB. App. Lexis 185. 
45The Times. Thursday, January 6, 1994. 
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S. Hayman. The focus of their study was to determine if, as 
the Supreme Court has ruled, Miranda is "prophylactic," what 
would a cost/benefit analysis determine? Is the 
effectiveness of police interrogations eroded by Miranda? 
If this is weighed against the suspect's rights, is there 
balance in the law? The sample used was obtained in Salt 
Lake County, Utah and encompassed a sample of more than two 
hundred cases. The study examined: 
A. Frequency of waivers 
B. Police compliance with Miranda 
C. Role confessions played in prosecutions 
Basic findings produced the following data: 
A. 21 percent of all suspects were never questioned 
B. 16 percent of suspects invoked their Miranda rights 
C. only about 33 percent gave confessions 
The research pointed out that the 33 percent figure is lower 
than pre-Miranda onset by the Supreme Court. When compared 
to other countries that do not have Miranda warnings, this 
same 33 percent was again lower indicating that perhaps 
Miranda has depressed confession rates. 
The comparison with rates of confessions in other 
countries is a valid one considering that the law in other 
countries was a part of the basis for consideration of the 
Warren Court, which issued Miranda. Chief Justice Warren's 
opinion issued in Miranda stated that foreign jurisdictions 
followed comparable rules with no ill effects. Cassell goes 
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on to illustrate that, "British confession rates fell from 
over 60percent before 1986 to between 40 and 50percent when 
the Miranda-style Police and Criminal Act was imposed in 
that year."46 
Another datum which bears consideration in Cassell's 
paper is Table 2. This table clearly shows that 
interrogation by police need not be unduly long in duration 
to obtain a confession. 
TABLE 2 
QUESTIONING RESULT BY LENGTH OF QUESTIONING 
(N=173; 87 unavailable) 
Length of Questioning Questioning Total 
Questioning Successful Unsuccessful 
No o. No % No % 
< 5 Minutes 6 33.3% 12 66.7% 18 100.0% 
6-10 Minutes 11 40.7% 16 59.3% 27 100.0% 
11-15 Minutes 5 62.5% 3 37.5% 8 100.0% 
16-30 Minutes 15 68.2% 7 31.8% 22 100.0% 
31-60 Minutes 4 40.0% 6 60.0% 10 100.0% 
60+ Minutes 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 
Total 42 48.8% 44 51.2% 86 100.0% 
Source : Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman. "Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of Miranda," 43 UCLA Law Review 001 (1996) :59. 
46Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman. "Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of Miranda," 43 UCLA Law Review 001 (1996) :42. 
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This table illustrates the progression of success as the 
length of time interrogating a suspect increases from 5 
minutes to 60 minutes. This clearly is not up to Star 
Chamber standards! This research supports the position that 
interrogations are not extended periods of time in which the 
suspect is held incommunicado. Further, the collected data 
showed that most interrogations were held during the daytime 
hours. These data were important because the protection to 
remain silent was intended, in the first instance, to 
prevent the accused from torture. With this in mind, this 
research dealt earlier with torture, perceived and actual. 
From Cassell's paper, table 3 shows the interrogation to be 
more successful when the accused is confronted with evidence 
against him. 
TABLE 3 
QUESTIONING RESULT BY STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE 
(N=173; 30 unavailable) 
Strength Invoked Questioning Questioning Total 
of Evidence Rights Successful Unsuccessful 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Overwhelming 3 33.3% 5 55.6% 1 11.1% 9.0 100.0% 
Strong 12 16.7% 34 47.2% 26 36.1% 72 100.0% 
Moderate 4 9.3% 18 41.9% 21 48.8% 43 100.0% 
Weak 0 0.0% 5 26.3% 14 73.7% 19 100.0% 
Total 19 13.3% 62 43.4% 62 43.4% 14 100.0% 
Source : Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman. "Police Interrogation in the 
1990s: An Empirical study of the Effects of Miranda," 43 UCLA Law Review 
001 (1996) : 62 . 
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The stronger the evidence, the more likely that a confession 
will occur. 
Cassell goes on to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's 
"prophylactic Miranda doctrine sweeps more broadly than the 
Fifth Amendment and is over broad in that its application 
excludes some statements made during custodial 
interrogations that are, in fact, not coercive."47 Cassell's 
position is well taken that ". . .a suspect has no 
legitimate interest under the Constitution in avoiding 
confessing; rather, a suspect is entitled to be free from 
unconstitutional coercion."48 If "coercion" is the 
proscribed element, then we must look to Chief Justice 
White's position. Chief Justice White finds it difficult to 
agree with the contention that if "the police ask a single 
question 'Do you have anything to say?' such a query becomes 
coercive."49 Should Miranda be required to ask the simple 
question? In Moran50 the Court "now tells us that Miranda is 
'a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both 
47New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 684 n. 7 (1984) . 
(Marshall, J. dissenting). 
48Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman. "Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the 
effects of Miranda," 43 UCLA Law Review 001 (1996) : 94. 
49Ibid. 
50Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n. 4 (1986). 
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the defendants' and society's interest.'"51 These statements 
by the Court are without empirical data to support them and, 
on the face of it, it appears that society pays more than 
its share of the balancing act. Clearly the score is 
"advantage" suspect. 
With society's interest now the point, the second 
portion of Cassell's research52 gains prominence. The 
methodology used in this study did not focus on confession 
suppression rates, but attempted to delineate the number of 
confessions "lost" or not obtained because of Miranda. The 
studies were two-sided. One study looked at the numbers on 
a "before" and "after" Miranda onset. The second looked at 
the confession rate in the United States vis-a-vis other 
countries that use different methods to direct police 
interrogations. 
Before and After Studies 
As table 4 shows, there were drops in the confession 
rate in all cities with the exception of Los Angeles. Data 
from Los Angeles was contaminated because of variance in the 
questions asked. The studies in Los Angeles are known as 
51Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman. "Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of Miranda,," 43 UCLA Law Review 001 (1996): 96. 
52Paul G. Cassell. "Miranda's Social Cost: An Empirical 
Reassessment," Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 90, 
No. 2 (1996) . 
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the Dorado53 studies. These studies are discredited on two 
points. First, many replies were incomplete or 
inconsistent. Second, a follow-up re-designed questionnaire 
included in the analysis "confessions and admissions" or 
other statements. Also, Dorado was compared in Los Angeles 
a few weeks after Miranda and may have included pre-Miranda 
data. 
TABLE 4 
ESTIMATES OF CHANGES IN THE CONFESSION 







Pittsburgh 48.5% 29.9% -18.6% 
N.Y. County 49.0% 14.5% -34.5% 
Philadelphia 45% (est./der.) 20.4% (der.) -24.6% 
"Seaside City" 68.9% 66.9% -2.0% ? 
New Haven- 
1960-66 
58-63% (est.) 48.2% -10.15% Yes 
New Haven- 
calculated 
? ? -16.0% 
D.C. 21.5% (der.) 20.0% (der.) -1.5% Yes 
Kansas City ? ? -6% (der.) ? 
Kings County 45% (est./der.) 29.5% (der.) -15.5% 
New Orleans 40% (est.) 28.2% -11.8% ? 
Chicago 
homicides 
53% (der.) 26.5% (der.) -26.5% ? 





Source : Paul G. Cassell. "Miranda’s Social Cost: An Empirical Reassessment," Northwestern 
University Law Review Vol. 90, No. 2 (199S): 416. 
est. - estimated 
der. = derived 
“People v. Dorado, 398 P. 2d (Cal.) (en Banc), Cert, 
denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965). 
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"Thus the study is not really a before and after study, but 
rather an after-after study."54 It is Cassell's contention, 
based upon the analysis shown in the "before" and "after" 
table 4, that "the best estimate is that Miranda results in 
a lost confession in roughly one out of every six criminal 
cases in this country."55 
In summary, this chapter has provided a comprehensive 
overview of the legal and political processes which 
culminated in the present provisions of Miranda. This 
moreover shows that this process is still dynamic and, to 
further underscore this comment, there is the realization 
that when Miranda was decided by the Supreme Court, its 
margin of inception was by one vote. The Supreme Court has 
witnessed its periodic intrusion upon the states' legal 
viewpoint of confessions and has, on occasion, in its 
estimation, found the states' position to be legally 
wanting. 
Of additional consideration is the political implication 
of providing to the public a vantage point to help reaffirm 
its belief in the abstract quality of the law through its 
political process. The period of Miranda was one of turmoil 
within the society on many levels. The Government was 
involved in attempting to justify its military decisions 
54Paul G. Cassell. "Miranda's Social Cost: An Empirical 
Reassessment," Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 90, 
No. 2 (1996) : 416. 
55Ibid. p. 417. 
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regarding Viet Nam; the civil rights issues of the South 
were producing clashes between state and Federal 
authorities; environmental issues as well as sex-based 
employment problems were all vying for the Government's 
attention on behalf of some portion of society. Issues of 
the marches, riots and other expressions of political 
discontent required, perhaps, some expression by an 
authoritative governing body to provide reassurance to the 
public that the Government was not abandoning it to a 
dictatorial process. The rulings of the Supreme Court may 
have performed a function of political salvation by 
instituting restraints upon the most visible expression of 
the Government -- the criminal justice system. It is not 
the position of this research that the Supreme Court acted 
under these concerns, but rather, that the end product was 
serendipitous to the era. 
The public, through the decisions of the Supreme Court, 
now had cause to believe that the protections of the Bill of 
Rights were indeed real in their application. Miranda gave 
way to all types of legal challenges. Areas of immunity, 
violations of the right to remain silent, even those 
concerned with the peculiar psychological malady of 
"multiple personalities," were all given their opportunity 
in this ever-changing legal quagmire. 
CHAPTER 5 
ENGLISH LAW AND SUSPECTS' RIGHTS 
A direct comparison of English case law and United 
States' case law was made difficult because the variations 
on a legal theme, so prevalent in the judicial system of the 
United States, were found to be lacking in its English 
counterpart. The cases selected for comparison from the 
English records were chosen because they most closely 
addressed those issues concerned with the research. The 
interplay between English civil and criminal law had to 
likewise be examined, as some issues of protection of the 
right to silence were shown to be challenged in their 
effectiveness when considerations of law that existed 
between the civil and criminal proceedings of an accused 
were taken into account. 
The research found, as a by-product, that some areas of 
recent concern in the United States' courts are not at all 
present in the English courts. Most notable is the recent 
plethora of cases in the United States with the accused 
claiming to contain multiple personalities. There is little 
evidence that the mental health professionals in England 
consider this as a valid malady and, therefore, it is not 
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unusual to find it missing from legal proceedings. The 
massive change of Federal law into the provinces of the 
state courts in the United States is also lacking within the 
English system, as England does not possess a federal type 
of political division. The struggle, therefore, to 
reconcile Federal law with state law does not present itself 
in England. Curiously, also missing is the formation of 
"judicial rules," witnessed in the United States' legal 
system by virtue of the Supreme Court edicts. Such judicial 
rules as the "Miranda rule," or the "exclusionary rule," of 
the United States' type, are not within the province of 
authority of English appellate judges. 
Of concern in the area of English law and suspects' 
rights, with considerable possibility of strong impact, was 
the amount and motivation for Parliament to have overturned 
its own laws in respect to the problem under consideration. 
With the availability of quick judicial viewpoint 
modification of Parliament vis-a-vis changing the viewpoint 
of the United States Supreme Court through its limitations 
placed on replacement of those seated on the court, we 
examined if this availability for swiftness was motivated to 
benefit the suspect and if so, what were the conditions that 
brought it about. 
With the English system, Parliament can be brought down 
in a matter of days and replaced within a matter of weeks, 
thereby possibly changing the political thought behind the 
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provided judicial review. In the United States, this 
process could conceivably be stretched over a twenty-year 
period or even longer. How then has this been a factor, if 
at all? 
"Miranda" - English Style 
Although England is the birthplace of the individual's 
"right to silence", it is here that we find changes, however 
slight, occurring. At the heart of the matter is the 
wording of the new warning -- Miranda, if you will -- that 
has been codified into the legal system. This warning, 
given by the police to a suspect, used to be "You do not 
have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you 
say may be given in evidence." This caution has been 
replaced by the following: "You do not have to say anything. 
But if you do not mention now something which you later use 
in your defence, the court may decide that your failure to 
mention it now strengthens the case against you. A record 
will be made of anything you say and it may be given in 
evidence if you are brought to trial." The controversy over 
this change in the wording of the caution will be addressed 
further in the succeeding chapter. 
Of comparison interest is the area requiring the suspect 
to provide certain types of exemplars for evidentiary 
purposes. In England, the suspect may refuse and this 
refusal, the research shows, can have an adverse impact on 
the suspect when the refusal is coupled with additional 
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evidence to help convict the suspect. Adverse as this may 
appear, the fact that the suspect does exercise the right 
not to provide evidence is in keeping with both the letter 
of the law and its spirit. "Cautions" must be administered 
if the person is suspect of an offense before any questions 
are put to him to obtain information. No "caution" is 
needed to establish identity, establish ownership or to 
search the person. As soon as the officer questioning the 
person believes that he should be prosecuted and has a good 
chance to convict, the officer will ask the person if he has 
anything to say. When a person is charged for multiple 
offenses, the person will be "cautioned" for all charges. 
When the person is charged or informed he may be charged, he 
will be "cautioned." 
As stated earlier in the research, a direct comparison 
in all instances may not be possible given the nuances of 
the law under each political system. The research discussed 
at some length how information obtained under one type of 
legal setting could be used in another proceeding if, under 
United States' law, there were Fifth Amendment issues 
controlling. In England we find a similar situation with 
quite a different outcome than what would be expected in the 
United States. 
Civil and Criminal Law 
The research has shown that there is a division of the 
law in the United States, not only between cases of civil or 
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criminal origin, but also between legal systems i.e. state 
or Federal jurisdiction. The English system benefits, or 
suffers, from a division of law into only civil or criminal 
courts. These differences will be further addressed in the 
succeeding chapter. It is mentioned here so that inclusion 
of both civil and criminal cases, under English law, may 
provide a clearer understanding of the rights and protection 
in question. 
The research of English law records revealed substantial 
insight into areas of law both of a criminal and civil 
nature. Whereas the court in either division may order or 
request certain "intimate samples" of evidence for 
comparison purposes, their actual presence may not be 
forthcoming. The failure to produce these "samples" does 
impact upon the accused, but in different ways than under 
the law in the United States. 
The case of R. v. Tottenham Justices Ex Parte ML Queens 
Bench deals with the prosecution being able to obtain "edge" 
prints of the palm of a juvenile suspect in a burglary under 
investigation. Argument by the defense did not center upon 
the point that this was prevented by law because it would be 
providing "self" evidence but rather upon the proviso that 
perhaps "edge" prints of the palm were not themselves "palm 
prints" as dictated by Parliament. The prints were taken 
and, after conviction, an appeal was filed from which dicta 
for this research is reflected. The appeal was denied under 
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two points. One, the judges agreed that the edge of the 
palm was a palm print in all respects and, second, "non¬ 
intimate" samples may be taken of a suspect by court order. 
The appeal at no time proffered the argument of providing 
evidence contrary to the right to remain silent. This is a 
clear indication of the lack of interest by English 
barristers to bring into prominence legal nuances for debate 
or consideration at the appellate level. 
The case of R. v. Brody1 does however hinge on the right 
to silence. The law being addressed in this case concerned 
statements made by the accused in voire dire. This voire 
dire under English law differs in that it more closely 
resembles a preliminary hearing in the United States rather 
than the voir dire in the United States which concerns 
itself with the jury selection process. Under English law, 
the accused has the right to give evidence at voire dire 
without affecting his right to remain silent at the 
substantive trial which is absolute and not to be made 
conditional by judicial discretion.2 At the substantive 
trial for this case, the prosecution called as a witness the 
court reporter to read the notes from the voire dire 
regarding the suspect's admission that he was a member of 
the IRA. The defense objected but the trial judge allowed 
1R. v. Brody House of Lords [1982] AC 476, [1981] All 
ER 705, [1983] 3 WLR 103, 73 Cr App Rep 287, 145. 
2Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen [1979] 1 All ER at 946-947. 
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the court reporter to be heard. After a conviction on only- 
one count out of forty-nine charges, the suspect appealed 
his conviction on count 49, the one which addressed his 
involvement as a member of the IRA. A court of appeals in 
Northern Ireland found for the defendant and the Crown 
subsequently appealed the appeal. The Crown lost its 
argument because of the following opinion. If the evidence 
at voire dire is relevant to the case it cannot be used 
against the accused at substantive trial. Further, if this 
evidence could be used at substantive trial it would limit 
the accused's freedom at voire dire to examine points of law 
contested by the defense. In this case, the voire dire was 
used to determine if the statements made by the accused at 
various times while in police custody were freely given or 
coerced. The judge at voire dire decided the statements 
made by the accused to the police might have been coerced 
and so the judge, at voire dire, disallowed 
statements/confessions at the substantive trial. 
If the accused wants to have a determination to decide 
whether evidence was obtained properly by the police, he 
must be allowed the freedom to speak at voire dire without 
jeopardy for he cannot provide an adequate argument without 
giving evidence, and if his evidence were admissible at the 
substantive trial, the accused would suffer significant 
impairment of his right to silence at the trial itself. It 
may be reasoned that in the situation of voire dire, the 
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accused is "compelled" to give evidence; this in stark 
contrast to the right to remain silent. ". . .no man is to 
be compelled to incriminate himself; nemo tenetur se ipsum 
prodere."3 The word "compelled" in that context includes 
being put under pressure to give evidence at voire dire. 
The appeals judge's decision in part reads: 
Any civilised system of criminal jurisprudence must 
accord to the judiciary some means of excluding 
confessions . . . the accused not to be subjected to 
ill treatment . . . it is therefore necessary the 
accused should feel free, either by his own 
testimony or other means, to challenge the voluntary 
character of the tendered statement. 
It was the position of this appeals court that this right is 
absolute and cannot be made conditional by judicial 
discretion. Under the law in the United States, this type 
of hearing, usually held prior to trial, also precludes the 
use of testimony obtained at the hearing to be used at 
trial. 
Non-Testimonial Self-Incrimination 
Whereas in Brody the accused's right to silence was 
absolute, there are areas which allow the accused to place 
himself in jeopardy to various degrees by not providing 
evidence, to wit, "intimate samples," blood, etc. The case 
of McVeigh v. Beattie4 is of particular interest in this 
regard. Although this case is civil in nature, the law is 
3R. v. Sang [1979] 2 All ER 1222 at 1246, [1980] Ac 402 
at 455 per Lord Scarman. 
4McVeigh v. Beattie [1988] Fam 69, [1988] 2 All ER 500, 
[1988] 2 WLR 992, [1988] 2 FLR 67, [1988] Fam Law 290. 
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the same regarding court orders for obtaining "intimate 
samples." This case involved one of paternity determination 
brought about by a nanny employed by the defendant. The 
plaintiff stated that the accused had sexual intercourse 
upon her body and against her will and that, as a result of 
this unwanted sexual assault, she became pregnant. She also 
stated that prior to the assault she had been a virgin and 
had no previous sexual contact with anyone. The birth of 
her illegitimate child ensued. The plaintiff brought 
charges against the accused. The judges made a direction, 
under section 20 of the Family Law Act 1969, for blood tests 
of the parties and the child. The accused did not comply 
with the court direction to provide blood samples. To place 
the points at issue in this case, it will help to examine a 
companion criminal case to assist in understanding the point 
of demarcation between the suspect's right to remain silent 
and the obligation to provide "intimate samples" for the 
determination of fact-finding. Reg, v. Smith5 is such a 
case for inclusion here. Smith was charged with robbery and 
a search of the crime scene produced hair samples. The 
accused refused court direction to provide samples for 
comparison. Smith did not take the stand at trial and the 
only evidence against him was from an accomplice who 
implicated Smith. The jury was warned of the danger of 
convicting the suspect on the "uncorroborated" evidence of 
5Reg v. Smith (Robert William) [1985] 81 Cr App R 286. 
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the accomplice, and the judge defined corroboration and 
directed the jury that Smith's refusal to provide hair 
samples was capable of amounting to corroboration. The 
appellate court considered the defense's position that the 
trial judge's direction perhaps conflicted with the basic 
principle that no-one was obliged to incriminate himself, 
and an analogy was drawn with the right to remain silent. 
The court of appeal held that the trial judge's direction 
was properly given. The appellate court found no connection 
between the basic right to remain silent and the producing 
of hair exemplars for comparison. 
Reg, v. Smith was the precursor to the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In this Act, Section 62 deals 
with "intimate samples" which may be taken from a person in 
police detention, including blood samples. Several points 
are now important if the suspect refuses to provide these 
samples : 
A. Was there good cause to refuse 
B. Whether the accused be so charged for trial 
C. The court or jury, in determining guilt or innocence 
"... may draw such inferences from the refusal as appear 
proper; and the refusal may, on the basis of such 
inferences, be treated as, or as capable of amounting to, 
corroboration of any evidence against the person in relation 
to which the refusal is material." 
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These same provisions are found in sections 20 and 23 of the 
Family Law Reform Act 1969. The McVeigh case is almost 
identical with minor exceptions. The McVeigh case was civil 
and the samples involved were blood samples. McVeigh 
refused to honor the court direction to provide samples for 
comparison; he did, however, take the stand and denied any 
involvement with the plaintiff. The situation was now his 
word against hers. Corroboration for the plaintiff was 
needed. The justices hearing his case made the following 
determinations : 
A. McVeigh did not comply with the direction to provide 
blood samples. 
B. The justices treated this failure to comply as the sole 
evidence providing corroboration for the plaintiff's 
case 
the point of law being "On the hearing of a complaint under 
section 1 of this Act, the court may adjudge the defendant 
to be the putative father of the child but shall not do so, 
in a case where evidence is given by the mother, unless her 
evidence is corroborated in some material particular by 
other evidence to the court's satisfaction." In this case, 
the court drew an adverse inference of McVeigh's failure to 
comply and that failure was capable of corroborating the 
plaintiff's allegation that McVeigh was the father of her 
child. 
149 
Because of the similarity of these cases, despite 
definite lines of differences, a clear picture is formed as 
to how English law allows for evidence of this nature to be 
treated by the courts -- the right to remain silent 
notwithstanding ! 
Under English law, when is an interview not an 
interview? In R. v. WilliamsS 6 the accused was in custody 
for one offense and had a solicitor assigned to him to 
advise him. While in custody for the original charge, 
police officers dropped by his cell for a "social visit." A 
few minutes after the "social visit" the accused signed a 
statement saying he wished to be "interviewed" by the police 
without the presence of his solicitor. There are in place 
certain safeguards for the accused. The Codes of Practice 
under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 offer that 
the accused's solicitor should be present also, that the 
recorded interview not be preceded by an unrecorded 
interview, and that a signed statement from the accused 
outlining his desire to see the investigating officer be 
obtained. Although the appellate judge found the "social 
visit" to be suspicious with the taped interview immediately 
following the visit which produced admissions on the part of 
the accused, the judge stated "... that it was the accused 
who wished to see the investigators, that it was he who was 
SR. v. Williams (Mark Alexander) Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) 156 JP 776. 
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wanting to do a deal himself and offer assistance, and so 
volunteer this information . . . did not mean that the 
evidence should be ruled out." Further finding stated that 
if the suspect wishes to make a statement and if he is 
properly cautioned (Mirandized) the officers are not 
debarred from recording what the suspect has to say, after 
proper caution. In addition, the court ruled that the 
"social visit" was not an interview as defined by R. v. 
Absolam.7 "... namely a series of questions directed by 
the police to a suspect with a view to obtaining admissions 
on which proceedings could be founded." 
This case is similar to its United States' companion 
cases of Michigan v, Mosely (1975)8 and Oregon v. Bradshaw 
(1983)9 wherein the suspects were interrogated (United 
States' definition) after being Mirandized (cautioned, 
English definition), and attorneys having been assigned to 
the respective suspects. The police later re-Mirandized the 
suspects about an unrelated charge and obtained a 
confession. The United States Supreme Court held the 
incriminating statements in both cases to be admissible in 
court. 
7R. v. Absolam [1989] 88 Cr. App. R 336. 
8Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S. Ct. 321, 46 L. 
Ed. 2d 313 (1975). 
’Oregon v. Bradshaw, 459 U.S. 966, 103 S. Ct. 292, 74 
L. Ed. 2d. 276, 51 L.W. 4940 (1983). 
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In R. v. Kelt.10 the suspect argued against providing a 
blood sample for one investigation but did agree to provide 
a blood sample for another investigation. The sample was 
used by the police for comparison in both crimes. There was 
a match of the sample for the crime in which the accused 
refused to provide a sample, while the other crime was still 
under investigation. Kelt argued the police should not have 
used the blood sample for additional inquiries. What is of 
note here is that the suspect hinged his appeal on the 
improper extension of comparison rather than the right to 
silence cum right not to be compelled to provide evidence 
points of law. 
One such case, using the argument that being "compelled" 
to provide evidence was contrary to the protection granted 
by the right to remain silent was the case of Rank Film 
Distributors. Ltd, and others v. Video Information Centre 
and others.11 The plaintiffs filed suit in civil court and 
requested discovery with an Anton Piller order which 
required defendants to allow representatives of the 
plaintiff to enter the premises of the defendant for the 
purpose of looking for and removing any unauthorized films. 
The defendants were charged with pirating video films, 
10R. v. Kelt, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [1994] 
2 All E.R. 780. 
i:LRank Film Distributors, Ltd. and others v. Video 
Information Centre and others. Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) [1982] AC 380, [1980] 2 All E.R. 273, [1980] 3 WLR 
487, [1970] FSR 242. 
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making duplicate masters, duplication of the films and their 
subsequent distribution and sale. The defendants appealed 
to have the order "varied claiming if all the information 
was disclosed they would incriminate themselves and open 
themselves to criminal prosecution under the Copyright Act 
of 1956 s 21.1,12 The plaintiffs argued that the court had 
the discretionary power to uphold the order and to limit its 
use only to the civil proceedings -- the court disagreed. 
The judges stated variously that the current law was lacking 
and that legislation was needed to allow an owner his just 
rights to the protection of his property and a removal of 
the rights of self-incrimination to the extent that use of 
this information in criminal proceedings would be precluded. 
Part of the paradox was that the more criminal their 
activities can be made to appear, the less effective is the 
civil remedy that can be granted but, prima facie, is what 
the privilege achieves. Another point considered by the 
court was that although a subsequent criminal trial may 
ensue, the trial judge at that trial could refuse to allow 
information of a self-incriminâting nature obtained through 
discovery at a civil trial. This argument was rejected on 
the grounds that this would substitute, for a privilege, a 
dependence on the criminal courts discretion much to the 
detriment of the defendant. Further, even if the direct 
information was excluded, the process itself could set into 
12Ibid. 
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motion a chain of events leading to discovery of other real 
evidence of an incriminating nature. 
Lord Wilberforce summed it up for the court thusly: "All 
that this House can do is to decide that the privilege 
against self-incrimination is capable of being involved." 
Here again we find the problem that the Court, civil or 
criminal can "compel intimate samples" but not necessarily 
physical items. If the Anton Piller Order in civil court 
can be denied upon these grounds, where the danger to the 
defendant is less than in criminal proceedings, it would 
appear the privilege against self-incrimination is eroded 
crossing the legal bridge from civil to criminal 
proceedings. 
The case of Reg - W (A minor) Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division)13 brings out yet another facet of the defendant 
refusing to provide blood samples in a paternity suit. In 
the United States civil court system, if a party to the suit 
is directed to produce something and its production is 
refused, the judge may order that person to be in contempt 
of court and could assess jail time until such items are 
produced. In England, the judge can draw any inference he 
wants from the failure of the defendant to provide blood 
samples. In this case, the judge decided that the 
defendant, by virtue of refusing to provide blood samples, 
was the father of the child. Case dicta reads in part, "By 
13Reg - W (A minor) Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
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refusing to take the tests, the court believes that he is 
the father of A. He has chosen to reject the opportunity to 
prove he is not the father." It would appear that this 
direction of the court reverted the English law back to 
trials of an inquisition nature wherein the accused must 
answer all questions and prove his own innocence! 
Multiple Personality Disorder 
The research was unable to discover any court cases 
addressing the issue of Multiple Personality Disorder and 
the right to silence. In fact, there do not appear to be 
ANY cases dealing with this phenomenon. Whether this is so 
because the argument is not acceptable under English law or 
whether the mental health professionals have not made the 
jump from medical to legal issues is not known. More 
research in the area is indicated. 
Immunity and English Law 
In the previous chapter, the research examined the 
various types of immunity that may be granted to accused 
persons or witnesses to obtain information in furthering 
investigations of various types. The various types of 
immunity possible under the legal code in the United States 
do not appear to have the same parallels under the English 
legal system. However, the legal database of Lexis was able 
to produce several instances for comparison purposes. They 
appeared to be concerned with civil matters with possible 
after-effects concluding in criminal courts. Although the 
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case presented here in the research, Rank Film Distributors, 
Ltd. and others, was selected for presentation, it was not 
the landmark decision in such matters. The landmark case 
was Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE and 
others.14 This case was not selected for presentation in 
this research because of the extensive nature of the parties 
involved in transnational business dealings. However, the 
essence of the case was very similar in the legal points 
argued in Rank, and, Rank being less complex in nature, it 
was selected for issues of both clarity and brevity. Other 
cases reviewed by the research also were not utilized 
because all were of a similar legal nature and would not add 
any considerable knowledge to assist with the issue at hand 
(see note) .15 
The "New" Caution 
Crime does not mire itself in tradition from a by-gone 
era. Criminal defenses are modernized along political, 
economic, social and legal lines. Whereas statutes are 
updated, much of the basic language is founded in ideas and 
ideals centuries old. The wording of the new warning to 
14Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE and 
others v. Lundquist and others. Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) [1991] 2 QB 310, [1990] 3 All ER 283, [1991] 2 WLR 
280 . 
15Cases reviewed: 
R. v. Stipendiary Magistrates Ex Parte Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office. Queens Bench Division. 
Johnstone & Others v. United Norwest Co-operatives Ltd. 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division). 
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replace the "caution" has elicited strong opposition from 
various quarters. It is unclear at first whether this 
opposition is guided by the fear of real "rights" erosion, 
or just the fact that some people are more comfortable with 
the well-worn, old shoes of tradition. The old warning is 
"You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, 
but what you say must be given in evidence." This statement 
is very straightforward and outlines two things. First, 
that you can remain silent. Second, what you say may be 
used in court. This is what it says. What it does not 
outline are the implications of remaining silent and, there 
are implications. Would not the unsuspecting accused be 
better informed if he were advised that there are possible 
consequences to face if he remains silent? Many of the 
arguments we see in opposition to this new warning place 
great concern on protecting the suspect, and an examination 
of these concerns is part of the research. Quoting Helena 
Kennedy, QC: "It's about an erosion of the presumption of 
innocence. It's an emblem of how we have stopped caring 
about liberty. The 'right of silence' was to protect the 
vulnerable and the innocent."16 Is this comment fair? The 
new warning says the following: "You do not have to say 
anything. But, if you do not mention now something which 
you later use in your defence, the court may decide that 
16"Life with the Criminal Justice Act," Independent. 14 
January 1994. 
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your failure to mention it now strengthens the case against 
you. A record will be made of anything you say and it may 
be given in evidence if you are brought to trial." How the 
new warning erodes the presumption of innocence is not 
clear. The new warning, although longer, appears to be more 
explanatory in actual effect, and any negative applications 
would surely be addressed and placed in proper perspective 
by the barrister involved at trial. If an individual at the 
time of the warning could not accurately give his 
whereabouts at the date or time in question, what would be 
in jeopardy if the suspect said so? A possible scenario may 
be the following: "I do not remember precisely where I was 
on such and such a date but I will check my diary, 
(appointment book, etc.) and give the police a more accurate 
account later." Could this be used against the accused? If 
the trial were by judge only, it would appear that the judge 
would accurately assess what transpired, and if a jury were 
hearing the case, the accused's barrister would properly 
argue that his client did not make a statement at the time 
the "caution" was given, in order to be more accurate in his 
answer after checking the facts. This does not seem, in any 
realistic fashion, to be to the detriment of the accused. 
The fact, however, does remain that the accused does not 
have to say anything and if he desires to remain silent, the 
court or jury still has the right to draw any inference it 
wishes from such silence. Is that not what is done when the 
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situation is viewed realistically? Besides, at the time the 
warning is given, if the accused does not understand 
something, he is not precluded from asking for 
clarification. If the individual is guilty, he incurs no 
harm, and if innocent, this warning could help him from 
appearing guilty. 
Charles Glass of the Independent waxes quite indignant 
in his article headlined "A Modern Enactment of the Star 
Chamber.17 It is Glass' position that the new warning 
overturns the right to remain silent. The research does not 
agree that this is the case. Nowhere is the accused forced 
to speak. The new warning only includes that which was a 
part of the legal liabilities one already faced within the 
system. Mr. Glass' comparison to the Star Chamber, where 
torture was a normal part of the legal exercise, of the new 
wording borders on hysteria. Glass' statement "This threat 
is as coercive, though not as brutal, as torture. The 
police and the court are saying: 'If you do not speak, you 
will most likely be convicted for it.'"18 The paraphrase 
that Glass makes is wrong, and he adopts the language "most 
likely" making his a position in the extreme! Glass 
furthers his point that juries must consider that the 
testimony of the accused is now given under threat of 
17"A Modern Enactment of the Star Chamber," Independent, 
9 November 1994. 
18Ibid. 
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imprisonment and is, therefore, less reliable than testimony 
freely given. His position is more philosophical than 
realistic given the fact that, in court, evidence is 
challenged by both sides to determine its accuracy or 
reliability. Moreover, Glass ignores the fact that if a 
confession or statement is truly coerced, it will be deemed 
so in the voire dire process prior to trial. Furthermore, 
from where does Glass obtain the "threat of imprisonment" 
which was so compelling that it produces, spontaneously, a 
confession? 
The hysteria over the issue of modifying the manner in 
which the "caution" was worded is perhaps best illustrated 
by the article appearing in the May 14, 1994 issue of the 
Economist. This issue raises several points that need 
careful examination. The first of these is the point of 
view held by some Tories, as well as Labour and Liberal 
Democrats in the House of Lords, that the new "caution" will 
require the suspect to now prove his own innocence. This 
clearly is not the case. The "warning" is given prior to 
trial and at that point in the investigation where the 
subject becomes a viable suspect. If the "warning" was in 
the original format, is it inconceivable that some, many, or 
even all the jurors would draw some inference from the 
failure of the defendant to take the stand in his own 
defense? Another point of contention in this article is the 
claim that the outcome of the new "caution" will not help in 
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the fight against crime. How can the press be so omniscient 
as to determine what will occur when the new "caution" 
becomes law? There is clearly no data to support their 
theory (opinion!). Another strawman argument in the same 
article attempts to show that, when the right to silence was 
weakened in Northern Ireland as an aid to combatting 
terrorism, the following statistics emerged. Prior to the 
change of the wording of the "caution," in Northern Ireland 
6.5 percent of the 3000 people prosecuted for serious or 
terrorist offenses were acquitted. In the five years 
following the change, 9 percent were acquitted. The article 
contends that there was no evidence that eroding the right 
to silence made convictions easier. The article failed to 
note that perhaps the new "caution" was more beneficial to 
the accused, resulting in fewer convictions! Though this 
seems implausible, the article went even further. Studies 
by psychologists were included to bear out the point that, 
under pressure of a fierce interrogation, almost everyone, 
however intelligent and lucid, could be made to say things 
they do not know to be true. The operative word here is 
"fierce." This conveniently overlooks the fact that the 
accused can still refuse to speak. How the jump from a 
"change in wording" to a "fierce interrogation" is made is 
unclear. Additionally, there is concern expressed that, 
without the right to silence, there is greater risk that the 
police will force wrong information from a suspect. On the 
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face of this statement all appears correct. However, how 
does one admit to knowledge of a crime in which one was not 
involved? It is one thing to admit having committed crime 
such and such. However, when one commits a crime one has 
intimate knowledge of the details. Let us envision this 
scenario. A murder is committed in the victim's home. A 
person, not involved, would be hard pressed to provide 
various details. In which room did the murder take place? 
What was the weapon used? What were the injuries inflicted? 
How many? How was the victim dressed? Manner of entry into 
the home, etc.? Arguments by the less informed into the 
nature of criminal investigation do not have the knowledge 
to properly envision that which takes place in these 
circumstances of committing a crime, and then supporting the 
confession to the crime by being able to provide information 
of which only the perpetrator could have knowledge. Can the 
wrong person possibly confess to a crime he did not commit 
and be convicted for it? Yes, the possibility will always 
exist, but to suggest that someone would confess after 
coercion in a police interview room and then repeat that 
confession at voire dire prior to trial forces one to 
believe more in the unusual rather than the actual. Then, 
the article declares that the right to silence is being 
abolished. This is not the case. Can abuses by police 
contaminate an investigation? Clearly the answer is "yes," 
but that is an entirely different problem for, if the 
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corruption of the police were that widespread, the matter of 
a mere "caution" would pale in its insignificance. This is 
not to minimize possible police misconduct, but rather to 
ensure that any misconduct is kept in its proper 
perspective, that it is indeed rare for such misconduct to 
be carried out and, if such misconduct were widespread, the 
population would have serious political concerns, requiring 
an immediate change of political direction. 
Articles such as these assist in the assessment of the 
political climate of the population and to witness any 
changes brought about through political/legislative 
activity. The problem arises if the media indicates 
population directions that are not consistent with the 
dynamic direction as reported. 
Areas of Concern 
Balance in the ramification of self-incrimination is 
difficult to achieve. If we examine the Serious Fraud 
Office's powers in investigating financial criminal 
activity, we find a curious dilemma. Those suspects 
interviewed (interrogated) by the Serious Fraud Office 
investigators must answer questions put to them under pain 
of contempt. Information obtained under these conditions 
can be used against the suspect in subsequent criminal 
proceedings. This appears to be violating the basic 
principle of the right to silence. Carrying the thought one 
step further, it is easy to see that someone who kills many 
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people has better "rights" of protection than someone 
possibly guilty of fraud. 
Law correspondent Bruce McKain's19 article points out 
that the new "caution" may face legal/political problems 
because the new "caution" may be in conflict with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The government's 
position rests upon the desire to balance the rights of the 
individual and the need to convict the guilty. If this is 
the case, several questions emerge. First, is this a 
solution for a non-existent problem? There is no apparent 
entity, for neither the criminal justice system nor the 
population are complaining. Second, are there any data 
illustrating how many guilty parties were acquitted by their 
exercise of the "right to silence?" Finally, who and how 
would we define what the correct balance should be? 
Perhaps it is the presumption of innocence that is the 
problem. This presumption places the State in the 
questionable position of putting on trial persons who are 
presumed to be innocent. What real difference would be made 
by a presumption of guilt? The State would still have to 
prove its case. 
If we consider the viewpoint of the European Convention, 
sovereignty issues come to the fore. The new European 
Convention blankets the signatories with a legal concept 
19"Scots Law Experts Question Need For Silence Rule 
Change." Glasgow Herald. 28 October 1994. sec. B, p.l. 
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that is homogeneous in nature. Any apparent conflict 
between one country's laws and the European Convention 
guidelines will witness those guidelines to prevail over the 
country's laws. The political struggle between trade 
conventions with the mainland would begin to conflict with 
the desire to deal effectively with the criminal element in 
England. 
If the role of the European Convention was to usurp 
areas of sovereignty, one would find that the wording is 
very careful in matters to which it will or will not address 
itself. Article 177 (2) of the EEC Treaty states the 
following as outlined in The Modern English Legal System. 
"It seems that any institution which exercises judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions and which has at least 'a measure 
of official recognition' will be included, and not 
therefore, bodies whose functions are advisory, 
investigatory, conciliatory, legislative or executive."20 
One possible solution to the use of the new wording 
might be to have a solicitor present at the time the 
"caution" is presented. This would allow for the suspect to 
make a better informed decision regarding his peril if he 
remains silent, by the possible adverse inference that could 
be drawn. 
20P.E. Smith and S.H. Bailey, The Modern English Legal 
System (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), p. 751. 
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Who is more frightened or placed at risk by the new 
caution? Is it the individual whose protection is the 
concern of the media? Or is it the legion of lawyers 
fearing a loophole to the appeals court is being closed? It 
may, perhaps, be the political agenda of that portion of the 
media which is most liberal in its political viewpoint. If 
the new "caution" provides further legal insight to the 
accused, more protection is afforded him. Keeping silent on 
matters of possible outcomes detrimental to the accused 
extends little real protection. If the consequences of his 
silence are explained to him as possibly being negative in 
their effect on him, is this any different from the police 
advising someone not to commit any crime because of its 
negative consequences as well? If the police can "caution" 
someone as to their "right to remain silent" should they not 
also be permitted to issue further warnings especially if 
the suspect, in exercising his right, could be placing 
himself in jeopardy? With the new "caution", it appears the 
suspect is just a better informed individual. 
These circumstances appear to be a result of the courts 
being more involved in the actual process of stationhouse 
actions rather than being focused on whether the confession 
of the accused was voluntary. The courts went out of their 
way to ensure that any confession forthcoming was a result 
of the accused harboring pangs of guilt or remorse vis-a-vis 
as a result of any promise or threat. This sets up a 
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curious situation. What types of threats are inadmissible? 
What admissible? It would appear that a statement (threat?) 
by the police, that the accused would be tried for the 
crime, could be construed as a threat. But, is that not the 
reason for the investigation of a crime? To bring 
wrongdoers to justice. Clearly, threats of physical harm by 
the authorities should be excluded, as well as their actual 
infliction, but are there not "permissible" statements that 
could be labeled as "threats" merely because they produce 
fear of future consequences? What about "promises." Why is 
it not permissible for the police to advise the suspect that 
his cooperation, in the form of a confession, may result in 
a lesser sentence if this may be the case? Is this not in 
the best interest of the suspect? There is argument to the 
effect that this scenario would defeat the voluntariness 
rule of admitting the confession. How so? The suspect 
received his "caution" and various outcomes were discussed. 
Again, is the suspect not now better informed? If the 
suspect committed the crime he is no more guilty than before 
the "caution" and attendant dialogue took place. If the 
forthcoming confession is questioned as to its reliability 
because of any promise or threat, what would be the harm to 
explore the totality of the circumstances at voire dire? 
Advocation for reverting to Star Chamber procedures is not 
the intent here but, rather, a rational look at where the 
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English law is at present from where it originated 
concerning such matters. 
Some recent polling data is worth including here. The 
results of a public opinion poll conducted by the 
Independent21 indicates a definite shift in opinion. The 
"deliberative poll," described earlier in the research, bore 
the following fruit. 
Prior to the discussion periods, the participants were 
asked certain questions: 
A. Should a confession made during police questioning be 
enough on its own to provide a conviction: 
Prior to discussion 67 percent answered yes 
After discussion 78 percent answered yes 
B. If the suspect remained silent under police questioning, 
should this be held against the suspect : 
Prior to discussion 36 percent answered yes 
After discussion 49 percent answered yes 
On this question of the suspect remaining silent at trial, 
counting against the suspect: 
Prior to discussion 57 percent 
After discussion 41 percent 
C. Is it a worse thing to convict the innocent than to let 
the guilty go free : 
21 "Crime/what the country really thinks; Suspects 
Rights/ Support for option to remain silent grows." 
Independent, 9 May, 1994, Deliberative Polling page. 
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Prior to discussion 60 percent answered yes 
After discussion 70 percent answered yes 
This last question had the possibility of being influenced 
by the manner in which the panel of experts addressed the 
discussion group, demonstrating in part how the police could 
put someone under pressure during questioning. 
Another indication from the survey showed that, although 
the prior figures would indicate a "liberal" outlook, the 
respondents still held the view that the court process is 
slanted towards the accused. An increase of 11 percentage 
points between the surveys in the number of people who 
believed the courts should be less "on the side" of the 
accused may be reflecting a desire for a more effective 
system in dealing with crime. 
Paul Cassell's Miranda's Social Cost22 was consulted on 
various levels. This definitive work successfully 
repudiated the opinions of various writers who, during the 
last quarter of a century, saw little harm to the efforts of 
law enforcement caused by the Miranda rule. The drop in 
confession rate for many of the United States' cities was 
compared in his work. Other comparisons in this work 
consider cases "lost" because of Miranda, with the 
comparisons being made across time, jurisdictions and 
offenses. The final analysis of his research will be 
22Paul G. Cassell, "Miranda's Social Cost: An Empirical 
Reassessment," Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 90, 
No. 2: (1996) 391-499. 
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discussed further in the final chapter. Additionally, Mr. 
Cassell and Bret Hayman23 reviewed police questioning in 
another study. In this study, confession rates were 
compared to those of other countries, and of particular 
interest were those comparisons made with England and Canada 
showing the effects in those countries that "cautions" or 
"Miranda warnings" had on confession rates. 
Of added value to the present research is Cassell's 
research in the comparisons made between the United States 
and England/Scotland. 
TABLE 5 
CONFESSION RATES IN BRITAIN PRIOR TO 
PACE 1984 
BRITAIN - Prior to PACE 1984 Incriminating Statements 
Obtained 
Cases Old Bailey 76% 
Worcester 86% 
Brighton 65% 




Metro Police (London) 61% 
(Seven Crown Court Centers) 71.2 
(London ) 
Random selection Sheffield 94% 
the 
: 1-103. 
23Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman, "Police 
Interrogation in the 1990's: An Empirical Study of 
Effects of Miranda," 43 UCLA Law Review 001 (1996) 
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These confession rates are substantially higher than the 
United States rates post-Miranda. However, the British type 
Miranda in place for this table excludes the right to 
counsel warning that Miranda conveys. In 1984, the English 
employed a change in the warning which included the right to 
counsel as well as the recording of interrogations. The 
study which Cassell relies upon for his research indicating 
a drop in confession rates after 1984 was authored by Gisl 
Gudjonsson.24 That research showed "the frequency with which 
suspects confess to crimes in England has fallen in recent 
years from over 60 percent to between 40 and 50 percent.25 
This tracks very well with the post-Miranda research 
conducted by Cassell. The controlling effect appears to be 
the inclusion of a right to counsel. 
It is readily apparent that the variety of legal 
appellate points found in the United States does not enjoy 
similar popularity in England. The two systems also view 
the rights of the accused to remain silent slightly 
differently, the difference being that in England there is a 
detrimental effect upon the accused's insistence on silence. 
The silence of the accused can be the sole corroborating 
evidence needed to convict the accused. Likewise, the jury 
can make adverse inference from the accused's implementation 
24Ibid. p. 421. Cited by Cassell as Gisl H. Gudjonsson, 
The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony 
324 (1992) . 
25Ibid. p. 421. 
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of his right not to speak. This is balanced by the accused 
being able to use England's version of voire dire with some 
measure of protection. The appellate process in England, 
however, also supported the law's provision that failure to 
submit "exemplars" was equally considered as corroborative 
evidence needed to secure conviction. 
The news media portrayed the "new caution" as the 
precursor to the collapse of the entire English judicial 
system, thereby allowing the media to extend its support for 
the accused and its opposition to the Conservative 
Government. The deliberative poll conducted by the media 
supported the fact that the impression of the people was 
that the court system leaned too heavily in its protection 
of the accused. 
The most noted variance between the United States' and 
English systems is the fundamental difference of judicial 
pathways. England is more straightforward by virtue of its 
unitary system over the entire country. In the United 
States, conflict has arisen over issues of legal prominence 
of state law versus Federal law. This process is further 
confused by the United States Supreme Court overriding some 
of its previous decisions on comparable issues. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
Exactly what was it that prompted this protection of the 
right to remain silent? With John Lilburn, we have the 
scenario of a man before the awesome power of the Star 
Chamber defying the tribunal. He just refused to say 
anymore than he did, challenging his captors to charge him 
with evidence that they had obtained independently of his 
testimony, as he would offer nothing new with which they 
might condemn him. The earlier extremes of obtaining a 
confession must surely have frightened, to some degree, all 
those who were aware of the power of torture and their own 
limited willingness to experience it. 
The final analysis of the research attempts to draw 
together those foundations that underpin the rights offered. 
What are the trade-offs bound within each of the two systems 
in question? Of relative concern is also the type of 
interpretation of the right to silence and those risks, if 
any, inherent to its use. Is the protection granted under 
each system the same, or does one system allow for more 
encroachment than the other upon the right in question? If 
the rights are so protected, do they benefit scoundrels or 
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innocent people? In this area, are the dangers real or 
perceived when they are voiced in opposition to any revision 
in the wording? 
Modern science has created methods of truth-finding well 
beyond the imagination of early protectors of the 
individual. What if truth could be detected without pain? 
How would this alter the right to silence? There are 
several problems with Wigmore's contention as to what is 
testimony, and some additional viewpoints need to be 
offered. There are, as well, other portions of the Fifth 
Amendment that are not absolute. Does this portend changes 
in the manner in which future right to silence arguments are 
decided by the Supreme Court? 
With the "Miranda warning," and the "caution" in England 
taken as a whole, is there a better protection which should 
be considered as being more effective to the suspect? In 
this chapter, research which examines the societal cost of 
"warnings" as well as the impact under each system upon law 
enforcement, will be reviewed. 
Outside the spectacle of legal wrangling is the matter 
of society itself, that body politic which wagers in the 
lottery of government by its selection of representatives to 
become the gatherers of trust in order to provide for the 
safety of the citizens while balancing the rights of other 
citizens suspected of crime. 
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A clearer picture of what exactly "rights" are, and how 
they are viewed is, perhaps, to examine them in comparison 
to other rights and how they have been interpreted. This is 
required because not all rights are treated (interpreted) in 
the same manner, and some rights have been handled more than 
others by the Supreme Court over the years. If these rights 
have been expanded or contracted by the various 
interpretations, has this strengthened the provisions of 
each right? 
We will start with the First Amendment. The concept of 
freedom of the press, speech, religion and assembly are 
purely the child of American political thought. Whereas 
other provisions in the Bill of Rights have deep roots in 
English law and tradition, the close relationship in England 
between politics and the Church provided fertile ground for 
censorship and political repression of opposition. The 
history of the period of 1585, with its Star Chamber in 
ascendence, clearly shows how printed material could not be 
published until it was reviewed and licensed by the 
Archbishop or his delegate. Although these licensing laws 
were abolished in 1594, this did not lead to a burgeoning 
society openly expressing free thought. There were still in 
effect very stringent libel and sedition codes which were 
rigorously enforced. 
After the United States Constitution was ratified, 
additional measures were needed to protect the individual 
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from governmental oppression. In order to ensure that the 
individual could be secure in his dealings with the 
Government, certain "protections" were expressed in a Bill 
of Rights. The importance of free speech, press, religion 
and assembly were considered the most important, for without 
these firmly enshrined, other provisions would be 
meaningless. An area free from Federal control, that of 
intellectual freedom, was created. 
The population of the United States is a heterogeneous 
one. As a natural consequence of its diverse groupings one 
finds the various needs of each group, each competing for 
limited resources and each, in turn, criticizing the 
Government for its failure to provide to that group that 
which the group considers its just due. 
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech." If one now considers Wigmore's position of 
testimony being speech only, and with the United States 
Supreme Court essentially concurring with that notion, one 
should now view the Supreme Court and its views on speech 
vis-a-vis the First Amendment. If one is to examine this 
provision, "speech" must first be involved. If one burns a 
draft card, is that "speech?" If it is burned in silence, 
is that speech? Is nude dancing "speech?" Further, does 
the challenge to the act constitute an abridgement of free 
speech? If the restriction of these acts is based in 
aspects of communication (messages, political expression, 
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etc.) then possible conflict with the First Amendment could 
occur. Can the Government force people to speak? Can the 
Government force citizens to dance, burn draft cards or 
voice those beliefs which the population finds abhorrent?1 
If these instances are protected by free speech and the 
First Amendment, there is small room for acceptance in the 
Fifth Amendment to not consider the drawing of blood as 
being a witness against oneself i.e. giving testimony -- 
speech! Nor can it provide for silence for prayer or 
meditation. The First Amendment includes ideologically 
grounded silence as well.2 If the various nuances of so- 
called speech can be considered, such as boycotts, pickets, 
parades, letter-writing, media broadcasting and live 
entertainment, how then can Wigmore and his interpretations 
of the Fifth Amendment hold up? Are not all the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights of equal weight in their application 
to the individual vis-a-vis the Government? In the case of 
the First Amendment, language is not an indispensable 
ingredient to afford constitutional protection. 
The Second Amendment states, in part "... the right of 
the people to have and bear arms, shall not be infringed." 
’-West Virginia State Board of Education v. Burnette 319 
U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943). In this 
case, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute 
requiring school children to pledge their allegiance to and 
salute the flag. 
2Wallace v. Jeffries, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2749, 86 
L. Ed. 2nd 29 (1985). 
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It is curious to note that, in dealing with the Second 
Amendment, we find that the Supreme Court, in Presser v. 
Illinois3 issued a rather peculiar ruling. The Court held 
that the Second Amendment only restricts the Federal 
Government, and therefore a state or city ordinance does not 
necessarily conflict with the Constitution in regulating who 
may or may not possess handguns. 
The research find this curious in that the Federal 
courts have asserted their authority to enforce laws through 
the vehicle of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending Federal 
safeguards to the individual when state laws would be more 
restrictive or oppressive. Presser clearly shows that the 
Supreme Court does not unilaterally extend solid 
Constitutional guarantees equally, but rather, the 
protections granted are on a case-by-case (direction of 
political wind?) basis. If this is so, other provisions are 
in no less of a precarious situation. 
The Third Amendment addresses the issue of quartering 
troops in one's home during peace or war. This has not yet 
been considered a problem of note. 
Prior to the Revolutionary War, England issued to 
various individuals Writs of Assistance. These were, for 
the most part, general search warrants allowing the holder 
to search for smuggled goods. Broad powers were granted 
3Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S. Ct. 580, 29 L. 
Ed. 615 (1886) . 
178 
with these Writs, and they became the outrage of the 
citizenry because of their issuance. The Fourth Amendment 
was to be a safeguard against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The case law surrounding this Amendment soon 
erodes the Court's position allowing the states a free hand 
in matters of searches and seizures. The final peg is the 
attachment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fourth 
Amendment guaranteeing that the states' excesses would not 
erode the provisions granted by the Fourth Amendment. The 
Writs of Assistance, which covered arrests on mere 
suspicion, was another provision the Fourth Amendment sought 
to guard against. The case/argument against the Writs of 
Assistance pre-dated by four years the Stamp Act which was, 
perhaps, more important in helping to shape constitutional 
issues. But, "John Adams, eager to secure pride of place in 
the Revolution for Massachusetts was obsessed with the 
case."4 Adams wrote, sixty years later, "Then and there was 
the scene of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary 
claims of Great Britain."5 This was the first articulation 
of the American viewpoint, which still lingers, 
demonstrating opposition to general warrants used for 
search. Although the Constitution did not allow for 
4Hendrik Hartog, ed., Law in the American Revolution 
and the Revolution in the Law; A Collection of Review Essays 
on American Legal History, New York University School of Law 
Series in Legal History, no. 3 (New York: New York 
University Press, 1981), p. 4. 
5Ibid. 
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unlawful searches/seizures up until 1914, all evidence was 
essentially admitted into court. In Weeks v. United States. 
1914,6 the Supreme Court held that letters belonging to the 
defendant were illegally seized by Federal officers and the 
Supreme Court ruled that, in a Federal prosecution, the 
Fourth Amendment barred the use of illegally obtained 
evidence. This however, left open the door for state 
officers to continue not observing the Fourth amendment if 
it so pleased them. 
As mentioned earlier in the research, this attitude 
allowed the "silver platter" doctrine to come into play, 
where state officers could obtain evidence in the fashion 
they did, the Fourth Amendment notwithstanding. Once 
obtained by the state officers, the evidence could be passed 
to Federal officers without Fourth Amendment violation. 
This situation prevailed until the Supreme Court ruled in 
Elkins v. United States.7 After Elkins, the Federal courts 
could not use any illegally seized evidence, regardless of 
the source providing it to the Federal prosecutors or 
courts. 
6Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 
58 L. Ed. 652 (1914). 
7Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 
4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). 
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What is curious is the ruling in Wolf v. Colorado (1949)8 
which, at that time, ruled that the "exclusionary rule" 
would apply to the states' courts. A vote on the 
"exclusionary rule" across the country showed thirty-one 
state courts did not like the rule and sixteen states were 
in favor of adopting it into their state laws. A 
summarizing thought from Wolf is illustrative. "We hold, 
therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for a 
State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the 
admission of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and 
seizure."9 
Closure appeared to be at hand with the Mapp v. Ohio10 
case. In this case, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier 
decision in Wolf and declared that the provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment did apply to the states by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. There were only twelve years between 
Wolf and Mapp, and yet, what was so clear in Wolf still gave 
way to the decision in Mapp. Clearly, the Supreme Court was 
edging toward a more intrusive role in states' affairs. 
What is more noteworthy, perhaps, is the ease with which the 
Supreme Court "gives" and "takes away" its favors. In this 
case, the accused is better protected, but the thought must 
8Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. 
Ed. 1782 (1949). 
9Ibid. 
10Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 
2d 1081, (1961). 
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be considered that a more conservative, or law and order 
disposed, majority of the Court has within its grasp the 
wherewithal to view the protection in a more restrictive 
manner. 
The Fifth Amendment is well presented throughout the 
research and is not included here at this time for 
comparison purposes. 
An additional provision of the Fifth Amendment not yet 
considered in the research concerns "double jeopardy," that 
provision which prohibits re-trials for the same offence. 
It provides "that no person shall be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This 
protection dates back in English law to the thirteenth 
century, so it was common practice long before colonial laws 
were enacted in the United States. Bartkus' decision11 by 
the Supreme Court underlined the accepted practice, however, 
of allowing two different jurisdictions (state and Federal) 
to each try a defendant for the same crime if each judicial 
system listed the act as proscribed by law. If an accused 
can be tried by both systems, it is difficult to understand 
what interests of the accused this restraint is designed to 
protect. The obvious ones include protecting the defendant 
from continued financial costs in subsequent trials if the 
accused could be tried, after being acquitted in the same 
“Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676, 2 L. 
Ed. 2d 684 (1959). (Black, J. dissenting). 
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court system, by that same system. The emotional protection 
is a given for the same set of circumstances. Any 
protection, however, does not come to the fore until the 
accused has reached that point in the judicial proceedings 
where he is actually placed in jeopardy. That point is 
reached in jury trials when the jury is empaneled and sworn, 
and in bench trials when testimony has begun to be heard -- 
jeopardy being here defined as the risk of conviction and 
punishment.12 The provisions state jeopardy of life or 
limb, but in reality, this protection is extended to all 
criminal trials, both misdemeanor and felony. The 
protection is not extended to civil proceedings even when 
the Government is the plaintiff.13 
There are other circumstances where an accused can be 
re-tried. They are: 
A. Where the accused requests and is granted a termination 
of his first trial before the charges against him are 
resolved 
B. where the trial judge prematurely halts the first trial 
for reasons of "manifest necessity" 
C. where the accused's conviction is set aside by appeal 
12Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 44 L. 
Ed. 2d 346 (1975). 
130ne Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S. Ct. 489, 34 L. Ed. 2d 438 
(1972) . 
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One fact does remain however. If the accused is acquitted, 
it does not matter that the acquittal was a result of 
mistaken rulings, misinterpretation of criminal statutes or 
on trial errors, retrial for the same offence following 
acquittal is constitutionally prohibited.14 A curious point 
surfaces with regard to "double jeopardy" and dual 
sovereignty. If an accused can be prosecuted for the same 
crime under different judicial systems because the offense 
was proscribed by each, how then can the Supreme Court turn 
its back on those states which, in state law violations, 
elect not to follow Miranda guidelines? If the Constitution 
reaches out through the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of 
search and seizure (remembering the Silver Platter 
doctrine), how can the Court then reconcile double jeopardy 
as being outside the Federal/state guidelines vis-a-vis the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment? The case can 
be made that the Supreme Court either treats each Amendment 
differently, or, the Court differing over time views the 
protections granted by the Bill of Rights with greater or 
lesser importance. 
The Sixth Amendment can be reduced to its pertinent 
provision "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of Counsel for 
14Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S. Ct. 
671, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962). Also Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957). Also 
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. 
Ed. 114 (1904) . 
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his defence." This provision or protection has been 
expanded as well. It is well to note that the denial of 
counsel at the time of interrogation nullifies the 
confession, thus underscoring the protection offered. There 
are various Court decisions extending the right to counsel, 
starting with "the preliminary hearing ... if counsel is 
not afforded to the accused at this 'critical stage' of the 
proceedings a plea of guilty at a later future trial will be 
disallowed." The same reasoning applies to the arraignment 
and, of course, to the actual trial itself. This is true, 
even if there is no apparent unfairness in the proceedings.15 
The question, prior to 1938, was concerned with whether the 
provision imposed an affirmative obligation on the part of 
the court to appoint counsel, where the accused does not 
request counsel or if he is unable to pay for one. Further, 
did this provision address felony cases or "capital" cases 
only? In 1938, the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Johnson v. Zerbst.16 In all Federal trials of persons 
charged with crimes of a serious nature, counsel must be 
appointed for an indigent defendant unless he intelligently 
waives his right to counsel. An earlier case of Powell v. 
15Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S. Ct. 756, 5 L. 
Ed. 2d 793 (1961). 
16Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. 
Ed. 1461 (1938). 
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Alabama17 provided for Federal standards in state courts 
dealing with "capital" crimes. Some twelve years elapsed 
until Betts v. Brady (1942)18 entertained the issue of 
including state felony crimes under the umbrella of the 
Sixth Amendment. At that time, the Supreme Court did not 
incorporate the state courts to provide counsel for non¬ 
capital felony cases. Indeed, it was not until 1963, under 
the same Supreme Court that expanded the rights of a 
suspect, and which would go on in 1964 to write the 
decisions in Escobedo and Miranda, that the state courts 
were tied to the Sixth Amendment through the auspices of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) .19 This 
case overruled Betts and its prior Supreme Court decision, 
and now the Court provided to the accused that which an 
earlier Court denied him. The right to counsel was now 
firmly fixed for trial purposes. Could the accused now 
petition for representation by counsel at other preliminary 
stages of the process? The Sixth Amendment itself give 
little guidance, granting only that the accused should enjoy 
the right to counsel in all "criminal prosecutions." Is the 
prosecution of an accused the trial itself or is it 
17Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. 
Ed. 2d 158 (1932). 
18Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 
L. Ed. 1595 (1942). 
19Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). 
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all-encompassing from start to finish? The research now 
looks to Hamilton v. Alabama.20 This case examined the right 
to counsel at the arraignment of the accused. This last 
step prior to trial advises the accused of his right to 
counsel; he is informed of the charges against him and he is 
given an opportunity to enter a plea. The Supreme Court 
held in Hamilton that the arraignment was so critical a 
stage that, if the accused were to be denied counsel at this 
juncture, it would be tantamount to denial of due process of 
law. In a period of less than twenty years, the right to 
counsel was extended to cover right to counsel in all felony 
trials, then to the arraignment stage and ultimately, to the 
preliminary hearing. Progression continued backwards in the 
criminal justice process to go on to include the 
investigatory phase with Escobedo.21 In this case, Escobedo 
was arrested and released on habeas corpus the same day. 
Arrested again eleven days later, Escobedo requested an 
opportunity to consult with his lawyer, who was also 
attempting to contact his client. The police were able to 
frustrate their meeting together, and incriminating 
statements were made by Escobedo. Escobedo went to trial 
and was convicted. His conviction was overturned five to 
four by the United States Supreme Court. Justice Goldberg 
20Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. 
Ed. 2d 114 (1961). 
21Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 
L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964). 
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wrote the majority decision, stating "When the process 
shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory . . . the 
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." The 
Miranda case cited earlier in the research was the next 
logical step. This progression put the Sixth Amendment and 
the Fifth amendment in lock-step with each other. There are 
some state cases wherein the accused was not allowed counsel 
for a psychiatric examination. The ruling of the United 
States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit stated that " a 
psychiatric examination is not an adversary proceeding."22 
Right to counsel now extends to the line-up procedure 
(United States v. Wade) .23 or in-court identification 
(Gilbert v. California) .24 And, identification procedures 
prior to charging the accused (Kirby v. Illinois)25 are not 
covered by the Sixth Amendment. These cases presented were 
all of a felony nature. It was the case of Argersinger v. 
Hamlin26 that saw the United States Supreme Court attack the 
Sixth Amendment in misdemeanor cases where a possible 
22United States v. Williams, 456 F. 2d 217 (5th Cir. 
1972). Also: Stultz v. State, 500 S.W. 2d 853 (Tex. 1973). 
23United States v. Wade, 
Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). 
388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 
24Gilbert V. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967) . 
25Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. 
Ed. 2d 411 (1972). 
26Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 
L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). 
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outcome, if the accused is convicted, is imprisonment. On 
May 15, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States 
extended the right-to-counsel privilege to juveniles.27 Also 
now included were: 
A. Right to counsel on appeal28 
B. Right to counsel at probation or parole revocation 
hearing29 
C. Effective assistance of counsel30 
D. Right to freely communicate with counsel31 
E. Self-representation rights32 
The Sixth Amendment providing a speedy trial, and the 
right to trial by jury are unremarkable, with the possible 
exception of unanimous verdicts by the jury being a 
prerequisite to conviction. Two states allow for less than 
unanimous verdicts. They are Louisiana33 and Oregon.34 The 
27In Re Gault, 387 U.S.L, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 
527 (1967). 
28Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963). 
29Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 
2d 336 (1967). 
30Cardarell v. United States, 375 F. 2d 222 (8th Cir. 
1967) quoting O'Malley v. United States, 285 F. 2d 733, 734 
(6th Cir. 1961). 
31State Ex Rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 
P. 962 (1913) . Also State v. Cory, 62 Wash. 2d 371, 382 P. 
2d 1019 (1963) . 
32Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 
45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). 
33LA. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 782 (West 1966) . 
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Supreme Court in a five to four decision in Apodaca v. 
Oregon35 upheld that in state courts unanimous verdicts were 
not required by the Sixth Amendment. Mr. Justice Powell, 
who provided the swing vote, stated that whereas in Federal 
proceedings unanimous verdicts were an indispensable part of 
the Sixth Amendment. However, he rejected as unsound the 
premise that, when a given procedural safeguard is 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and made binding 
upon state jurisdictions, identical (emphasis author) state 
application is required. Here again, it appears that 
state/Federal viewpoints are not congruent by law. However, 
this provision for less than unanimous verdicts did not 
survive in six-man juries utilizing a five out of six 
requirement for conviction. In Burch v. Louisiana. 36the 
Supreme Court ruled that a non-unanimous six-person jury 
presented a sufficient threat to the fairness of the 
proceedings and the proper functioning of the jury to draw 
the Constitutional line. In direct contrast to holdings of 
the Supreme Court in regards to the Fifth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court, in addressing issues of the Sixth Amendment, 
has ruled that the Government may not compel a criminal 
340r. Const, art. I, Para. II; Or. Rev. stat. Paras. 
136 . 330, (1967) . 
35Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. 
Ed. 2d 184 (1972). 
36Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S. Ct. 1623, 60 
L. Ed. 2d 96 (1979). 
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defendant to stand trial before a jury while dressed in 
prison garments, because this practice served no important 
Governmental, interest.37 In Holt v. United States, discussed 
earlier in the research, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Governmental interest should prevail (1910) 
and allowed the defendant to be dressed as requested by the 
state. Whether Estelle overturned Holt is unclear. What is 
being considered is the point that, if protections are 
expanded or restricted, are these expansions/contractions in 
themselves amending the Amendments? If so, then it appears 
that "judicial review" in the United States has taken on a 
legislative role and that would be contrary to the role 
authorized by the Constitution itself. 
In consideration of the argument that is fostered by 
Wigmore in regards to speech and testimony questioned 
earlier, this question requires attention in rebuttal. The 
Eighth Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual" punishment. In 
Furman v. Georgia. Justice Brennan traced the history of the 
Eighth Amendment relating to punishment to include, at the 
time the Bill of Rights was written, public hanging, 
flogging, cropping of ears, etc. Thomas Jefferson himself 
advocated castration, facial mutilation, etc. for those 
convicted of rape, sodomy or polygamy. These punishments 
were not considered unusual or cruel at that time. 
37Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. 
Ed. 2d 126 (1976). 
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Investigation of the case Weems v. United States38 finds the 
Court resorting to phrases such as "expansive and vital 
character" and capacity for "evolutionary growth"39 thereby 
expanding cruel punishment to be viewed in the context of 
contemporary standards. If punishment is to be viewed in 
contemporary light, and if that same contemporary light 
views wearing a flag of the United States on the rear 
portion of someone's jeans as free speech, then how can that 
same speech be limited to verbal testimony as according to 
Wigmore? If speech is "things" and "actions," then the 
drawing of blood (both a "thing" and an "action") must also 
be considered speech and protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Perhaps the protection offered by the Fifth is no protection 
at all save to prohibit "torture" for obtaining confessions. 
38Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377, 30 S. Ct. 
544, 553, 54 L. Ed. 793, 802 (1910). 
39Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 
2d 630 (1958) . 
CHAPTER 7 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 
Polls and surveys provide necessary feedback to both the 
government and the people. They allow for each in turn to 
view a given event. From the government's perspective they 
show how the population supports or rejects proposed 
revisions. For the public, polls and surveys give needed 
input to the individual that he might make comparison of his 
opinions in relationship to the population as a whole. 
The consensus of the governed, coupled with a perceived 
benevolent bureaucracy, help to provide the needed 
components for the formation of the political culture. The 
intertwining of values and the interaction of the competing 
groups can dispel anxiety and create or maintain the 
stability required for the population to flourish. The 
government, as well as the people, needs feedback on the 
effects of various changes in policy or law that affect the 
people. To accomplish this, some government agencies 
utilize the perspective and experiences of other countries 
to support their particular line of reasoning for 
instituting change. This, however, is only one part of the 
requisite equation. The missing element is perceptual 
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knowledge of how the people are considering these changes. 
Miranda was to have a significant effect upon the criminal 
justice system of the United States. This, in turn, would 
impact upon the people and their perception of safety from 
both the government and crime. The media can play an 
important role in providing to the government what the 
people are thinking and, additionally, to the people, 
allowing them to assess their perspectives in relation to 
the remainder of the population. The media does this 
through polls and surveys. We will view Miranda with this 
in mind. 
Whereas Chief Justice Warren's argument in his Miranda 
decision that "the experience in some other countries also 
suggests that the danger to law enforcement in curbs on 
interrogation is overplayed . . . there appears to have been 
no marked detrimental effect on criminal law enforcement in 
these jurisdictions as a result of these rules."1 
What is clear is that Miranda obviously did affect the 
percentage of confessions obtained in the United States and, 
when England adopted similar provisions, such as the 
addition of a right to counsel, similarities in the rate of 
loss of confessions obtained were observed. 
England has witnessed an erosion of the "cautioned" post 
1984. The recent changes listed earlier in the research are 
1Paul G. Cassell. "Miranda's Social Cost: An Empirical 
Reassessment," Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 90, 
No. 2 (1996) : 418. 
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clearly designed to balance the rights of the accused while 
maintaining, as a goal, the determination of facts. Only 
through the determination of facts can the guilty be 
identified, the punishment be assessed according to law and 
the well being of society be secured. 
For purposes of this research, it must be noted that 
Miranda is only a Supreme Court prescription for obtaining a 
confession, and that the underlying protection is still the 
Fifth Amendment and its prohibition on coerced confessions. 
This is evidenced by the Court's ruling in Tucker,2 Quarles3 
and Elstad.4 In Tucker, the Court held, through Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, that the Miranda warnings were "not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution" but only 
"prophylactic standards" designed to "safeguard" or to 
"provide practical reinforcement" for the privilege against 
self-incrimination. In Quarles, the Court also refused 
Quarles' contention that statements made by Quarles could be 
used absent Miranda warnings, taking into consideration the 
point that the "public safety" was paramount as well as the 
fact that the police did not compel him to speak nor coerce 
him -- only that the police failed to provide the Miranda 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 
L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974). 
3New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 
L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984). 
4Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. 
Ed. 2d 222 (1985). 
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warning. In Elstad, we have a similar circumstance in that 
two confessions were given, the first without Miranda and a 
second confession a short while later, with the Miranda 
warning preceding the questioning. Elstad contended that 
the first un-Mirandized confession contaminated the second 
Mirandized confession, thereby making the second confession 
"fruit of the poisoned tree" and therefore inadmissable. 
The Court disagreed saying, in essence, that the "fruit of 
the poisoned tree" assumes the existence of an underlying 
constitutional violation, and that the failure to give a 
Miranda warning is not in itself a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. "If, as the present Court seems to say, a 
violation of the self-incrimination clause itself occurs 
only when a confession is 'involuntary' under traditional 
standards, is this an outright rejection of the core premise 
of Miranda?"5 
Perhaps the Court now sees the earlier broadness of the 
Miranda interpretation as flawed and is seeking pathways to 
politely circumvent Miranda by applying new interpretations 
to the rule. If the Supreme Court can revise the Amendments 
by the mere reinterpretation of them, then it is reasonable 
to assume that Miranda, being only a Court created ruling 
and not an Amendment, could also be re-interpreted. 
sYale Kamisar et al., Basic Criminal Procedure. (St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1994), p. 505. 
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The advisability of a Bill of Rights for its citizens is 
being examined presently by the people in England. 
Editorials are replete with instances where ministers have 
exceeded their authority. The courts are not powerless to 
take action as evidenced by Minister Kenneth Baker being 
found guilty of contempt of court for deporting an asylum 
seeker. An editorial in the Independent stated, 
By extending their powers and occasionally 
flouting the law, ministers have inadvertently 
legitimized judicial activity in areas that were 
once deemed the preserve of politics. If Britain 
gets a Bill of Rights, as Labour promises, we can 
expect even more aggressive intervention. . . 6 
The political position of the Tories has always been to be 
"tough on crime." That this is a strong political issue is 
evidenced by the Labour party also espousing strong measures 
to combat crime. So, while the newspapers and various 
groups oppose the new legislation of England's crime bill, 
both political parties appear to be of one thought as it 
relates to encroachment on the right of silence. The Age 
wrote, "... spells an end to the 300 year old right of 
those accused of crimes to remain silent."7 Other comments 
depicting dire effects include such phrases as 
6"In Judgement of Government," Independent. 29 November 
1994, editorial, p. 15. 
’"Britain's New Law and Disorder," Age. (Melbourne), 5 
November 1994, p. 26. 
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" . . . not only removes the right to silence and undermines 
presumption of innocence . . . "8 
With Parliament being the legislative body and supreme 
in matters of law, the marriage of politics, legislation, 
social and criminal issues all come together in such a 
manner that it clearly shows the rapid change possible in 
affecting one's rights. If the social/political outcry is 
sufficient, then politicians, desirous of maintaining their 
political station and structures, must and will acquiesce to 
those demands voiced by their constituencies. Differing 
views of the public are voiced by various others such as QC 
Michael Mansfield who said "the bill is the most draconian 
act this government has put through. "9 Sir John Smith, the 
president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, 
offered that "the bill ran the risk of politicising the 
police and alienating communities."10 
United States Polls and.Surveys 
The Wall Street Journal viewed public opinion on the 
Fifth Amendment in September, 1995. Although it would be 
difficult to determine how widespread the following views 
are, the fact remains that these views are indeed part of 





0. J. Simpson trial where, not only did the accused not 
testify but, a prosecution witness, Mark Furman, invoked his 
right to silence privilege. Edward Felsenthal, whose by¬ 
line carried this article, indicated that this use of the 
Fifth Amendment by Mark Furman "has done an awful lot to 
destroy people's confidence that the Fifth Amendment is 
invoked to prevent government excesses."11 To show that this 
use is viewed unfavorably Felsenthal cites Washington 
lawyer, Harvey Pitt, who said "That's not going to be 
helpful in future cases where people try to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment."12 This reference to prosecution witnesses has 
happened in the Simpson case. In the Bernard Goetz case, 
two of the youths shot by the so-called "subway vigilante" 
and who were also prosecution witnesses, took the Fifth 
Amendment. Boston criminal defense lawyer, Harvey 
Silverglate, feels that "if a plebiscite on the Fifth 
Amendment was held today it would likely be defeated.13 
Here is where the Bill of Rights offers real protection. 
The whims of the moment of the public cannot be easily 
satisfied. The process necessary to change the Amendments 
is a long and deliberative one. To be successful, any 
change must have the support of Congress, the President and 
11 "As Fifth Amendment is Invoked More, Would Framers Rue 





the States. There is a shorter method in form, but it is 
longer in the time generally spent going through the former 
method. This method is through interpretation by at least 
five members of the Supreme Court. The members of the Court 
are appointed for life. They leave the bench either by 
dying or retiring. This process has allowed, as a 
consequence, the ability of a president to place upon this 
Court his legacy, far into the future, after he himself is 
no longer in office. If the president, unable to place his 
agenda on the Court due to a lack of vacancy, tried to 
increase the size of the Court, he would most likely face 
the same fate as Franklin D. Roosevelt did in his attempt to 
"stack the court" in order to help with his New Deal 
legislation. Even the appointment of Federal judges to the 
various levels of the Federal judiciary has its own spheres 
of influence. Whereas in selecting a judge for the Supreme 
Court, the president selects with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, in the lower Federal district courts, the 
senators from the state in which the need exists nominate 
the judge with the president consenting. This "tradition" 
of patronage, as a perk of being a senator, came into being 
around 1840. The Federal Court of Appeals, which spans 
several states, falls again within the prerogative of the 
president, because different states are involved. This 
process of judge appointments gives diversity to the system, 
allowing for competing political interests to be heard. 
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This diversity can be of great political advantage to a 
president. He can play one senator against another in order 
to increase the likelihood of his Supreme Court nominee 
being confirmed. A president, therefore, can nudge the 
political thought of the Supreme Court in his direction, if 
the circumstances allow enough of his input to be reflected 
in the make-up of the Court. 
Polls and surveys are used to determine what message 
being put forth by the population. This manner of pulse¬ 
taking information is important to both the population and 
where, amongst its heirarchy of needs, it is being placed. 
The polls indicated here that the populations of both 
England and the United States viewed the "right to silence" 
with a similar degree of importance. Cassell's research 
demonstrated that, even when crime statistics were 
increasing, the "right to silence" suffered little in the 
eyes of the people. England's data showed similar concerns. 
Polls can also indicate the political underpinnings of 
Supreme Court nominees and the ultimate outcome. In an 
article by E.J. Dionne, Jr., the importance of the nominee's 
constitutional viewpoint carries a great deal of weight. 
The question of judicial philosophy has become 
central to the Bork nomination because Justice 
Powell had been a key swing vote on the Court. 
Liberals fear that Judge Bork would decisively move 
the Court to the Right. Also, many Bork opponents 
concede his intelligence and competence and will 
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thus have to contest the nomination on philosophical 
grounds.14 
In July, 1987, a poll taken over two days asked the 
following questions of seven hundred and forty-five 
respondents. First, was the Supreme Court too liberal or 
too conservative? Second, has the Supreme Court gone too 
far in protecting the rights of the accused? The results 
were that 36 percent felt the Court was too liberal; 38 
percent felt the Court to be too conservative; 43 percent 
felt the Court went too far in protecting the rights of the 
accused and 41 percent felt that the Court needed to do more 
for the accused. 
Another question in this poll addressed the issue of 
whether or not a nominee to the Supreme Court should be 
questioned on his or her judicial philosophy. Democrats 
answered in favor of questioning the nominee as to his/her 
judicial philosophy at 65 percent, Republicans at 63 
percent, Liberals at 64 percent and Conservatives at 61 
percent. The last question asked if the President should 
pay "a lot of attention" to the nominee's judicial 
philosophy, to which 72 percent replied that he should. No 
breakdown on this last question was provided as to party 
affiliation or political viewpoint, whether Liberal or 
Conservative. 
14"Senate Should Consider the Opinions of High Court 
Nominees, Poll Finds." New York Times. 24 July 1987, sec. A, 
p. 12 . 
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"In a Times/CBS News Poll taken in June 1986 34 percent 
said the Supreme Court had 'gone too far in protecting the 
rights of people accused of crimes.'"15 In a 1987 repeat 
survey, the figure was 43 percent. 
Another poll, taken in 1987, was conducted in Ohio. 
This Ohio poll was conducted at the University of 
Cincinnati's Institute for Policy Research with an accuracy 
rating of plus or minus 3 percent. A random selection of 
818 adults were interviewed across the state between April 
23rd and May 9th.16 The questions asked were as follows: 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
A. Police should be required to warn a criminal suspect 
before interrogation of the right to remain silent and 
to have a lawyer 
Agree 85 percent 
Disagree 13 percent 
No opinion 2 percent 
B. Evidence that proves the guilt of a suspect should be 
admissible in a criminal trial even if the evidence was 
obtained in a search that violated the individual's 
constitutional rights 
Should be admissible 59 percent 
Should not be admissible 35 percent 
No opinion 6 percent 
It appears the population at large fears interrogation more 
than intrusive searches. Could this be a reflection of the 
population's fear of the "third degree" methods visualized 
by those polled? 
15Ibid. p. 12. 
16"Ohioans Support Suspects' Constitutional Rights," 
Regional News (Cincinnati), 28 July, 1987. p. B4. 
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The American Bar Association also conducted a study 
addressing the exclusionary rule and the Supreme Court's 
Miranda decision.17 This study, conducted over a two-year 
period, concluded that neither the exclusionary rule nor 
Miranda were hindering the police or the prosecutors from 
doing their job. The survey was performed by telephone and 
was national in scope. It contacted police, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys and judges. The survey concluded that the 
lack of adequate resources and not legal protections was the 
culprit in the rise of drug related cases. 
On the surface, this report is easy to accept but it 
must be considered "soft" because rarely will an 
administrator state his resources are adequate for, if they 
are adequate, why then is he not more successful in lowering 
his crime rate? Budget increases are grants of power -- the 
bigger the budget, the more power to wield. It appears that 
lawyers, on either side of the issue, prefer to have 
cumbersome points of law to consider and argue rather than 
to clarify or streamline the legal system. It is also 
problematical for political post holders, police chiefs, 
prosecutors, judges, etc. to support less constitutional 
rights for people. It is not a good political platform to 
stand upon, so the safe bet is for them to take the position 
that resources, neutral in ideology, are the culprit. 
17"Study Says Drug Crisis Overwhelming Legal System" 
Associated Press. 30 November 1988. p. A16. 
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The National Law Journal published the results, in 
August of 1989, of a National Law Journal/Lexis poll with 
the following results.18 The published results failed to 
provide the total number of respondents to the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of seventy 
questions and covered suspects' rights, causes of crime, 
extent of the emergency perceived, racism, the media and 
Supreme Court rulings. Of interest to this research are the 
numbers concerned with suspects' rights and Supreme Court 
rulings. 
Nearly half of those surveyed favored cutting back 
suspects' rights 
34 percent felt "desperate" about crime 
48 percent supported reversing court rulings that 
limit police conduct in gathering evidence 
Another poll taken in November, 1993 indicated that, 
although crime was a major problem, a majority of the five 
hundred people surveyed would NOT support diminishing the 
protections currently enjoyed by suspects. 
"There's a feeling that maybe something that 
protects an alleged criminal will protect me too," 
Ferrer said. "The majority is willing to let some 
guilty people go free rather than convict innocent 
people. 1,19 
In April of 1994, the National Law Journal conducted 
another poll to compare with the one performed in 1989. One 
18Fred Strasser, "Perceptions and Reality; Crime in 
America," National Law Journal (7 August 1989): 52. 
19Courant-ISI Connecticut Poll, Hartford Courant. 21 
November 1993, A edition, p. B1. 
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standout feature indicated a dramatic change in numbers. 
Whereas in 1989, 34 percent felt "desperate" about crime and 
personal safety, in 1994 that figure jumped to 62 percent. 
"Those polled reject the government's intrusion on basic 
civil rights, gun ownership and the media's displays of 
violence."20 It appears 78 to 85 percent of people are 
unwilling to give up basic civil rights even if doing so 
might enhance their personal safety. Another dramatic 
figure showed three out of four people say that the police 
and the criminal justice system cannot protect people 
adequately. Could this portend a turn to "vigilante" 
tactics? If so, when then does the protection for civil 
rights come in? The survey was perhaps too broad in its 
scope, thereby allowing conclusions to be drawn in error. 
The report went on to state that 78 percent supported the 
continuation of the police reading suspects their Miranda 
rights. 
It is reasonable to conclude from the survey data that 
the population of the United States, although fearful of the 
increase in criminal activity, along with its perception 
that the police and the criminal justice system cannot cope 
with crime sufficiently, are nonetheless loathe to sacrifice 
civil right guarantees that are now in place in order to 
enhance their personal safety. It is possible that the 
2°"Crime's Toll on the U.S.: Fear, Despair and Guns," 
National Daw Journal. 18 April 1994, p. A1. 
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population has been "cultured" into the belief that the 
United States Constitution is unique to this country, and 
that the citizens are fortunate indeed to be inhabitants of 
the United States. Clearly, to change any Amendment would 
be an arduous task. If the population, seeing its 
"desperate need" to fight crime, would not be strong enough 
to sway public opinion, then the politicians would have 
small support to undertake such a far-reaching measure to 
attempt to cure the problem. Changing the "basic civil 
rights" of the American people through the political process 
of Congress, the President and state ratification appears 
remote. However, the Supreme Court has the ability to 
expand or limit protections by a five to four majority. 
Polls and Surveys . - England 
The Daily Telegraph reported a study that was conducted 
for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice.21 This survey 
examined over one thousand cases from all over England. It 
determined that the use of the "right to silence" was 
significant in only five percent of the cases. With a 
conviction rate of fifty percent for these one thousand 
cases, the report concluded that the suspect's right to 
silence may have hampered conviction in two to three percent 
of the cases. Also examined was the relationship in 
acquittals and the suspect remaining silent. The findings 
21 "Study Backs the Right to Silence," Daily Telegraph, 2 
February 1993, p. 6. 
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showed that "while the defendant had been silent during 
interrogation in ten percent of such cases, the majority- 
failed for reasons that were unconnected."22 The report went 
on to conclude that abolishing the right to silence would 
have little impact on the cases. This study's report fails 
to provide survey structure data. One could assume from the 
report that, whether or not there is in place a right to 
remain silent, it makes or affords little protection. This 
conclusion on the part of the Daily Telegraph is based on 
its findings that the rate of conviction for those 
interrogated was similar to those not interrogated, and that 
other factors needed to be considered. 
Another survey dealing with convictions based solely 
upon confessions cited attorney incompetence rather than 
right to silence as primary concerns.23 This report also 
noted a survey by a Solicitors Journal which indicated 
continued support for the suspect to have the right to 
remain silent by 61 percent of those surveyed. The 
Solicitors Journal data fails to indicate the total number 
of those surveyed and the method of obtaining the polling 
data. Also absent are the respondents' classification for 
opposition to the right to silence, as well as those 
percentages of respondents who were undecided. 
22Ibid. 
23"Defence Lawyers Errors 'Ignored'," Guardian. 5 July 
1993, p. 2. 
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What is disturbing in the surveys reported by the 
various newspapers is that the newspapers report the changes 
in the "caution" being revised as an "abolition of the right 
to silence." With media incorrectly portraying this 
situation, it calls into question the manner in which the 
questions were constructed and the method of the various 
surveys themselves. The Independent of May 9, 1994 is a 
case in point.24 How can one determine what the country 
thinks about a particular matter if the point in question is 
not identified properly? The abolition of a right is 
drastically different as compared to minor changes in the 
description of the right offered. Prior to the new 
"caution," the suspect could remain silent and request a 
lawyer. Subsequent to the passage by the House of Commons 
to include a warning to the suspect that the judge could 
note the suspect's silence to the jury does not deprive that 
suspect of his right to silence. Nor does it deprive him of 
his right to an attorney. Abolition of a right has not 
occurred. What has occurred is the implementation of the 
political agenda of the reporting paper, thereby biasing the 
perception to its readers as to what is involved. 
This paper was instrumental in conducting a deliberative 
poll mentioned earlier. A cross-section of three hundred 
people was brought to one location for an intensive weekend 
24"Crime: What the Country Really Thinks," Independent. 
9 May 1994, p. 9. 
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of debate and discussion. Collaborating with the 
Independent was Channel 4. Values offered by those polled 
were "effective" or "very effective." The following is 
excerpted from the report published in the May 9, 1994 
edition.25 
Before After 
A - Do prison sentences lower 
crime? 
57% 38% 
B - Rights of Suspects to remain 
silent without it being held 
against them 
57% 41% 
Other reported results showed a marked increase to re¬ 
instate the death penalty but no numbers were reported. 
With the biased reporting by the staff writer for the 
newspaper, the entire survey is brought into question as to 
its reliability, method of question formation and desired 
outcome for future action or non-action. As earlier noted, 
a deliberative poll conducted in an unbiased fashion is a 
proper sounding board against which to test ideas. If the 
survey is conducted by professionals careful to eliminate 
areas of bias in either the formation of the question or by 
careful selection of balanced interests in the debate 
panels, then an informed select group should provide safe 
guidance for future action. But the final analysis is still 
only opinion. The actual effects of such legislation upon 
25Ibid. p. 1. 
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crime and criminals can only be properly realized by 
empirical research such as the two studies performed by Paul 
Cassell. 
Whereas perception of "rights" and the reality of 
"rights" are concerned, the perception is more to the short¬ 
term, while the reality is shaped in consequences over the 
long term. In politics, the memory of the voters appears to 
be, in some cases, of short duration. Unless the issue is 
passionately held, political positions on various issues can 
be modified over time. Herein could lie the danger in 
revising perceived rights. The surveys in England tend to 
illustrate that even the fear of crime does not lessen the 
population's perception of its protection from the excesses 
of government inquiry. 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The research has provided answers for some areas of 
concern but has also, perhaps, brought to the fore some new 
questions for consideration. If there are alternative 
methods to fact finding, how are they affected under each 
political/legal system of the United States and England? 
It is obvious that, for the accused to be able to defend 
himself, there must be in place a method whereby the accused 
can remain silent and someone else speak in his defense. 
The old method "the accused speaks" provided for the accused 
to defend himself by answering question by question, 
refuting or denying, where possible, the charges or 
allegations now issuing from the bench. At the time when 
"the accused speaks" was in vogue, persons charged with 
serious crimes were not allowed the assistance of defense 
counsel. This situation precluded counsel for felonies but 
allowed for defense counsel in cases of misdemeanors, 
because many misdemeanors were concerned with civil actions. 
Blackstone wrote "For upon what face of reason can that 
assistance of counsel be denied to save the life of a man, 
which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty 
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trespass?"1 Once it became accepted practice to have defense 
counsel, it became possible for the lawyer of the accused to 
question the case against his client. When lawyers for both 
the defense and prosecution controlled the proceedings, 
rather than just a judge, several new outcomes were 
realized. One, the prosecution was now under pressure to 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the 
privilege against self-incrimination was solidly entrenched. 
The defendant, now having an attorney to defend him, no 
longer needed to be a witness. The courtroom procedure is 
now metamorphosed from where "the accused speaks" to 
"testing the case by the prosecution." Both of these 
conditions now prevail at trial, but where the jury or judge 
must determine if the prosecution proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is often determined long after the 
actual trial itself as to what might be self-incrimination. 
If the progression of decisions relating to protecting 
the defendant is viewed over time, it becomes apparent that 
the period of 1960 to 1972, or thereabouts, reflects Supreme 
Court decisions in such a manner. Prior to the Warren 
Court, states' rights in matters at trial were, for the most 
part, not proper subjects to be reviewed. The Federal 
system, that is a separate Federal and state judicial system 
of procedures, was closer in concept to the original intent 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, quoted in John H. 
Langbein, Michigan Law Review 1994 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 
(1994) : 63 . 
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of the Framers in 1787, than it was to become. The Warren 
Court, perhaps looking to engineer social changes, used its 
judicial review powers to usurp power from the states and 
began to nullify the Federal system in favor of a de facto 
unitary one. The expansion and contraction of judicial 
powers now began in earnest. 
The political agenda of the Democratic Party began to 
embrace social issues on a major scale, and this concern 
with social issues appears to have been in lock-step with 
the judicial decisions rendered at the time. If one were to 
analyze the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and 
compare those decisions with the English determination to 
curb crime, the final position reached would most likely be 
that in the United States the right of the accused to remain 
silent is a better protection than in England. However, 
this analysis must be viewed as part of a dynamic process 
subject to Supreme Court rulings and crime legislation 
geared to control criminal activity. 
Is There an Alternative? 
There has been, throughout the years, the effect of 
science impacting on the criminal justice system. The 
electronic media and freedom of speech is but one example of 
impingement upon the First Amendment. The Fourth Amendment 
has hosted a large array of modernization in society and the 
effects upon rights to privacy and search and seizure 
issues. The Eighth Amendment has confronted new methods of 
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executions across the spectrum of time. With regard to the 
Fifth Amendment and in particular the "right to silence" 
there appears to be reluctance to come to grips with the 
issue. Defence lawyers cringe at any attempt to validate 
polygraph usage while, at the same time, espousing a 
dedicated commitment to "seek the truth." Yet defence 
lawyers overwhelmingly are the advocates of not wanting 
various types of evidence introduced at trial for any number 
of reasons. The seeking of truth can take many paths and, 
if justice and truth are the desired goals, why not allow 
all types to compete at trial, if they fulfill Frye 
requirements? But even Frye has given way to an expanded 
meaning allowing for the admission of evidence. In 1993 
Daubert2 allowed for competing viewpoints to be heard in 
court as to the reliability and validity of scientific 
techniques. The history of Frye is three quarters of a 
century long, providing guidance in many new areas of 
criminal investigation such as: 
A. Forward looking radar systems3 
B. Chromatographic analysis of ink4 
2Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 
2786. (1993) . 
3United States v. Kilgus, 571 F. 2nd 508 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
4United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 
1971). 
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C. Gunshot residue tests5 
D. Voice prints6 
E. Psychiatric testimony7 
F. Blood splatter analysis8 
G. Blood group typing9 
H. Bitemark comparisons10 
I. Microscopic comparisons of hair samples11 
to name just the major examples. 
In 1975 Congress enacted the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 702 stated "If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
5State v. Smith, 362 N.E. 2d 1239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). 
6United States v. Addison, 498 F. 2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) . 
7Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F. 2d 1250 (7th Cir.) Cert. 
Denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). 
8Mustafa v. United States Parole Comm'n, 479 U.S. 953 
(1986) . 
Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P. 2d 382 (Cal. 1966). 
10People v. Sloane, 143 Cal Rptr. 61 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 
1978) . 
“People v. Watkins, 259 N.W. 2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1977) . 
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This new ruling set aside Frye and now allows a more 
liberal approach to the admission of evidence or testimony. 
The case of Daubert saw the Supreme Court unanimously 
holding that Frye was incompatible with the new Rule 702 and 
the relevancy standard. Since Daubert, all Federal courts 
and many state courts simply require that scientific 
evidence be relevant and reliable. 
Enter now the polygraph. What could be more 
compelling than to be able to place before a judge or jury 
evidence that conclusively indicates the truth of a 
testimony? There has been widespread opposition to this 
method of fact finding by defense lawyers. Consider this. 
If there is a method of decisively indicating the truth of a 
matter, and the accused maintains his innocence, but does 
not avail himself to take a polygraph, the problem of the 
defense to create an aura of doubt is severely limited. 
Also, this method of fact finding makes our deepest secrets 
revealable to the world. This is frightening. But if this 
method can be so devastating, why is it not used more, and 
why is it not more acceptable across the spectrum? Argument 
has been successful in showing that the polygraph is not 
infallible. It is not one hundred percent accurate. There 
can be mistakes made, and possibly send an innocent suspect 
to prison. If this argument was used to challenge all other 
methods of determining evidence, what would survive? Are 
blood tests not also fallible? What about the comparison of 
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fingerprints? ballistics? eye-witness testimony? And of 
considerable interest, the testimony of the accused, whose 
welfare is most in jeopardy at trial? There is a central 
paradox of the trial paradigm and this is the need for the 
reliable representation of facts. Such representations are 
commonly made by witnesses who may be less than truthful in 
their testimony. To combat this, our legal system attempts 
to utilize various safeguards to secure accuracy in 
testimony. Oaths and prosecution of perjurers are among the 
most noteworthy. With a polygraph, there are two possible 
outcomes in considering error rates. One is a false 
positive where the person is telling the truth and the 
second, a false negative, where deceit is not registered by 
the equipment. With the realization that no technology is 
without error, what is an acceptable rate of error for use 
of this information at trial? That there is serious regard 
in this matter is to recognize the prejudicial nature to the 
accused when the jury views such evidence. A polygraph's 
results may overshadow all other evidence in its effect upon 
the decision making process of the jury. Perhaps this is 
the proper role in which to view this technology. Extensive 
experiments by Norman Ansley12 shows the accuracy rate for 
polygraphs to be in the range of eighty percent to one 
hundred percent. See table 6. 
12Norman Ansley, "The Validity and Reliability of 
Polygraph Decisions in Real Cases." Study prepared for the 
American Polygraph Association. 
TABLE 6 
VALIDITY OF EXAMINERS' DECISIONS 
(inconclusives excluded) 
Authors/Date # / 
NDI 
# Correct / % 
DI 
# / # Correct / % # / * 
Total 
Correct / % Technique 
Arellano (1990) 18 18 100% 22 22 100% 40 40 100% Backster Zone 
Edwards (1981) 363 356 98% 596 587 98% 959 943 98% Variety 
Elaad & Schahar (1985) 100 95 95% 74 73 99% 174 168 97% Reid CQT Sc 
Matte Sc Reuss (1989) 54 54 100% 60 60 100% 114 114 100% 
Backster Zone 
Quadri-zone 
Murray (1989) 21 18 86% 150 150 100% 171 168 98% Arther CQT 
Patrick Sc Iacono (1987) 30 27 90% 51 51 100% 81 78 96% CQT 
Putnam (1983) 65 62 95% 220 219 99% 285 281 99% Backster Zone 
Raskin et al (1988) 28 27 96% 57 54 95% 85 81 95% 
Sc MGQT 
CQT 
Widacki (1982)* -- -- -- -- -- -- 38 35 92% Backster Zone 
Yamamura Sc Miyake (1980) £1 94% in 2A 80% 11 11 89% POT 
TOTALS 744 718 97% 1260 1240 98% 2042 1993 98% 
TOTALS (less Edwards and 
Yamamura & Miyake) 316 301 95% 634 629 99% 988 965 98% 
Source : Norman Ansley, "The Validity and Reliability of Polygraph Decisions in Real Cases." Study prepared for the American 
Polygraph Association. 
♦Only the totals reported. 
POT = Peak of Tension 
CQT = Control Question tests 
RI = Relevant/Irrelevant technique 
DI = Deception indicated 






What is of significance is that more than one method of 
question formation was used. Included are the major studies 
of the previous ten years because they are representative of 
current trends. 
Results : 
Not all tests invoked control questions and some tests may 
have employed various types. Of the Control Question Tests 
(QCT) , excluding Edwards and Yamamura, examiners were 
correct in 301 out of 316 No Deception Indicated (NDI) for a 
95 percent rate. They were correct in 629 out of 634 
Deception Indicated (DI) for 99 percent. Unlike Peak Of 
Tensions (POT), the control question tests were more 
accurate with guilty subjects. If Edwards is included the 
No Deception Indicated numbers are 656 of 679 for a 96 
percent rate. The Deception Indicated rate was 99 percent 
obtained from 1,216 of 1,230 cases. The ground truth 
against which these percentages were obtained included 
either the confession of the accused or a "charge partner" 
of the accused or upon court decisions. Also included were 
follow-ups based upon both, and some had the addition of 
physical evidence. There are two weaknesses that should be 
noted. Physical evidence and court decisions are 
unreliable. Confessions are better as false confessions are 
rare, but the researcher must be mindful that the types of 
individuals who will confess are a different breed from 
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those who refuse, and deception detection between those 
groups may not truly reflect the accuracy of such detection. 
Other studies show singular techniques and concern 
themselves with isolated portions of the craft. This study 
was selected because of its "real world" content and its 
inclusive use of all major indicators. The first table 
addressed validity, the next table will provide the 
reliability analysis. This measurement is a blind analysis 
where the evaluator does not know the facts of the case. 
This study assumed that the blind evaluators and examiners 
were of comparable levels of competency and that all had 
similar amounts of experience. Other concerns addressed the 
background of the scorers, as there are different schools of 
polygraph utilizing different methods of scoring the charts. 
So the scoring methods and the scoring of others' charts was 
of some concern. Another notable point was the detail of 
the chart markings, and whether or not the evaluator used 
any assumptions in his markings. The results of Table 7 
indicated correction rates from 83 percent and greater -- 
significantly greater than chance. If we accept these 
results as valid, and there do not appear to be results to 
the contrary, the criminal justice system faces a dilemma of 
two parts. First, how to gain court approval for the 
introduction of polygraph results in all criminal cases, and 
second, combatting constitutional concerns. 
TABLE 7 
RELIABILITY OF BLIND CHART ANALYSIS 
(inconclusives excluded) 
Authors/Date # / 
NDI 
K Correct / % # / # 
DI 
Correct / % 
Total 
# / # Correct / % Technioue 
Arellano (1990) 18 18 100% 22 22 100% 40 40 100% Backster Zone 
(numerical scoring) 
Elaad (1985) 30 23 77% 30 23 77% 60 46 77% CQT (numerical 
scoring) 
Elaad (1985) 30 27 90% 30 23 77% 60 50 83% CQT (global 
scoring) 
Franz (1989) 49 33 67% 50 47 94% 99 83 84% Reid CQT 
(numerical scoring) 
Honts & Driscoll (1988)* — — — — — — 52 46 88% CQT (numerical 
scoring) 





100 92 92% Reid CQT 
(numerical scoring) 
Matte & Reuss (1989) 54 54 100% 60 60 100% 114 114 100% Quadri-Zone 
(numerical scoring) 
Patrick & Iacono (1987) 20 11 55% 49 48 98% 69 59 86% Canadian CQT 
(numerical scoring) 
Raskin et al (1988) 22 19 86% 48 45 94% 70 64 91% CQT (numerical 
scoring) 
Ryan (1989)* — — — — — — 233 218 85% Reid CQT (numerical 
scoring) 
TOTALS 233 193 83% 300 279 93% 940 831 88% 
Source : Norman Ansley, "The Validity and Reliability of Polygraph Decisions in Real Cases." Study prepared for the American 
Polygraph Association. 
*Only the totals reported 
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Such concerns address: 
A. Is it still appropriate to allow the accused to remain 
silent when there is technology for determining truth 
B. Should the courts/Constitution protect the accused or 
allow the Government to establish the accused's guilt 
C. The Fifth Amendment may have failed to predict this set 
of circumstances 
One possible solution would be Congressional hearings 
assessing the technology that pits science against law. 
One possible solution would allow for a more liberal use 
of the polygraph in civil proceedings. Another would, in 
criminal cases, allow the accused to enter a polygraph 
result to prove innocence, while providing that the 
prosecution would need more than just a polygraph test to 
secure a conviction. Other points to consider would be a 
re-vamping of the trial itself from that of an accusatorial 
nature to the inquisition model where the judge is the 
seeker of truth. This would still allow for cross- 
examination between opposing sides. This would model those 
countries using a civil law basis for their proceedings. 
This method is used in the majority of countries. If truth 
is what is desired, obtaining it in the face of scientific 
advances clearly invades areas protected presently by 
Constitutional directive. The Constitution of the United 
States and its attendant Bill of Rights has been hailed for 
its ability to adapt to changing times. The rapid 
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advancement of science may be posing, to this Constitution, 
the strongest challenges yet. 
The research therefore shows that a suspect's "right to 
silence" is better protected under the United States system 
with its written Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
limiting the Government's actions against the individual. 
The cases brought before the Supreme Court praying for 
relief because of unique circumstances, real or imagined, 
demonstrate a commitment over time to provide protection to 
the accused. 
That the protection could be expanded is still a player 
in the arena. It is conceivable that a Supreme Court could 
view the Fifth Amendment in the same legal light as the 
state courts, prior to Weeks. This viewpoint allows for the 
rapid expansion of protections originally considered by the 
state courts. Again, all that would be required is a 
ruling/interpretation of the Fifth Amendment protections, 
disregarding Wigmore's position as to what is considered 
testimony, as discussed earlier in the research. The 
withdrawing of body fluids appears to circumvent the 
protection against one being a "compelled" entity to provide 
evidence, but if the intent of the originators of the Bill 
of Rights is considered in context with the level of 
investigative procedures in place at that time, then the 
strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is proper. 
Clouding this issue somewhat have been the pronouncements of 
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the Court however, to "broaden protections of other rights" 
provided in the accompanying Amendments. Whereas there has 
been a narrowing of the protection, as witnessed by the 
cases indicated from the late nineteenth century to Miranda 
of the twentieth century, the "compelling" of testimony by 
force has been, for the most part, eliminated. If one 
agrees with Wigmore that only testimony is protected, then 
interrogation prior to trial is not included. The procedure 
for change in the Amendment, absent Supreme Court unilateral 
decisions, is a long and arduous one. Extensive debate in 
both houses of Congress would necessarily ensue if a change 
in the Amendment was pondered. This is highly unlikely 
witness the Equal Rights Amendment of the late 1970s. 
Ratification of this Amendment, which endangered no-one nor 
placed anyone in jeopardy of incarceration, was defeated 
through failing to get the requisite three-quarters of 
states' legislatures to ratify; this after being accepted by 
two-thirds vote of both houses in Congress. Amending 
anything by this method, in the Bill of Rights, would almost 
certainly fail as well. The Supreme Court, as mentioned 
earlier, could expand the Federal viewpoint to encompass the 
earlier protection granted by the state courts in the late 
1800s. Given the social damage reported in Cassell's 
reports, this appears most unlikely as well. For, if 
Miranda could have a negative impact on conviction rates, 
the widening of the umbrella of protections granted in the 
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Fifth Amendment would increase the level of alarm in the 
population and, quite possibly, bring about "vigilante" 
actions at worse, or increased political replacement of 
legislatures at best. Recent political dialogue in Congress 
has voiced desires to fully implement the Tenth Amendment, 
which would return to the states those rights not ceded to 
the Federal Government. How the resurrection of the Tenth 
Amendment would affect decisions based upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment is yet to be decided. If the states retain 
certain rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment abrogates those 
rights, it is possible to see a case being made for revising 
the Fourteenth Amendment or having it declared 
unconstitutional. There are definite, serious 
constitutional issues that need to be addressed in order to 
provide equal Amendment protection from all of the 
amendments based upon the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Some previous Supreme Court decisions may clearly reside 
outside the scope of the Federal Government because of the 
nature of the Federal system at hand. The Founding Fathers 
clearly wanted a limitation upon Federal authority 
insinuating itself into the workings of the state. With 
this in mind, state trials may revert to having various 
degrees of protections for the accused, as witnessed by the 
state cases prior to Weeks. It is not reasonable to expect 
a serious erosion of the right to remain silent as this 
right was broader under state control, it having been 
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narrowed by the action of the Supreme Court as illustrated 
earlier in the research. 
James Madison believed that the greatest threat 
to human rights in a popular government is the 
majority tyranny that results when one faction 
seizes control of the entire power of government and 
uses it to advance its own selfish interests at the 
expense of all other interests.13 
This viewpoint of Madison allows for competing interests in 
the country to exist, but with the Federal Government 
wielding the power through the Fourteenth Amendment, we move 
from a heterogeneous society to a homogenized one. Almond 
contends that "a political culture is a particular 
distribution of political attitudes, values, feelings, 
information, and skills."14 This political culture in the 
United States provides a basis for most Americans thinking 
highly of themselves as Americans while somewhat cautious in 
their views of their politicians. It is with this in mind 
that Americans most value their Bill of Rights. Americans 
have been socialized to value highly the United States 
Constitution, perhaps more so than other populations and 
their laws and governments. George Washington remarked on 
the uniqueness of the United States in his inaugural 
address, saying, 
The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, 
and the destiny of the republican model of 
13Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., gen. 
eds. Comparative Politics Today: A World View. 5th ed. (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), p. 567. 
14Ibid. p. 569. 
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government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps 
as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to 
the hands of the American people.15 
It is therefore no wonder that Americans cherish their 
"rights." However, "rights" do not come without 
responsibility. The mere fact that someone has "rights" 
does not remove obligations that are co-committant with 
those "rights." It is a zero sum situation. The individual 
exercises his right to silence which is not absolute, 
witness the immunities discussed earlier. There are rights 
to free speech and freedom of expression, but a restaurant 
which had a sign saying "No handicapped people" would find 
itself afoul the Federal law, thus modifying rights of 
speech, freedom of expression, right to assembly, etc. That 
the United States Supreme Court issued decisions on all 
variances of free speech, it is not likely that the right to 
silence would be so abridged even if scientific progress 
allowed for it. If our thoughts and secrets are to be laid 
bare through effective scientific apparatuses, then 
political freedom is also jeopardized. For, if the "self" 
is not held inviolate, then neither can the accumulation of 
"selves" be so. Intrusions of a moderate nature are now 
tolerated by society recognizing that the needs of society 
are being carefully balanced against the "rights" of the 
individual, but the operative word is "balanced." 
15Ibid. p. 595. 
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It is therefore concluded that each Amendment has the 
potential to have its protections extended or diminished at 
the discretion of the Supreme Court. However, it is also of 
note that a written Bill of Rights, wherein each right is 
formidable in its own protections, when these rights are 
interwoven, can constitute a legal fabric in which the 
citizen can clothe himself with a substantial degree of 
security. This protection allows for a population to have 
real impact on the political process without undue fear of 
reprisal. With societies in competition for various 
resources, this political trust can be maneuvered to obtain 
the items of priority for that particular group. Absent 
this political trust, the population would seek out ways to 
effect what it considers to be needed adjustments outside 
those afforded by the orderly process of laws and balloting. 
To be considered are even those who are unsuccessful in 
their initial attempts to secure their goals. Political and 
legal history in the United States has demonstrated that the 
protection of minorities does, in fact, take place, and the 
opposition of those minorities to various in-place 
institutions can be coerced to modify their alienating 
actions. The civil rights movement of the 1960s provides 
emphatic proof that this is true. 
In England the process to further limit the right to 
silence passed the new regulations with minor difficulties. 
Moreover, the new regulations, having been passed by 
229 
Parliament are not subject to additional review for 
legitimization. The recent cry in England for a written 
Bill of Rights underscores the importance such a document 
demands. 
The clash of science with the legal system is not yet 
over; rather, it has just begun. If the original intent of 
the right to silence was predicated upon the use of torture 
to secure the truth, it is reasonable to assume that 
increases in crime, coupled with advances in science, may 
create an atmosphere wherein the right to silence becomes 
the duty to speak. The Bill of Rights has shielded the 
citizens of the United States for over two hundred years. 
The next fifty years may be the most crucial to its 
survival. 
The paucity of English cases demonstrates that the legal 
aspects of protecting its citizens are not as often 
challenged as in the United States. The English courts are 
more closely focused as to legal issues considered to be 
heard. The judicial review in the United States considers 
issues of legal procedure within the criminal justice 
system, as well as issues regarding the constitutionality of 
the law itself. The issue of legality of the law is absent 
in England as this is outside the scope of authority of its 
judicial appellate process. The options for challenge by 
the accused are therefore somewhat limited in England 
whereas, in the United States, the limitations are only a 
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function of limited legal imagination of the defense team. 
That imagination has provided for the Supreme Court 
decisions emphatically voiced in the First Amendment's 
decisions. Further, whereas there are court recognitions of 
Multiple Personality Disorder variances, the English courts 
do not address this issue at all. This cannot be for lack 
of legal imagination on the part of the barristers or 
solicitors engaged in defense tactics. 
The use of the polygraph is conspicuously absent in 
England also. Usage of this technology appears to be 
limited, and court cases based upon its use are limited as 
well, to its use by the Government in areas of espionage. 
The Framers of the United States Constitution were more 
concerned with property issues and political concerns 
interfering with trade as opposed to issues of crime and 
criminal procedure. This original intent of the Bill of 
Rights, to offer political protection, assumed as a 
secondary area of concern criminal accusations of all types. 
This adoption by the Bill of Rights speaks well for its 
versatility. 
With these points in mind, further support is given to 
the contention that a written Bill of Rights clearly 
outlining protections, and with the mechanism to change 
these rights long and arduous, provides a substantial legal 
foundation upon which the citizens can rely for protection. 
The judicial review provided for under the United States 
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Constitution allows for minor expansion and contraction of 
legal guarantees, without the necessity for wholesale 
overhaul because of changing conditions. It has been 
demonstrated that the United States' approach to judicial 
review is two-fold: one being the review of judicial 
outcomes of trial courts, and the second by the Supreme 
Court in its role of overseeing the laws generated by 
Congress. 
A comparison between the United States and England of 
outcomes at trials is difficult because of the underlying 
protections of the Bill of Rights enjoyed by the accused in 
the United States. In England, for instance, there is no 
exclusionary rule, as all evidence is admissible regardless 
of the manner in which it was obtained. So, for someone to 
remark that in England elimination of confessions would have 
little impact on convictions would at first appear 
meaningful. But this must be viewed within the entire 
framework of the English system. Would the United States' 
population be willing to trade some protections by enhancing 
selected ones and eliminating others? It may very well be 
that the protections of the accused's right to silence are 
but "keystones" to an arch that embraces all covered by its 
strength. 
Consider the following. At trial, the presence of a 
suspect's fingerprints (or other physical evidence) at the 
scene of a crime is evidence against the accused. However, 
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lack of such evidence is usually noted by the defense to 
support the contention that the accused is innocent. If we 
follow this line of logic of evidence/no evidence, then the 
accused's failure to testify, denying such accusations, 
should also be allowed by the prosecution. The accused is 
not compelled to testify to provide incriminating 
statements, but how can the denial of wrongdoing, by an 
innocent person, be harmful? A court of law is the place in 
which the search for truth takes place. No torture is 
presumed. No fear, other than what is appropriate under the 
circumstance, is induced. That anyone taking an oath or 
affirmation feels apprehensive is a normal occurrence for 
those who do not testify as a matter of course in daily 
life. The court can compel an accused to give intimate 
samples but shrinks from placing the accused on the stand to 
deny accusations of guilt! Perhaps what has occurred is 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs being applied to legal issues. 
Maslow's pinnacle of achievement, that of "self- 
actualization" appears to come into play. The lofty ideals 
of justice have set up unrealistic rules to combat crime. 
Those who are engaged in crime do not follow those rules. 
It is as if we have one side playing baseball while the 
other is engaged in soccer. It may be well to note that 
crime detection and criminal activity may not have been the 
focus of the Bill of Rights but rather political protection 
from Government. If this is so, how then would it alter the 
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criminal justice system of the United States? This thought 
bears weight, because organized police activity did not 
occur until some fifty years after the Bill of Rights. 
If the Bill of Rights was introduced because of criminal 
activity, is it not also plausible to assume that some 
mechanisms, as a part of government, would have been in 
place to combat crime? The excesses of the English monarchy 
upon the colonists were those oppressions of a 
political/economic nature having more to do with politics 
and trade rather than crimes against people. Property crime 
was influential in the drafting of the Constitution, and 
property was safeguarded by its dictates, but again, the 
underlying purpose was protection from Government. 
If a newly emerging country wishes to duplicate the 
system of law in England, it would be adequate if there has 
been enough time for that country to build a foundation of 
trust over time that allows for a legal expectation to exist 
wherein the rights of the accused are accepted on a cultural 
level and imbedded into the country's tradition. However, 
absent this long legal history, it appears the United 
States' model would be better suited in providing real and 
long-term protection to that country's citizens. 
Outbreaks of crime, or severe increases in criminal 
activity do not place the general population in jeopardy, 
witness the use of intrusive wire-taps and organized crime. 
If there is to be a danger to the Bill of Rights, that 
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danger will come from the area from which the original 
protection emanated -- economic concerns. Economic concerns 
have the face of Government on them, and it is that face the 
population will see if economic prosperity is no longer a 
reality. The Government may have to act in such a fashion 
that the Bill of Rights, which is guaranteed by the 
Government, may be set aside to effect control of a 
population that is disenchanted with the economic outlook 
and realities. 
A written Constitution is a constant reminder to both 
the people and the Government of the political contract that 
exists between them. The written word becomes part of the 
political expectations of the people and it is incorporated 
into its culture. It becomes referred to on a day-to-day 
basis, and children are informed of its value at an early 
age in their education. In short, the population 
"internalizes" the Constitution and its protections, 
especially if it has served them well for over two hundred 
years. To attempt any change in the protections provided 
would cause alarm and concern in the people, even if the 
touted reasons for the change were serious in nature. As 
stated earlier, the different competing demographic groups 
would all consider such changes in relationship as to how 
they themselves would be affected. Rarely, if ever, could 
such an undertaking be viewed without a considerable degree 
of suspicion and distrust. The polling data also indicated 
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that the population was willing to concede "Exclusionary- 
Rule" protection while it was less eager to relinquish 
"Miranda" protections.16 This is most likely a by-product 
of the people realizing that they can be searched against 
their will provided certain criteria are maintained, and any 
evidence properly obtained can be used against them. The 
right to silence offers protection even if it is 
circumvented by the various grants of immunity, for then the 
evidence obtained through such a grant of immunity is 
prohibited for the prosecution of the accused. 
In the final analysis, it is determined that the 
protection afforded under the system in the United States is 
superior to the English protection because of two facts. 
First, the protection is codified in a written Bill of 
Rights and, second, the process to alter this document is a 
long procedure with many safeguards available. Although the 
United States Supreme Court can set aside the provisions of 
protection, the Supreme Court cannot alter the basic 
document. This provides underlying protection allowing for 
minor changes by the Supreme Court. Even if the Supreme 
Court were to rule major changes in the protection granted, 
the Supreme Court cannot effect a major change in the Bill 
of Rights that would be viable for a significant period of 
time. To restate the English position, a new law by 
16"Ohioans Support Suspects' Constitutional Rights," 
Regional News (Cincinnati), 28 July, 1987. p. B4 . 
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Parliament would eliminate, or create, a new doctrine in but 
a single step. 
APPENDIX 1 
THE USE OF IMMUNITY 
A state or the federal government is not obligated to 
plea-bargain or grant immunity. But it is sometimes 
necessary in order to obtain the evidence and witnesses 
needed to obtain a criminal conviction in a court. 
Pocket Immunity 
Immunity is a promise not to prosecute for the named crime 
in return for the cooperation of the person in the manner 
agreed upon in the immunity agreement. The immunity granted 
could be "pocket immunity," which was described by the Sixth 
Circuit in the 1991 case of Turner v. United States. 936 F. 
2d 221, 223, as: 
. . . This informal immunity arises by way of assurances by 
prosecutors, either orally or by letter, to a potential 
grand jury witness that he will be immune from any 
prosecution based upon that testimony. Such decisions are 
made informally, outside the supervision of a court. The 
legality of granting informal immunity has been upheld in a 
number of circuits. . . . 
. . . Pocket immunity is nothing more than a promise on the 
part of the prosecutor that they would not be charged in 
that district and that their testimony would not be 
disseminated to other government agencies. Such promises of 
"immunity" are contractual in nature and do not bind other 
parties not privy to the original agreement. 
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Federal Statutory Immunity 
The Sixth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals described federal 
statutory immunity as follows in 1991: 
. . . The federal immunity statute prohibits the compelled 
testimony of a witness from being used against him "in any 
criminal case. ..." Immunity of Witnesses Act, para. 
201(a), 18 U.S.C. para. para. 6001-6005. In order for a 
federal prosecutor to grant this type of immunity, he must 
receive approval from both the United States Attorney in the 
relevant judicial district, and from a high-ranking official 
in the Justice Department; the immunity grant must also be 
approved by a federal district judge. See 18 U.S.C. para. 
6003. This immunity assures a witness that his immunized 
testimony will be inadmissible in any future criminal 
proceeding, as will be any evidence obtained by prosecutors 
directly or indirectly as a result of the immunized 
testimony. 18 U.S.C. para 6002. 
In Kas.t.igar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 s.ct. 1653, 
32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972), the Supreme Court held that when a 
witness who has given incriminating testimony under a grant 
of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. para 6002 is subsequently 
prosecuted for a matter related tot he compelled testimony, 
the government bears "the heavy burden of proving that all 
of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from 
legitimate independent sources." Ici. at 4 61, 92 S. Ct. at 
1665. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York. 378 
U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1964). 936 F. 2d 
at 223. 
Compelled or Forced Testimony 
Legislative bodies (the U.S. Congress and state 
legislatures) have the power to grant immunity, as do 
federal and state prosecutors. In most instances, witnesses 
receiving immunity voluntarily enter into an immunity 
agreement. 
Source : Thomas J. Gardner and Terry M. Anderson, Criminal 
Evidence : Principles and Cases. 3rd ed. (Minneapolis/St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company, 1988), Introduction. 
APPENDIX 2 
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF - INCRIMINATIQN 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
ratified in 1791, states "No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . 
In tracing the origins and roots of the Fifth Amendment's 
right to remain silent, the United States Supreme Court 
pointed out in the case of Miranda v. Arizona that the 
privilege's "roots go back into ancient times," and probably 
has origins in the Bible. 
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self- 
incrimination is the only privilege given constitutional 
protection. All other privileges exist only by statutory or 
common law. In 1896, the United States Supreme Court 
pointed this out in the case of Brown v. Walker. 161 U.S. 
591, 597, 16 S.Ct. 644, 647. 
The privilege "protects a person . . . against being 
incriminated by his own compelled testimonial 
communications." Fisher v. United States 425 U.S. 391, 409, 
96 S.Ct. 1569,1580 (1976). Because statements made by a 
person in any civil hearing or questioning might later be 
used against that person in a criminal proceeding, the 
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United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
privilege "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or 
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory." Kastigar v. United States. 406 U.S. 441, 
444, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1656 (1972). The privilege has thus 
been invoked, for example, in divorce and tax cases as well 
as in criminal cases and questioning by law enforcement 
officers. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
privilege against self-incrimination "reflects many of our 
fundamental values and noble aspirations." Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm.. 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. at 1594, 1596 
(1964). Because it is "the essential mainstay of our 
adversary system," the United States Constitution requires 
"that the government seeking to punish an individual produce 
the evidence against him by its own independent labor rather 
than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from 
his own mouth." Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 
S.Ct. at 1602, 1620 (1966). 
Immunity and the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination 
Under state and Federal statutes, prosecutors and 
legislative bodies may grant immunity to witnesses in order 
to encourage or compel the witness to testify. The grant of 
immunity means the witness can no longer be charged with the 
crime for which the immunity is granted, eliminating the 
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possibility of incrimination and the need for Fifth 
Amendment privilege of protection against self¬ 
incrimination . 
Statutes that 
In some areas state or Federal governments grant 
immunity by statute. For example, several states create a 
statutory privilege for statements made to a police officer 
after a motor vehicle accident has occurred. 
Source : Thomas J. Gardner and Terry M. Anderson, 
Criminal Evidence: Principles and Cases 3rd ed. 
(Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1988), 
Introduction. 
APPENDIX 3 
AREAS WHERE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF - INCRIMINATION DOES NOT APPLY 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
applies only to evidence of a communicative or testimonial 
nature. It does not apply when only physical evidence is 
sought and obtained. Seizure of physical evidence is 
controlled by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Thus, the privilege against self¬ 
incrimination does not apply in the following circumstances: 
A. A witness could testify that the defendant was compelled 
to put on a shirt and it fit him. Holt v. United 
States. 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2 (1910). (Would apply 
to any clothing or hat.) 
B. The withdrawal of blood and use as evidence to show the 
defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of 
accident was approved by the United States Supreme Court 
in Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826 
(1966). 
C. The use of a handwriting exemplar, or sample, was held 
to be controlled by the Fourth Amendment by the United 
States Supreme Court in Gilber v. California. 388 U.S. 
263 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967). 
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D. Compelling the accused to exhibit his person for 
observation, as in a lineup or showup. United States v. 
Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967). 
E. To make a voice exemplar, or sample. United States v. 
Dionisio. 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973). 
F. Federal Courts of Appeal have held that no Fifth 
Amendment violation occurred where the defendant was 
compelled to wear a false goatee, United States v. 
Hammond. 419 F. 2d 166, 168 (4th Cir. 1969), cert, 
denied, 397 U.S. 1068, 90 S.Ct. 1508 (1970); to wear a 
wig, United States v. Murray. 523 F. 2d 489, 492 (8th 
Cir. 1975); to shave for identification purposes, United 
States v. Valenzuela. 722 F. 2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 
1983); to put on a stocking mask at trial to permit a 
witness to testify as to similarity to the masked 
robber, United States v. Roberts. 481 F. 2d 892 (5th 
Cir. 1973); or to dye her or his hair to the color it 
was at the time of the offense, United States v. Brown. 
920 F. 2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1991). 
G. To corporations and organizations (the Fifth Amendment 
applies to persons only). George Campbell Painting Corp. 
v. Reid. 392 U.S. 286, 88 S. Ct. 1978 (1968); United 
States v. Doe. 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237 (1984); 
United States v. White 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248 
(1944), held that an unincorporated union did not have 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
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H. To records required for the benefit of the public, or 
records subject to public inspection. In Shapiro v. 
United States. 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948), the 
records were required by law of transactions subject to 
government regulation. 
I. Where immunity has been granted and the person is 
compelled to testify or agrees to testify as part of a 
plea agreement. 
J. Where the incrimination is of others and is not self¬ 
incrimination. Bursey v. United States. 466 F. 2d 1059 
(9th Cir. 1972). 
K. Where the public interest in protecting children from 
abuse outweighs Fifth Amendment privilege. After a 
small child had received numerous physical injuries and 
the child's mother was seen abusing the child, the 
mother was ordered to disclose the location of the 
child. The mother was jailed on contempt when she would 
not do so. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
contempt sentence in Baltimore Department of Social 
Services v. Bouknight. 493 U.S. 549, 110 S.Ct. 900 
(1990) . 
L. Where military service person failed to report drug use 
of other service personnel and was convicted of 
dereliction of duty. Defense that other personnel might 
retaliate and report Medley failed. United States v. 
Medley. 33 M.J. 75 (1991), review denied United States 
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Supreme Court, U.S., 112 S. Ct. 1473, 50 CrL 3199 
(1992) . The Fifth Amendment privilege would apply had 
the service person been a party to the crime of drug 
use. United States v. Heyward. 22 M.J. 35 (C.M.A. 
1986) . 
M. Where there has been a voluntary, intelligent waiver of 
the privilege. 
Source : Thomas J. Gardner and Terry M. Anderson, 
Criminal Evidence: Principles and Cases 3rd ed. 
(Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1988), 
Introduction. 
APPENDIX 4 
ENGLAND - SELF INCRIMINATION 
A. In any proceedings in which a court is hearing an 
application for an order under Part IV or V, no person 
shall be excused from: 
1. giving evidence on any matter; or 
2. answering any question put to him in the course of 
his giving evidence 
on the ground that doing so might incriminate him or his 
spouse of an offence. 
B. A statement or admission made in such proceedings shall 
not be admissible in evidence against the person making 
it or his spouse in proceedings for an offence other 
than perjury. 
Source : Children Act 1989 (c41) . Part XII Miscellaneous 
and General: Jurisdiction and Procedure, etc., Section: 98 
Self -Incrimination. 16 November 1989. 
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APPENDIX 5 
ENGLAND - WITHDRAWAL OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
INCRIMINATION OF SELF OR SPOUSE IN 
CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS 
A. In any proceedings to which this subsection applies a 
person shall not be excused, by reason that to do so 
would tend to expose that person, or his or her spouse, 
to proceedings for a related offence or for the recovery 
of a related penalty: 
1. from answering any question put to that person in 
the first-mentioned proceedings; or 
2. from complying with any order made in those 
proceedings 
B. Subsection (A) applies to the following civil 
proceedings in the High Court, namely: 
1. proceedings for infringement of rights pertaining to 
any intellectual property or for passing off 
2. proceedings brought to obtain disclosure of 
information relating to any infringement of such 
rights or to any passing off; and 
3 . proceedings brought to prevent any apprehended 




C. Subject to subsection (D), no statement or admission 
made by a person: 
1. in answering a question put to him in any 
proceedings to which subsection (A) applies; or 
2. in complying with any order made in any such 
proceedings 
shall, in proceedings for any related offence or for the 
recovery of any related penalty, be admissible in 
evidence against that person or (unless they married 
after the making of the statement or admission) against 
the spouse of that person. 
D. Nothing in subsection (C) shall render any statement or 
admission made by a person as there mentioned 
inadmissible in evidence against that person in 
proceedings for perjury or contempt of court. 
E. In this section 
"intellectual property" means any patent, trade mark, 
copyright (design right), registered design, technical 
or commercial information or other intellectual 
property; 
"related offence" in relation to any proceedings to 
which subsection (A) applies, means: 
1. in the case of proceedings within subsection (B)(1) 
or (2) 
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a) any offence committed by or in the course of 
the infringement or passing off to which 
those proceedings relate; or 
b) any offence not within sub-paragraph (a) 
committed in connection with that 
infringement or passing off, being an offence 
involving fraud or dishonesty 
2. in the case of proceedings within subsection (B)(3), 
any offence revealed by the facts on which the 
plaintiff relies in those proceedings; 
"related penalty," in relation to any proceedings to 
which subsection (A) applies means: 
1. in the case of proceedings within subsection (B) (1) 
or (2), any penalty incurred in respect of anything 
done or omitted in connection with the infringement 
or passing off to which those proceedings relate 
2) in the case of proceedings within subsection (B) 
(3), any penalty incurred in respect of any act or 
omission revealed by the facts on which the 
plaintiff relies in those proceedings. 
F. Any reference in this section to civil proceedings in 
the High Court of any description includes a reference 
to proceedings on appeal arising out of civil 
proceedings in the High Court of that description. 
Source : Supreme Court Act 1981 (c54) . Part III Practice 
and Procedure: The High Court: Other Provisions, Section: 72 
Withdrawal of Privilege against Incrimination of Self or 
Spouse in Certain Proceedings. 18 July 1981. 
APPENDIX 6 
ENGLAND - PRIVILEGE AGAINST INCRIMINATION 
OF SELF OR SPOUSE IN CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS 
A. The right of a person in any legal proceedings other 
than criminal proceedings to refuse to answer any 
question or produce any document or thing if to do so 
would tend to expose that person to proceedings for an 
offence or for the recovery of a penalty: 
1. shall apply only as regards criminal offences under 
the law of any part of the United Kingdom and 
penalties provided for by such law; and 
2. shall include a like right to refuse to answer any 
question or produce any document or thing if to do 
so would tend to expose the husband or wife of that 
person to proceedings for any such criminal offence 
or for the recovery of any such penalty. 
B. In so far as any existing enactment conferring (in 
whatever words) powers of inspection or investigation 
confers on a person (in whatever words) any right 
otherwise than in criminal proceedings to refuse to 
answer any question or give any evidence tending to 
incriminate that person, subsection (A) above shall 
apply to that right as it applies to the right described 
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in that subsection; and every such existing enactment 
shall be construed accordingly. 
C. In so far as any existing enactment provides (in 
whatever words) that in any proceedings other than 
criminal proceedings a person shall not be excused from 
answering any question or giving any evidence on the 
ground that to do so may incriminate that person, that 
enactment shall be construed as providing also that in 
such proceedings a person shall not be excused from 
answering any question or giving any evidence on the 
ground that to do so may incriminate the husband or wife 
of that person. 
D. Where any existing enactment (however worded) that: 
1. confers powers of inspection or investigation; or 
2. provides as mentioned in subsection (C) above, 
further provides (in whatever words) that any answer or 
evidence given by a person shall not be admissible in 
evidence against that person in any proceedings or class 
of proceedings (however described, and whether criminal 
or not), that enactment shall be construed as providing 
also that any answer or evidence given by that person 
shall not be admissible in evidence against the husband 
or wife of that person in the proceedings or class of 
proceedings in question. 
E. In this section "existing enactment" means any enactment 
passed before this Act; and the references to giving 
252 
evidence are references to giving evidence in any 
manner, whether by furnishing information, making 
discovery, producing documents or otherwise. 
Source : Civil Evidence Act 1968 (c64) . Part II 
Miscellaneous and General: Privilege, Section: 14 Privilege 
against Incrimination of Self or Spouse. 25 October 1968. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Allen, Ronald J., and Kuhns, Richard B. Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure; An Examination of the Fourth. Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendments and Related Areas• 2nd ed. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1991. 
Almond, Gabriel A., and Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. gen. eds. 
Comparative Politics.. Today ; A World View 5th ed. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistic 
Manual of Mental Disorders. 3rd ed. rev. Washington, DC: 
American Psychiatric Association, 1987. 
Anderson, Terence, and Twining, William. Analysis of 
Evidence: How to Do Things with Facts Based on Wigmore's 
"Science of Judicial Proof". Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1991. 
Bacon, Francis, Sir. The Elements of the Common Lawes of 
England. London: Assignes of I. More Esq. 1630; reprint 
ed. New York: Da Capo Press, 1969. 
Baker, J.H. An Introduction to English Legal History. 2nd 
ed. London: Butterworth, 1979. 
Bartol, Curt R. Psychology and American Law. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1983. 
Bertsch, Gary K.; Clark, Robert P.; and Wood, David M. 
Comparing Political Systems: Power and Policy in Three 
Worlds. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1991. 
Bill, James A., and Hardgrave, Robert L. Jr. Comparative 
Politics: The Quest for Theory. Merrill Political 
Science Series. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill 
Publishing Company, 1973. 
Billias, George Athan, ed. Law and Authority in Colonial 




Black, Henry Campbell. Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1990. 
Bodenhamer, David J. Fair Trial: Rights of the Accused in 
American History. New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
Bracton. Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England. 
Translated by Samuel E. Thorne, vol. I. Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968. 
 . Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England. 
Translated by Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968. 
Brant, Irving. The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. 
Brown, C.R.; Maxwell, P.A.; and Maxwell L.F. comps. Canadian 
and British-American Colonial Law: From Earliest Times 
to December. 1956. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1957. 
Bryson, William Hamilton. Census of Law Books in Colonial 
Virginia. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1978 . 
Burton, Steven J. An Introduction to Law and Legal 
Reasoning. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985. 
Caenegem, R.C. van. The Birth of the English Common Law. 2nd 
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Calvi, James V., and Coleman, Susan. American Law and Legal 
Systems. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1992 . 
Cameron, Iain. The Protective Principle of International 
Criminal Jurisdiction. London: Ashgate, 1994. 
Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: The 
Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994 . 
Coquillette, Daniel R., ed. Law in Colonial Massachusetts. 
1680-1800: A Conference held 6 and 7 November 19-8.1 bv 
the Colonial Society of Massachusetts. Boston: Colonial 
Society of Massachusetts, 1984. 
Coulton, George Gordon. Inquisition and Liberty. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1959. 
255 
Curtis, Michael, ed. Introduction to Comparative Government. 
3rd ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 
1993 . 
Danziger, James N. Understanding The Political World: A 
Comparative Introduction to Political Science. 2nd ed. 
White Plains, NY: Longman, 1994. 
David, Rene, and Brierley, John E.C. Major Legal Systems in 
the World Today. London: Stevens & Sons, 1985. 
Del Carmen, Rolando V. Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice. 
2nd ed. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing 
Company, 1987. 
Dudley, William, ed. The Creation of the Constitution: 
Opposing Viewpoints. American History Series. San Diego, 
CA: Greenhaven Press, 1995. 
Dunham, Roger G., and Alpert, Geoffrey P. Critical Issues 
in Policing: Contemporary Readings. Prospect Heights, 
IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1989. 
Dunn, John. The Political Thought of John Locke: An 
Historical Account of The Argument of The "Two Treatises 
of Government". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969. 
Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Law In America : How and 
Why It Works. New York: Bantam Books, 1979. 
Elton, Geoffrey R. Star Chamber Stories. London: Methuen & 
Co. Ltd., 1983. 
Epstein, Lee, and Walker, Thomas G. Constitutional Law for a 
Changing America: Rights. Liberties, and Justice. 
Washington, DC: CQ Press Division of Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1992. 
Finch, Henry, Sir. A Summary of the Common Law of England. 
London: 1654; Wingate, Edmund. The Body of the Common 
Law of England. London: 1655; Phillipps, William. The 
Principles of Law Reduced to Practice London: 1660; 
reprint ed. of 3 works, New York: Garland, 1979. 
Gardner, Thomas J., and Anderson, Terry M. Criminal 
Evidence: Principles and Cases. 3rd ed. St. Paul, MN: 
West Publishing Company, 1995. 
Goebel, Julius, and Naughton, T. Raymond. Law Enforcement in 
Colonial New York: A Study in Criminal Procedure (1664- 
1776).Montclair. NJ: Patterson Smith, 1970. 
256 
Gray, Jeffrey. The Psychology of Fear and Stress. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971. 
Hagan, Frank E. Research Methods in Criminal Justice and 
Criminology. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1989. 
Hale, Matthew, Sir. The History of the Common Law of 
England. Introduction by Charles M. Gray, ed. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971. 
Hall, Calvin S., and Lindzey, Gardner. Theories of 
Personality. 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. 
Hauss, Charles. Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to 
Global Challenges. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 
Company, 1994. 
Hartog, Hendrik, ed. Law in the American Revolution and the 
Revolution in the Law: A Collection of Review Essays on 
American Legal History. New York University School of 
Law Series in Legal History, no. 3. New York: New York 
University Press, 1981. 
Hawles, Sir J. Justices and Juries in Colonial America: Two 
Accounts. 1680-1722. American Law: The Formative Years 
Series. New York: Arno Press, 1972. 
Heath, James. Torture and English Law: An Administrative and 
Legal History from the Plantagenets to the Stuarts. 
Contributions in Legal Studies, No. 18. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1982. 
Hoffer, Peter Charles. Law and People in Colonial America. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992. 
Howland, Arthur C., ed. Translations and Reprints From the 
Original Sources of European History. Philadelphia, PA: 
The Department of History of the University of 
Pennsylvania, 1898. Vol. 4: Ordeals. Compurgation. 
Excommunication and Interdict. 
Hroch, Miroslav, and Skybova, Anna. Ecclesia Militans: The 
Inquisition. Translated by Janet Fraser. Dorset Press, 
1990 . 
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968. 
Kamisar, Yale et al. Basic Criminal Procedure. St. Paul, 
MN.: West Publishing Co., 1994. 
257 
Kamisar, Yale; LaFave, Wayne R.; and Israel, Jerold H. 
Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases. Comments and 
Questions. 7th ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 
1990 . 
Klein, Irving J. Constitutional Law for Criminal Justice 
Professionals. Vol. 2, 2nd ed. Miami, FL: Coral Gables 
Publishing Co., 1986. 
 • 133.3 .Supplement to Constitutional Law for Criminal 
Justice Professionals. 2nd ed., Miami, FL: Coral Gables 
Publishing Co., 1989. 
 • 1990 Supplement to Constitutional Law for Criminal 
Justice Professionals. 2nd ed. , Miami, FL: Coral Gables 
Publishing Co., 1990. 
Klotter, John C., and Kanovitz, Jacqueline R. Constitutional 
Law. 6th ed. Justice Administration Legal Series. 
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 1991. 
Kocourek, Albert, and Wigmore, John H., comps. Evolution of 
Law: Select Readings on the Origin and Development of 
Legal Institutions. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 
1915. Vol. II: Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions. 
Langbein, John H. Torture and the Law of Proof : Europe and 
England in the Ancien Regime. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1977. 
Lea, Henry Charles. Torture. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 1973. 
Lilburn, John. Londons Liberty: In Chains Discovered. 
London: By the author, Tower of London, 1646. 
Lobban, Michael. The Common Law and English Jurisprudence. 
1760-1850. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991. 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 2 
vols. 17th ed. London: For John Beecroft, No. 23, Pater- 
noster-Row, 1775. 
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter 
Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Lykken, David Thorson. A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and 
Abuses of the Lie Detector. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. 
Mace, George. Locke. Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers: An 
Essay on the Genesis of the American Political Heritage. 
258 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1979. 
Macridis, Roy C., and Burg, Steven L. Introduction to 
Comparative Politics: Regimes and Change. 2nd ed. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1991. 
Madison, James; Hamilton, Alexander; and Jay, John. The 
Federalist: A Collection of Essays. Written in Favour of 
the New Constitution, as Agreed Upon bv the Federal 
Convention. September 17. 1787. New York: J. and A. 
McLean, 1788; reprint ed., The Federalist Papers. 
Introduction by Isaac Kramnick. New York: Penguin Books, 
1987 . 
Mahler, Gregory S. Comparative Politics: An Institutional 
and Cross-National Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1995. 
Mason, Alpheus Thomas; Beaney, William M.; and Stephenson, 
Donald Grier, Jr. American Constitutional Law: 
Introductory Essays and Selected Cases. 7th ed. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983. 
Maxwell, W. Harold, and Brown C.R. comps. A Complete List of 
British and Colonial Law Reports and Legal Periodicals: 
Arranged in Alphabetical and in Chronological Order with 
Bibliographical Notes: With a Check List of Canadian 
Statutes. 3rd ed. Toronto, Ont.: Carswell Co., 1937. 
Meltzer, Milton. The Bill of Rights: How We Got It and What 
It Means. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1990. 
Mendelson, Wallace. The American Constitution and Civil 
Liberties. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1981. 
Nass, Gilbert D.; Libby, Roger W.; and Fisher, Mary Pat. 
Sexual Choices: An Introduction to Human Sexuality. 
Monterey, CA: Wadsworth Health Sciences Division of 
Wadsworth, Inc., 1981. 
O'Brien, David M. Constitutional Law and Politics. Vol. 1: 
Struggles for Power and Governmental Accountability. 2nd 
ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. 
 . Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American 
Politics. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990. 
Parry, L.A. The History of Torture in England. Patterson 
Smith Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement, and Social 
Problems, No. 180. London: Sampson Low. Marston & Co., 
259 
Ltd., 1934; reprint ed., Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith 
Publishing Corporation, 1975. 
Patterson, Thomas E. We the People: A Concise Introduction 
to American Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995. 
Peltason, J.W. Corwin & Peltason's Understanding the 
Constitution. 11th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1988. 
Pennypacker, Samuel Whitaker. Pennsylvania Colonial Cases: 
The Administration of Law in Pennsylvania prior to A.D. 
1700 as shown in the Cases Decided and in the Court 
Proceedings. Philadelphia: R. Welsh, 1892. 
Peters, Edward. Torture. New Perspectives on the Past 
Series. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985; reprint ed., 
New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986. 
Plucknett, Theodore F.T. A Concise History of the Common Law 
5th ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. 
Reid, John E., and Inbau, Fred E. Truth and Deception: The 
Polygraph Technique 2nd ed. Baltimore: The Williams & 
Wilkins Company, 1977. 
Rhyne, Charles S. Law and Judicial Systems of Nations. 3rd 
ed. Washington, DC: The World Peace Through Law Center, 
1978 . 
Riechel, Philip L. Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: A 
Topical Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 
Career & Technology, 1994. 
Rose, Richard. Politics in England: Chance and Persistence. 
5th ed. Little, Brown Series in Political Science. 
Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989. 
Royal, Robert F., and Schutt, Steven R. The Gentle Art of 
Interviewing and Interrogation: A Professional Manual 
and Guide. Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1976 . 
Russell, Elmer Beecher. The Review of American Colonial 
législation bv the King in Council. Historial Writings 
in Law and Jurisprudence Series. New York: Columbia 
University, 1915; reprint ed., Buffalo: W.S. Hein, 1981. 
Ruthven, Malise. Torture: The Grand Conspiracy. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1978. 
260 
Rutland, Robert Allen. The Birth of the Bill of Rights 1776- 
1791. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983. 
Samaha, Joel. Criminal Procedure. 2nd ed. St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Company, 1993. 
Scheb, John M., and Scheb, John M. II. Criminal Law and 
Procedure. 2nd ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 
Company, 1993. 
Scott, Arthur Pearson. Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia. 
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1930. 
Scott, George Ryley. The History of Torture Throughout the 
Ages. London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd, 1940; reprint ed., 
Gateshead on Tyne: Northumberland Press Limited, 1941. 
Selden Society. Select Cases Before the King's Council in 
The Star Chamber commonly called The Court of Star 
Chamber A.D. 1477-1509. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1903. 
Seliger, M. The Liberal Politics of John Locke.. New York, 
NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969. 
Selye, Hans. The Stress of Life, rev. ed. New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Co., 1978. 
Shively, W. Phillips. Power and Choice: An Introduction to 
Political Science. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1995. 
Smith, P.F., and Bailey, S.H. The Modern English Legal 
System. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984. 
Suedfeld, Peter, ed. Psychology and Torture. New York: 
Hemisphere Publishing Corp., 1990. 
Taylor, Ralph B. Research Methods in Criminal Justice. New 
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994. 
Terrill, Richard J. World Criminal Justice Systems: A 
Survey. 2nd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 
1992 . 
Ulmer, S. Sidney. Supreme Court Policymaking and 
Constitutional Law. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1986 . 
von Mehren, Arthur Taylor, and Gordley, James Russell. The 
Civil Law System. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1977. 
261 
Waltz, Jon R. Introduction to Criminal Evidence. 3rd ed. 
Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1991; reprint ed., 
1992. 
Weston, Paul B.; Wells, Kenneth M.; and Hertoghe, Marlene E. 
Criminal Evidence for Police. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1995. 
Wasby, Stephen L. The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial 
System. 3rd ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1988; 
reprint ed., 1989. 
Wigmore, John Henry. Evidence in Trials at Common Law vol. 
3. Revised by James H. Chadbourne. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1970. 
 . A Kaleidoscope of Justice Containing Authentic 
Accounts of Trial Scenes from all Times and Climes. 
Washington, DC: Washington Law Book Co., 1941. 
 . A Pocket Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials 
at Law. Massachusetts Edition by Charles N. Harris. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1915. 
 . The Principles of Judicial Proof as Given by 
Logic. Psychology, and General Experience. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1913. 
 . The Principles of Judicial Proof or The Process of 
Proof as given by Logic, Psychology, and General 
Experience and illustrated in Judicial Trials. 2nd ed. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1931. 
Reports - Published 
Amnesty International. Report on Torture. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1974. 
Gardner, J.P. Aspects of Incorporation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights into Domestic Law London: 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
(1993) . 
Articles in Journals or Magazines 
Almond, Gabriel. "Comparative Political Systems." Journal of 
Politics Vol. 18 (1956): 391-409. 
Amar, Akhil Reed, and Lettow, Renee B. "Fifth Amendment 
First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause." 
262 
Michigan Law Review Vol. 93, No. 5 (March 1995) : 857- 
928 . 
Berger, Mark. "Legislating Confession Law in Great Britain: 
A Statutory Approach to Police Interrogations." 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Vol. 24, 
Issue 1 (Fall 1990): 1-64. 
Bodenhamer, David J. "Fair Trial: Rights of the Accused in 
American History." 106 Harvard Law Review 1236 (March 
1993): 173. 
Brzezinski, Mark F. "The Emergence of Judicial Review in 
Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland." American Journal of 
Comparative Law 41 (Spring 1993): 153-200. 
Cassell, Paul G. "Miranda's Social Cost: An Empirical 
Reassessment." Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 
90, No. 2 (1996). 
Cassell, Paul G., and Hayman, Bret S. "Police Interrogation 
in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of 
Miranda." 43 UCLA Law Review 001 (1996): 1-103. 
Craver, Charles B. "The Inquisitorial Process in Private 
Employment." Cornell Law Review 63 (1977): 1-64. 
DiChiara, Albert, and Galliher, John F. "Thirty Years of 
Deterrence Research: Characteristics, Causes, and 
Consequences." Contemporary Crises Vol. 8, No. 3 (1984): 
243-263 . 
Feldman, David; Jackson, Gordon; Dixon, David; and others. 
"Criminal Investigation - Reform and Control." Anglo- 
American Law Review 20(1) (1991): 1-79. 
Fenwick, H. "Confessions, Recording Rules and Miscarriages 
of Justice: A Mistaken Emphasis?" Criminal Law Review 
(March 1993): 174-184. 
Geyh, Charles Gardner. "The Testimonial Component of the 
Right against Self-Incrimination." 36 The Catholic 
University Law Review 611 (Spring 1987). 
Langbein, John H. "The Historical Origins of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law." 92 Michigan 
Law Review 1047 (1994): 1060-1062. 
LeFrancois, A.G. "On Exorcising the Exclusionary Demons - An 
Essay on Rhetoric, Principle, and the Exclusionary 
Rule." University of Cincinnati Law Review 53(1) (1984): 
49-112. 
263 
Ludwikowski, Rett R. "Constitution Making in the Countries 
of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Development." 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 23 
(Summer 1993): 155-267. 
McKinnon, Murlene E. "A Guide to Nonverbal Deception 
Indicators." Law and Order (January 1982) : 5-14. 
Maguire, Brendan. "The Police in the 1800s: A Three City 
Analysis." Journal of Crime and Justice Vol. 13, No. 1 
(1990): 103-132. 
Malone, Patrick A. "'You have the Right to Remain Silent': 
Miranda after Twenty Years." American Scholar 55 
(Summer 1986): 367-80. 
Manfredi, Christopher P. "The Canadian Supreme Court and 
American Judicial Review: United States Constitutional 
Jurisprudence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms." American Journal of Comparative Law 40 
(Winter 1992): 213-35 
Moglen, Eben. "Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins 
of the Constitutional Privilege against Self- 
Incrimination." 92 Michigan Law Review 1086. 82-95. 
Moston, S.; Stephenson, G.M.; and Williamson, T.M. "The 
Incidence, Antecedents and Consequences of The Use of 
The Right to Silence During Police Questioning." 
Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 3/1 (1993): 30-47. 
Sage, Yves-Louis. "The 1990 French Laws on the Legal 
Profession." American Journal of Comparative Law 41 
(Fall 1993) : 649-666. 
Sherman, Lawrence W. "Enforcement Workshop: The Boundaries 
of Interrogation." Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 15, No. 1 
(Jan/Feb. 1979): 3-10. 
Strasser, Fred. "Perceptions and Reality; Crime in America." 
National Law Journal (7 August 1989): 52. 
Talbot, C.K. "Towards a Criminology of Literature." 
Crimecare Journal Vol. 4, No. 2 (1988): 142-169. 
Utter, Robert F. "Comparative Aspects of Judicial Review: 
Issues facing the New European States." Judicature 77 
(March/April 1994): 249-247. 
 . "Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative 
264 
Perspective." Ohio State Law Journal 54, No. 3 (1993): 
559-606. 
Van Kessel, Gordon. "The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial 
Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American 
Approaches." The Hastings Law Journal Vol. 38:1 (Nov. 
1986) . 
Wicklander, Douglas E. "Behavioral Interviews to a 
Confession." The Police Chief (October 1979): 12-17. 
Young, Marianne Wilder. "The Need for Legal Aid Reform: A 
Comparison of English and American Legal Aid." Cornell 
International Law Journal 24 (Spring 1991): 379-405. 
Young, Thomas J. "Native American Crime and Criminal Justice 
Require Criminologists' Attention." Journal of Criminal 
Justice Education Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 111-126. 
Articles in Encyclopedias 
Encyclopedia Americana - International Edition. 1992 ed. 
S.v. "Ordeal." 
Encyclopedia Americana - International Edition, 1992 ed. 
S.v. "Torture," by Leonard D. Savitz. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 16. 14th ed. S.v. "Ordeal." 
Encyclopaedia of Religion. Vol. II. S.v. "Ordeal," by Dario 
Sabbatucci. 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. IX. S.v. 
"Ordeal," by A.E. Crawley; Th. W. Juynboll; S. Langdon; 
J.A. MacCulloch; R.F. Johnston; P. Vinogradoff; J.A. 
Selbie; A.B. Keith; E. Edwards; G. Grandidier; A.C. 
Pearson; and M.E. Seaton. 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion. 1979 ed. S.v. 
"Torture." 
Newspapers 
"A Modern Enactment of the Star Chamber." Independent. 9 
November, 1994. sec. 4, p. 6. 
"A Few Words of Caution - The Right to Silence." Daily 
Telegraph. 20 August, 1994. sec. 2, p. 1. 
265 
Bennetto, Jason. "New Police Caution Alarms Legal Experts." 
Independent■ 20 August, 1994. sec 4, p. 7. 
Brace, Matthew. "Life with the Criminal Justice Act." 
Independent. 14 November, 1994. sec. 4, p. 6. 
"British Lawyers Criticise New Police Caution." Reuter News 
Service -UK. 19 October, 1994. 
"Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill Published." Hermes-UK 
Government Press Release. 18 November 1994. 
"Curbing Right to silence a Failure." Reuter New Service - 
UK. 17 May, 1994. 
de Lisle, Charles. "Right to Silence' Rebels Defeated." 
Daily Telegraph. 24 May, 1994. sec. 1, p. 3. 
Ellingsen, Peter. "Britain's New Law and Disorder." The Age 
(Melbourne), 5 November, 1994. p. 11. 
Ferguson, Richard. "More of the Innocent will be at Risk - 
Right to Silence." The Times. 17 May, 1994, sec. 3, p. 
8 . 
"In Judgment on the Government." Independent. 29 November 
1994, sec. 4, p. 6. 
International Criminal. Police Review, March 1978. 
International Criminal Police Review. August/September 1978. 
Kane, Frank. "DTI Discredited - Business Focus. Sunday 
Times. 16 October, 1994, sec. 3, p. 11. 
Kohli, Sheel. "London Calling." South China Morning Post. 22 
September, 1994. p. 3. 
"Life with the Criminal Justice Act." Independent. 14 
January, 1994. 
Looch, Anthony. "Suspects to be Cautioned on Silence." Daily 
Telegraph. 8 July, 1994, sec. 1, p. 3. 
McGregor, Stephen. "Clash Over Right to Silence for 
Accused." Glasgow Herald. 30 November 1994, sec. B, p. 
1. 
McKain, Bruce. "Scots Law Experts Question Need for Silence 
Rule Change." Glasgow Herald. 28 October, 1994. sec. B. 
p. 1. 
266 
Mills, Heather, and Penman, Danny. "Bill Ends its Stormy 
Passage into Law." Independent. 4 November, 1994. sec. 
1, p. 3. 
"The Queen's Speech - Scotland." Independent. 17 November, 
1994, sec. 1, p. 3. 
"The Right to Silence - Criminal Justice Bill." Economist. 
p. 13 . 
Shaw, Terence. "Convictions Drop with the Removal of Right 
to Silence." Daily Telegraph. 17 May, 1994. sec. 1, p. 
5 . 
Travis, Alan. "Howard Patches Battered Bill." Guardian. 20 
October 1994. sec. 2, p. 1. 
Wynn-Davies, Patricia. "Peers May Force Change on Right to 
Silence." Independent. 20 May, 1994. sec. 1, p. 5. 
Theses and Other Papers 
Kibitlewski, Joseph L. "The Use of Psychology in 
Interrogation." Paper presented at the 55th annual 
meeting of the Mississippi Academy of Sciences, Jackson, 
MS., 22 February 1991. 
Reinsch, Paul Samuel. "English Common Law in the Early 
American Colonies." Thesis, Wisconsin University, 1899. 
United States Government Documents 
U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory. Final Report on Detection 
of Emotional Stress by Voice Analysis. Report No. LWL- 
CR-03B70. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. September 
1972 . 
United States Legal Citations 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1962, 91 L. 
Ed. 1093 (1947). 
Alston v. United States, 383 A. 2d 307 (D.C. 1978) . 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. Ed. 
2d 184 (1972). 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 
Ed. 2d 530 (1972) . 
32 L. 
267 
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 88 L. 
Ed. 1192 (1944). 
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 
46 CRL 2096 (1990). 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676, 2 L. Ed. 
2d 684 (1959). 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 1612 
(1976) . 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 
1595 (1942). 
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). 
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 44 L. Ed. 2d 
346 (1975). 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 
2d 416 (1975). 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. 
Ed. 682 (1936) . 
Brown v. State, 576 S.W. 2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S. Ct. 1623, 60 L. Ed. 
2d 96 (1979). 
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S. Ct. 3517, L. 
Ed. 2d 1275 (1983). 
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 464-65, 473-74 (1971). 
Cardarell v. United States, 375 F. 2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967). 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 
716 (1940) . 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987). 
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 132, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 
(1975) . 
268 
Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786. 
(1993) . 
Davis v. State, 501 S.W. 2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed 
2d 811 (1963). 
Douglas v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 221 (1979). 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. 
Ed. 2d 1669 (1960) . 
Ellis v. United States, 416 F. 2d 801 (1969). 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-491 (1964) . 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 
126 (1976). 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. 
Ed. 2d 562 (1975). 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S. Ct. 756, 5 L. Ed. 
2d 793 (1961). 
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900). 
Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S. Ct. 671, 7 L 
Ed. 2d 629 (1962) . 
Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923) . 
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). 
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S. Ct. 1209 (1962). 
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 96 S. Ct. 1178 
(1976) . 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed 
2d 799 (1963). 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) . 
Graves v. United States, 472 A. 2d 395 (D.C. 1984) . 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. 
Ed. 2d 199 (1957). 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
269 
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S. Ct. 709, 19 L. 
Ed. 2d 906 (1968). 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 
114 (1961). 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 10 L. 
Ed. 2d 513 (1963). 
Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979). 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). 
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). 
Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F. 2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978). 
Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P. 2d 382 (Cal. 1966). 
In Re Gault, 387 U.S.L. 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 
(1967) . 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 
1461 (1938). 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. 
Ed. 114 (1904). 
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 
2d 411 (1972) . 
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 55 L. Ed. 2d 319, 98 S. 
Ct. 1091 (1978). 
Letsinger v. United States, 402 A 2d 411 (1979). 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 28 L. 
Ed. 2d 404 (1971) . 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 
L. Ed. 819 (1943). 
Maine v. Moulton, 54 L.W. 4039 (1985). 
Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d. 
653 (1964). 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 Sup. Ct. 1356, 1 
L. Ed. 2d. 1479 (1957). 
270 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 368, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 
(1967) . 
Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S. Ct. 321, 46 L. Ed. 2d 
313 (1975). 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L. Ed. 
2d 182 (1974). 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 16 L. 
Ed. 2nd 644 (1966). 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n. 4 (1986). 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commisssion, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
Mustafa v. United States Parole Comm'n, 479 U.S. 953 (1986). 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 81 L. Ed. 
2d 550 (1984). 
Norris v. Alabama, 295 U.S. 587 (1935). 
O'Malley v. United States, 285 F. 2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 
1961). 
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 
409 U.S. 232, 93 S. Ct. 489, 34 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1972). 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 459 U.S. 966, 103 S. Ct. 292, 74 L. Ed. 
2d. 276, 51 L.W. 4940 (1983). 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 
2d 222 (1985). 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969). 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 58 L.W. 4817 (1990). 
People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 388 (1915). 
People v. Dorado, 398 P. 2d (Cal.) 381 U.S. 937 (1965). 
271 
People v. Gonzales, 120 Mise. 2d 62, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 471 
(1983) . 
People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y. 2d 235, 204 N.E. 2d 857, N.Y. 2d 
931 (1965). 
People v. Sloane, 143 Cal Rptr. 61 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1978). 
People v. Thompson, 193 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1983); 145 Cal. App. 
3d 918 (1983). 
People v. Watkins, 259 N.W. 2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). 
Philibosian v. Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, 
149 Cal. App. 3d 941, 197 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1984). 
Pillsbury v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983). 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
158 (1932). 
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S. Ct. 580, 29 L. Ed. 
615 (1886). 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 908 (1966). 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 
(1973) . 
Shepard v. Baron, 194 U.S. 553 (1903) . 
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949). 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) . 
State v. Cory, 62 Wash. 2d 371, 382 P. 2d 1019 (1963). 
State v. Halcomb, 3 NCA 169, (Neb. 1993) . 
State v. Smith, 362 N.E. 2d 1239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). 
State Ex Rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 P. 962 
(1913) . 
Stultz v. State, 500 S.W. 2d 853 (Tex. 1973) . 
Taylor v. Alabama, 247 U.S. 687, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 73 L. Ed. 
2d 314 (1982). 
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 
(1966). 
272 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 
(1958) . 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 
97 (1908). 
United States v. 
United States v. 










United States V . 
United States V . 
United States V . 
United States V . 
United States V . 




United States V . 
United States V . 
United States V . 




United States V . 
Vaughn v. United States, 364 A. 2d 1187 (D.C. 1976). 
Victoria v. State, 522 S.W. 2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
Wallace v. Jeffries, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2749, 86 L. Ed. 
2nd 29 (1985). 
273 
Weeks v. United States, 
Ed. 652 (1914). 
232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. 
Weems v. United States, 







377, 30 S. Ct. 544, 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Burnette 319 U.S 
624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943) . 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 
1782 (1949). 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S . 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L 
Ed. 2d 441 (1963). 
English Legal Citations 
A (A Minor) (Paternity: Refusal of Blood Test), In re 
[1994], 2 FLR 463. 
B v. B and E [1969], 1 WLR 1800; [1969] 3 All E.R. 1106, CA 
Burbury v. Jackson [1917], 1 KB 16, DC. 
CA and Turner v. Blunden [1986], Fam 120, DC. 
Daly v. General Medical Council [1952], 2 All E.R. 666, 
[1952] WN 413. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Gordon [1990], RTR 71, 
DC. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Warren [1993], RTR 58, 
65F, HL(E). 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Winstanley [1993], RTR 
222, DC. 
Edge v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1993], RTR 146, DC 
Fox v. Chief Constable of Gwent [1985], RTR 337, HL(E). 
Guinness PLC v. Saunders and others [1988], Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division). 
Hayes v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994], RTR 163, 
DC. 
JS (A Minor) (Declaration of Paternity), In re [1981], Fam 
22, [1981] 2 FLR 146, [1980] 3 WLR 984, [1980] 1 All 
E.R. 1061. 
274 
JW v. K (Proof of Paternity) [1988], 1 FLR 86. 
Johnson v. Chief Constable of Surrey [1992], Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division). 
Johnstone and others v. United Norwest Co-operatives Ltd. 
[1994], Court of Appeal (Civil Division). 
L (An Infant), In re [1968], P 119; [1967] 3 WLR 1149; 
[1967] 2 All E.R. 1110; [1968] P 119; [1967] 3 WLR 1645; 
[1968] 1 All E.R. 20, CA. 
Lam Chi-Ming and others v. The Queen [1991], 2 AC 212, 
[1991] 3 All E.R. 172, [1991] 2 WLR 1082, 93 Cr App Rep 
358 . 
McVeigh v. Beattie [1988], Fam 69, [1988] 2 All E.R. 500, 
[1988] 2 WLR 992, [1988] 2 FLR 67, [1988] Fam Law 290. 
Mash v. Darley [1914], 3 KB 1226, CA. 
Mead v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1993], RTR 151, DC. 
Morris v. Beardmore [1980], RTR 321, HL(E). 




Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] , 
[1994] RTR 241, 1 Cr App Rep 383. 
1 WLR 
Paterson v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1990], RTR 329, 
DC. 
Pine v. Collacott [1985], RTR 282. 
Police v. Rajandah Coomar Kristnamah [1993], Privy Council. 
Rank Film Distributors, Ltd. and others v. Video Information 
Centre and others. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [1982] 
AC 380, [1980] 2 All E.R. 273, [1980] 3 WLR 487, [1970] FSR 
242 . 
Reffell v. Morton [1906], 70 JP 347, DC. 
Reg v. Absolam [1989], 88 Cr App Rep 336. 
Reg v. Brine [1992], Crim LR 122. 
Reg v. Brody House of Lords [1982], AC 476, [1981] All E.R. 
705, [1983] 3 WLR 103, 73 Cr App Rep 287, 145. 
275 
Reg v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1988] 1 WLR 
1204; [1989] 1 All E.R. 151, DC. 
Reg v. Cooke, [1994], 1 Cr App Rep 318. 
Reg v. Flavell [1884], 14 QBD 364. 
Reg v. Greenwich London Borough Council, Ex parte Lovelace 
(No 2), [1992] QB 155, [1991] 3 WLR 1015, [1992] 1 All 
E.R 679 CA. 
Reg v. Hamand [1985], 82 Cr App Rep 65, [1985] Crim LR 375. 
Reg v. Kelt, (Criminal Division) [1994] 2 All E.R. 780, 99 
Cr App Rep 372. 
Reg v. King [1983], 1 All E.R. 929, [1983] 1 WLR 411. 
Reg v. Robb [1991], 93 Cr App Rep 161. 
Reg v. Sang [1979], 2 All E.R. 1222 at 1246, [1980] Ac 402 
at 455 per Lord Scarman. 
Reg v. Smith (Robert William) [1985], 81 Cr App Rep 286, CA. 
Reg v. Stipendiary Magistrates Ex parte Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office, Queens Bench Division. 
Reg v. Tottenham Justices Ex parte ML [1985], 82 Cr App Rep 
277 . 
Reg v. W (A minor) Court of Appeal (Civil Division). 
Reg v. Williams (Mark Alexander), Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) 156 JP 776. 
Reg v. Wood [1994], Crim LR 222. 
S v. S; W v. Official Solicitor [1972], AC 24, [1970] 3 WLR 
366, [1970] 2 All E.R. 107, HL. 
Sénat v. Sénat [1965], P 172; [1965] 2 WLR 981; [1965] 2 All 
E.R. 705. 
Serio v. Serio [1983], 4 FLR 756. 
Simpson v. Collinson [1964], 2 QB 80; [1964] 2 WLR 387; 
[1964] 1 All E.R. 262, CA. 
Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE and others 
v. Lundquist and others. Court of Appeal (Civil 
276 
Division) [1991] 2 QB 310, [1990] 3 All E.R. 283, [1991] 
2 WLR 280. 
Taylor and another v. Plymouth Argyle Football Co. Ltd. 
[1991] , Court of Appeal (Civil Division) . 
Thomas v. Jones [1921], 1 KB 22, CA. 
Turner v. Blunden [1986], Fam 120; [1986] 2 WLR 491; [1986] 
2 All E.R. 75, DC. 
W v. W (otherwise L) [1912], P 78. 
Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen [1980], AC 247, [1979] 1 Ail E.R. 
939, [1979] 2 WLR 81, 69 Cr App Rep 47. 
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944], KB 718, [1944] 1 
all E.R. 293, CA. 
